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ABSTRACT  
 Recent practice-based approaches to strategic decision-making research have 
emphasized the importance of gaining a deeper understanding how managers think, act, 
and interpret strategic decisions in practice.  This focus on the micro aspects of strategic 
decision-making has emerged from the critique that much of the ‘traditional’ decision-
making theory may not be actionable in practice.  Research should therefore 
concentrate on what managers do when they engage in strategic activities.  This 
practice-based perspective considers decision-making as a situated, context specific 
activity, and research into the enactment of decisions constitutes an important part of 
understanding decision-making.  Such micro focus may reveal insights to the 
similarities and differences between organizations and teams in the ways in which their 
members approach decision-making tasks. 
 Studies on decision-making as a situated activity provide valuable insight into 
managerial practice.  However, few studies focus on the role of epistemic objects in 
decision-making.  This thesis makes a contribution by investigating the role of epistemic 
objects as situated material artifacts in the collective decision-making context. Drawing 
on extensive review of the literature on epistemic objects, sociomateriality, causal maps, 
group decision-making, and managerial attribution biases, the thesis identifies an 
under-researched area in our understanding how epistemic objects interact with 
human activity in strategy making.   
 As an inductive research undertaking, the thesis makes a theoretical 
contribution to knowledge by developing a conceptual framework how causal maps as 
epistemic objects are enacted, interpreted, and used as a sociomaterial decision-making 
‘tool-in-use’ by actors.  The research reveals how the enactment of causal maps as a 
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‘safety net’ in collective decision-making increases cognitive conflict in decision-making 
groups that results in the consideration of multiple decision outcomes and the 
development of innovative solutions to decision problems.  The research also shows 
how the enactment of causal maps increases decision acceptance among the decision-
makers by making their individual knowledge claims visible to other group members, 
and by motivating them to work collectively towards a shared goal.  Furthermore, the 
research reveals how causal maps act as a ‘shock absorber’ by deflecting the decision-
makers’ frustration and anger away from personal confrontation among group 
members thereby preventing the emergence of affective conflict.  Finally, the research 
results indicate that the enactment of causal maps mitigates managerial biases such as 
groupthink and the escalation of commitment bias.  In terms of managerial contribution 
the thesis offers a deeper insight to the affordances of causal maps, and how managers 
can use causal mapping as a practical decision-making ‘tool-in-use’ to improve the 
quality of decision-making processes by structuring conversations and debate, 
developing a shared understanding of decision problems, and achieving closure and 
decision acceptance of the decision outcomes.   
 The thesis concludes by making recommendations for future research and the 
testing of the conceptual framework that may provide useful guidance for the future 
development of strategy practice and managerial ‘tools-in-use’ for effective strategy 
work. 
 4 
       
 
 
 
 
 
      For Erika, Eva, and Max, 
without your unconditional love, 
encouragement, and support this work could 
never have been written. 
 
 
  
 5 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 It is customary to acknowledge and thank people who have given me their time, 
shared their wisdom, and supported me during the six long years of part-time research. 
 On the top of the list is my supervisor Professor Patrick Reinmoeller.  He had the 
patience to take me by the hand and guide me through the stormy waters of the PhD 
journey.  He was instrumental in my development as a researcher and he taught me an 
important lesson about perseverance.  At times when the going got tough he gently 
guided me back on track.  Patrick, thank you! 
 Although the life of a doctoral researcher is a lonely one, Cranfield School of 
Management provides support through formal PhD panel review meetings and a well 
functioning PhD program office.  As a part-time researcher I spent little time on campus 
during my studies.  Thus, I came to appreciate the importance of the review process and 
the insights, comments, and constructive critique offered by my review panel members.  
Although the composition of the panel changed during my studies, the quality of advice 
remained outstanding.  I would like to thank all panel members who took an active 
interest in my work.  They are Professors Cliff Bowman, Donna Ladkin, Mark Jenkins, 
and Principal research fellow Dr. Colin Pilbeam. Colin also gave me the opportunity to 
present my work at doctoral colloquiums and receive valuable feedback from other PhD 
and DBA researchers.  In addition, I am grateful for the insight of numerous Cranfield 
and external academics who shared their knowledge and experience with me during the 
research methodologies stage of my studies.   
 A big thank you goes to all PhD program administrators, especially Wendy 
Habgood and Irena Pidlyskyj who were my focal points of contact during my years at 
Cranfield.  I am yet to come across anyone who gets back faster on email with solutions 
 6 
to knobby administrative problems.  I would also like to thank the staff at the Cranfield 
library and the management information resource center, especially those librarians 
who manage the off-campus service by sending books out by return post. 
 There are a number of other academics and people who supported me during my 
studies.  I would especially like to mention Emeritus Professor Bruce Lloyd of London 
South Bank University, my long-term mentor, and Professor Brad MacKay of University 
of Edinburgh Business School for their valuable comments on aspects of my work.  
Furthermore, I acknowledge with gratitude the great number of academic staff 
members at London South Bank University and Regent’s University of London for the 
interest they showed in my research. 
 My research was carried out with students and practitioners.  My thanks go to 
numerous undergraduate and MBA students at London South Bank University and 
Regent’s University London who participated in the research and those who 
unknowingly acted as a sounding board for the development of my thinking during 
strategic management lectures and seminars.  I would also like to thank Mark Goninon 
who facilitated my access to conduct research at his organization. 
 When I reflect back to my decision to pursue a PhD it was influenced by people 
who have shaped me to become what I am beyond the world of academia, and without 
whom I could not have completed this journey.  I will always remain grateful for the 
love and encouragement that my parents gave me.  Although both of them have now 
passed, their memory lives on.  Aimo and Irja did not have the opportunity or the luxury 
of attending institutions of higher learning.  However, as a youngster growing up in 
Finland, our house was full of books and my parents were avid readers and debaters.  
They set a wonderful example by their striving for continuous self-improvement that 
was not dependent on their level of formal education, and they instilled in me the love 
 7 
of life-long learning.  This thesis is their wonderful legacy and testament, and I hope to 
carry on learning as they did for the rest of my days.  Finally, I am forever indebted to 
and in awe of the most important people in my life, my lovely wife Erika, and my terrific 
children Max and Eva.  It is amazing that they put up with me for all these years of study, 
absence mindedness, as well as some moments of frustration and tears.  I know that I 
am not the easiest husband and dad to live with at the best of times, and when I was hit 
by self-doubt and ready to throw in the towel, they were always there to pick me up and 
spur me on.  Erika, Eva, and Max - your love and unwavering belief in me kept me going 
and endure to the end.  You guys are my rock; I love you to the moon and back! 
  
 
   
 8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT 2 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 8 
LIST OF FIGURES 10 
LIST OF TABLES 11 
LIST OF EXHIBITS 12 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 14 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 14 
1.2 FOREWORD: PERSONAL MOTIVATION AND REFLECTION 15 
1.3 THE PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 16 
1.4 THE THEORERTICAL POSITION OF RESEARCH 18 
1.5 THE RESEARCH APPROACH 21 
1.6 THE RESEARCH PROCESS 21 
1.7 CONTRIBUTION 23 
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 25 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 25 
2.2 MATERIALITY 26 
2.3 EPISTEMIC OBJECTS 31 
2.3.1 BOUNDARY OBJECTS 35 
2.4 CAUSAL MAPS AS EPISTEMIC OBJECTS 37 
2.5 GROUP CAUSAL MAPS IN COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING 41 
2.5.1 EFFECTIVE GROUP CAUSAL MAPS 43 
2.5.2 AFFORDANCES OF GROUP CAUSAL MAPS 45 
2.6 GROUP DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ISSUES 47 
2.6.1 COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE CONFLICT 48 
2.6.2 MANAGERIAL COGNITIVE BIASES 51 
CHAPTER III: RESEARCH STRATEGY 54 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 54 
3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 55 
3.3 ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PRACTICE-BASED STRATEGY 
RESEARCH 57 
3.3.1 ONTOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 58 
FIGURE 3 - AN ACTIVITY SYSTEM MODEL FOR STUDYING STRATEGY PRACTICE 62 
3.3.2 EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 63 
3.3.3 HEIDEGGERIAN ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGY IN PRACTICE-BASED RESEARCH 67 
 9 
CHAPTER IV: METHOD 71 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 71 
4.2 INTERPRETIVE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS 72 
4.3 CASE STUDIES 74 
4.3.1 THE ROLE OF PRIOR THEORY IN CASE RESEARCH 74 
4.3.2 CASE PROFILES AND THE RESEARACH SETTING 76 
4.4 RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 80 
4.5 DATA CAPTURE AND THE ANALYSIS PROCESS 82 
4.5.1 DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS 84 
4.6 RESEARCH VALIDITY, RELIABAILITY, AND GENERALIZABILITY 89 
CHAPTER V: RESEARCH FINDINGS 93 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 93 
5.2 GETTING ACQUAINTED WITH THE DATA 93 
5.3 OVERVEW OF THE MAP ENACTMENT PROCRESS 96 
5.3.1 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 98 
5.3.2 INDIVIDUAL IDEA GENERATION 100 
5.3.3 MAP ENACTMENT 102 
5.3.4 FINAL DECISION 104 
5.4 CODING DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS 107 
5.4.1 CODING SCHEME 110 
ANALYTICAL STEPS 111 
ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION 111 
5.4.2 CONCEPTUAL MAP 118 
5.4.3 ACROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 128 
5.5 THEORETICAL DEVELOPEMNT 136 
CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTION 142 
6.1 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 153 
APPENDIX SECTION 158 
APPENDIX I – CAUSAL MAPPING PROTOCOL 159 
APPENDIX II – CASE STUDY 162 
APPENDIX III – DECISION-MAKING PROTOCOL 166 
APPENDIX IV – CASE VINGNETS 169 
CASE STUDY 1 – BLACKHAWKS 169 
CASE STUDY 2 – RANGERS 173 
CASE STUDY 3 – OILERS 178 
CASE STUDY 4 – BRUINS 181 
CASE STUDY 5 – DUCKS 184 
CASE STUDY 6 – FLYERS 187 
CASE STUDY 7 – WOLVERINES 189 
APPENDIX V – ATLAS.TI CONCEPTUAL MAP 191 
REFERENCES 192 
 
 
 10 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1 – RESEARCH PROCESS        22 
FIGURE 2 – AN ACTIIVTY SYSTEM MODEL FOR STUDYING STRATEGY PRACTICE  62 
FIGURE 3 – CASE ANALYSIS AND DATA STRUCTURE     87 
FIGURE 4 – THE MAPPING PROCESS       97 
FIGURE 5 – CONCEPTUAL MAP        119 
FIGURE 6 – THEORETICAL THEMES AND DIMENSIONS     137 
FIGURE 7 – CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK       138 
 
  
 11 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 1– TYPES OF MATERIALITY 28 
 
TABLE 2 – CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE GROUP CAUSAL MAPS 44 
 
TABLE 3– CONTRASTING EPISTEMOLOGIES 65 
 
TABLE 4 - CASES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF RECORDING 78 
 
TABLE 5 – ANALYTICAL STEPS OF CODING DEVELOPMENT 111 
 
TABLE 6 - CODEBOOK 113 
 
TABLE 7 – SUB-GROUPS BASED ON CODED ACTIVITY FREQUENCY 117 
 
TABLE 8 – SUB-GROUPS BASED ON CODED ACTIVITY FREQUENCY 123 
 
TABLE 9 – PROS AND CONS OF MAPPING 126 
 
TABLE 10 – ACROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 129 
 
  
 12 
LIST OF EXHIBITS 
 
EXHIBIT 1 – BINARY DECISION PROBLEM DEFINITION 99 
EXHIBIT 2 - INDIVIDUAL IDEA GENERATION AT THE START OF THE MAPPING PROCESS 101 
EXHIBIT 3 - INDIVIDUAL IDEA GENERATION DURING THE MAPPING PROCESS 101 
EXHIBIT 4 - MAP ENACTMENT AND INTENSE FOCUS 103 
EXHIBIT 5 - MAKING A POINT 103 
EXHIBIT 6 – CONSULTING THE MAP 103 
EXHIBIT 7 – JUSTIFYING THE DECISION AND ARTICULATING IT INDIVIDUALLY 105 
EXHIBIT 8 – JUSTIFYING THE DECISION AND ARTICULATING IT INDIVIDUALLY 105 
EXHIBIT 9 – EXPLAINING THE FINAL DECISION 106 
EXHIBIT 10 – A CLOSELY-KNIT GROUP IN FRONT OF THE MAP 124 
EXHIBIT 11 – AN UNDERDEVELOPED MAP 135 
EXHIBIT 12 – DEVIL’S ADVOCACY MAPPING 136 
 
 
 13 
        
 
 
 
       We shall not grow wiser before  
       we learn that much that we   
       have done was very foolish. 
       - Friedrich August von Hayek 
 
 
  
 14 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 My research investigates how decision-makers enact, interpret and use 
epistemic objects to make strategic decisions.  Strategic decisions are seen as big, 
expensive, and precedent setting decisions that are difficult to reverse in the short term, 
and such decisions are made under the conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity 
(Mintzberg et al., 1976).  Jarzabkowski (2005) argues, however, that from the practice 
perspective what constitutes a strategic decision is defined by managers themselves by 
their situated action that is a relational activity of managers as actors in the contexts 
that they operate.  This thesis is the contextualization of the situated actions of the 
decision-makers how causal maps as epistemic objects are enacted, interpreted, and 
used as a sociomaterial decision-making ‘tool-in-use’ to reach a decision.   
 Empirical qualitative data was derived from seven video-recorded cases of 
students and managers who were tasked to make a decision that was based on the 
information provided in a teaching case study.   
 The narrative that ensues does not claim to create an objective account or reveal 
an objective truth.  I readily admit this ‘story’ is the researcher’s construct, a fusion 
between the literature, empirical data, and the mind of the researcher.  However, the 
thesis provides an inductive generation of narrative reality that is derived from the 
collection and synthesis of multiple informant voices contained in the seven case 
studies.  As such, this work makes a theoretical contribution to practice-based literature 
to advance our understanding of how epistemic objects are enacted as situated 
managerial activity in strategic decision-making. 
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 The rest of this introductory chapter proceeds as follows.  After a self-reflective 
foreword in Section 1.2 on the motivation for and the journey to the completion of my 
PhD studies, Section 1.3 outlines the purpose of my research by identifying the field of 
inquiry, the research problem, and the research question.  Section 1.4 provides a 
summary how the thesis is positioned within the relevant literature and its theoretical 
framework. Section 1.5 gives an overview of the research approach followed by a 
graphical presentation of the research process in Section 1.6.  The chapter concludes 
with an outline of my research contributions in Section 1.7. 
1.2 FOREWORD: PERSONAL MOTIVATION AND REFLECTION 
 My decision to embark on this exciting and intellectually challenging PhD 
journey was motived by both professional and personal considerations.   I had left a 
career in the City of London to pursue a calling of teaching and working with young 
eager minds in management education.  The completion of a PhD and obtaining a 
‘license’ to become a researcher was a natural motivation and an extension of my work 
as a university lecturer.  In addition, as a mature part-time researcher I was motivated 
by self-actualization, personal growth, and the fulfillment of an ambition of doctoral 
studies that I had set for myself as a young undergraduate economics student at the 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.  I had interrupted my studies after my 
undergraduate degree and left the university to try my luck on Wall Street and later in 
the City of London.  Now the time had come, if ever, to embark on the PhD journey. 
 During my undergraduate studies I had come across the writings of Austrian 
School economists Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Israel Kirzner.  Their 
methodology of praxeology that focused on purposeful human action and the role of 
tacit knowledge in economic activity seemed to contradict, at least in the eyes of an 
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undergraduate student, the order given to economic decisions by elegant algorithms 
and statistical models that I studied in my econometrics classes.  While my academic 
interest ebbed and flowed during my corporate career I kept noticing how little impact 
the various modeling tools and techniques that were applied to strategic problems had 
on the decisions taken in practice, and ultimately the quality of actual decision 
outcomes.   
 When the opportunity and the time came for me to think about an area of 
research for my thesis I was determined to pursue a field of inquiry that placed the 
practitioner at the center of strategy making.  I wanted to gain a better understanding of 
how people made sense and solved strategic problems in practice.  Although my PhD 
journey has taken me to some blind alleys, I have learned every step of the way, and my 
wanderings in these dark alleyways always led me into a greater understanding of 
human action and strategic management as an academic discipline.  I was also humbled 
by the fact that I was not going to solve the causal ambiguity paradox, a critical aspect of 
the resource-based view of the firm that was my initial topic of research.  The last six 
years have given me a wonderful opportunity to pay homage to the great minds of 
management, economics and psychology, and read widely across strategic management 
literature in general, and managerial cognition, behavioral and evolutionary economics, 
decision-making, and strategy-as-practice literature in particular.   What follows is the 
product of this journey. 
1.3 THE PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
 Recent approaches to strategic decision-making have concentrated on 
how managers think, act, and interpret strategic decisions in practice.  Such practice-
based research has emerged from the critique that ‘traditional’ strategic decision-
 17 
making theory may not be actionable in actual managerial practice (Nutt and Wilson, 
2010).  The focus of practice-based research on managerial strategic activity, or 
‘strategy-as-practice’ perspective (Jarzabkowski, 2004, 2005; Whittington, 2006; 
Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009), is based on the premise that strategy work is not a static 
property of a firm, but it is continually created through the process of ‘doing’ strategy, 
or ‘strategizing’ (Golsorkhi et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2007).  Huff, Neyer, and Moslein 
(2010) clarify the focus of the practice-based inquiry by emphasizing the word 
‘strategizing’ rather than ‘strategy-as-practice’ to connote micro-level behaviors by 
organizational actors in situations that are non-routine.   
Following the practice-based inquiry, researchers should concentrate on what 
managers actually ‘do’ when they engage in strategy work (Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 
2006) including the analysis of conversations, gestures and bodily conduct, 
organizational practices of decision-making, problem solving, knowledge sharing, and 
collaboration for strategy work to become an observable activity (Alby and 
Zucchermaglio, 2006).  Other scholars point out that such research should also 
incorporate sociomaterial practices (Orlikowski, 2007; Tsoukas, 2010) and the tacit 
dimension of strategizing (Chia and Mackay, 2007; Chia and Rasche, 2010). 
My thesis extends research beyond the discursive practices and modes of 
strategizing that have been the main focus of the research into strategy practices 
(Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009; Vaara and Whittington, 2012).  Previous studies have 
emphasized how managers’ discourses shape firms’ strategic direction (Hendry, 2000; 
Rouleau, 2005; Jarzabkowski and Seidl, 2008).  Recently, however, questions have been 
raised in the strategy-as-practice literature that the emphasis on the discursive nature 
of practice has neglected the role of epistemic objects as material artifacts in strategy- 
making (Vaara and Whittington, 2012; Jarzabowski and Spee, 2009).  Therefore, there is 
 18 
a “dearth of research into material artifacts and how they are engaged in strategizing” 
(Jarzabkowski, Spee and Smets, 2012, p. 2).  Furthermore, the way epistemic objects 
interact with human activity in strategy making remains a relatively unexplored area 
(Jarzabkowski and Kaplan, 2014; Werle and Seidl, 2015).  Finally, Jarzabkowski, Spee 
and Smets (2012) point out that the relative neglect of the role of epistemic objects in 
strategy research is partly due to the inconsistent and overly broad definitions and 
conceptualizations of strategy practices in which actors, objects, and intentions are 
interwoven into a complex bundle of practices.  Hence, a more comprehensive 
investigation of the different forms of interplay between various epistemic objects as 
material artifacts and their respective effect on the strategizing process is required 
(Werle and Seidl, 2015). 
My thesis addresses this knowledge gap in the literature by researching causal 
maps and their affordances as situated epistemic objects that are enacted, interpreted, 
and used as a decision-making ‘tool’ by actors in a collective decision-making context.  
My research seeks to the answer the following research question: 
How do decision-making groups enact, interpret, and use epistemic objects such as 
causal maps to make sense and generate solutions to strategic decision problems? 
1.4 THE THEORERTICAL POSITION OF RESEARCH 
My research into the role of epistemic objects in strategy-making is consistent 
with the strategy-as-practice area of inquiry of strategy work that encompasses not only 
strategy formulation, but organizing work that is involved with the implementation of 
strategies, and all other activities that lead to the emergence of organizational strategies, 
either consciously or unconsciously (Vaara and Whittington, 2012; Jarzabkowski, Spee 
and Smets, 2012).  
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Whittington et al. (2006) argue that in a world of accelerating change, 
approaching strategy and organization as interlinked and practical activities such as 
collective decision-making is “more effective than traditional static and detached 
approaches” (p. 615).  Whittington (2007) suggests that such an activity-based 
approach should be founded on research that takes a ‘sociological eye’ to strategy to 
examine actors, strategy tools, e.g. frameworks, concepts, models, or methods 
(Jarzabkowski and Kaplan, 2014), and the rich interactions within which people and 
things are engaged in doing strategy work.  The sociological eye with a concern for the 
social embeddedness of strategizing is the distinctive feature that differentiates 
strategy-as-practice from strategy process research.  Under the sociological eye, 
strategy is ‘another thing’ or ‘stuff’ (Jarzabkowski and Kaplan, 2014), that people do 
individually and in groups that encompasses routines and procedures, discursive 
resources and material technologies that makes “the scope of strategy-as-practice wider 
than just strategy process” (Whittington 2007, p. 1584).    
Sociomateriality is a critical concept in my research as it is used to inform the 
interaction between situated, socially constructed epistemic objects and human agents 
in the context of collective decision-making (Whittington, 2007; Kaplan, 2011).  
According to Orlikowski and Scott (2008) our understanding of organizational life will 
remain limited as long as management literature continues to overlook the ways in 
which organizing is intrinsically bound up with material forms and spaces.   
Some scholars argue that there are no inherent differences between the social 
and the material (Leonardi, 2013).  Orlikowski (2007, p. 1437) states about 
sociomateriality: “the social and material are considered to be inextricably related – 
there is no social that is not also material, and no material that is not social.” However, 
critical realists argue that social context and the materiality that exist are different, but 
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the social and the material become sociomaterial as people imbricate social and 
material agencies through practice (Leonardi, 2003).   Similarly, Barley (1986) 
perceives social and material as distinct but mutually dependent aspects of the social 
world.   A clear demarcation between the social and the material, or the lack thereof, has 
implications on how to research the interaction between socially constructed objects 
and human agents.  According to Werle and Seidl (2015) most strategy-as-practice 
research adopts a critical realist perspective of sociomateriality.  Such a lens enables the 
researcher to identify the ways in which the social interacts with the material although 
they may be perceived as distinct ‘entities.’  Hence, the distinction between the social 
and the material allows the affordances inscribed into the materiality, i.e. the possible 
actions that are made available to actors in strategy work.   
The sociomaterial perspective in practice research considers managerial 
engagement with epistemic objects as “organized, open-ended human activities 
transpiring within material arrangement, unfolding in time, carried out by skilful agents” 
(Tsoukas, 2010, p. 49.)  Yet, not all strategy-work may be intentional or deliberate even 
if focal actors may articulate it as such retrospectively.  When organizational actors act 
non-deliberately, they respond spontaneously to the changing environment to get on 
with things on hand.  They may not pay explicit attention to what they do but they do 
what is needed at that point in time.  Or as Chia and MacKay (2007, p. 235) put it, 
“agents act purposefully without having a purpose in mind.”   Therefore, the challenge 
for practice-based researcher is not only to observe what actors ‘do’ when they engage 
in strategy work, but also what is left unsaid and observe the behaviours that may 
manifest themselves as a result of social and cultural conditioning (Chia and MacKay, 
2007). 
 21 
1.5 THE RESEARCH APPROACH 
Review of the literature shows that practice research rejects positivist 
approaches as an inadequate means to gain an understanding how agency and structure, 
and individual action and institutions are linked in social systems, cultures, and 
organizations.   A constructivist approach is called for as the means of understanding 
human activity in strategy work.  If strategy is to be understood as an activity or 
practice, and not something that organizations have, but something that people do then 
“practice research needs to be accompanied by constructivist epistemologies” 
(Golsorkhi et al., 2010, p. 8). 
My research is designed as an inductive multiple-case study undertaking 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) to understand how groups enact, 
interpret, and use causal maps as epistemic objects to make sense and generate 
solutions to strategic decision problems.    
The research is positioned within activity theory (Vygotsky, 1978; Leontiev, 
1978; Jarzabowski, 2010) that provides a framework for investigating how the practice 
of ‘strategizing’ is being framed by the perceptions, views, and mental models of 
organizational agents as they strategize within their organization’s structures, 
processes, norms, and values (Jarratt and Stiles, 2010).   Activity theory conceptualizes 
the ongoing construction of activity and it provides a resource for analyzing strategy 
practice that is “socially accomplished by individuals in interaction with their wider 
social group and the artifacts of interaction” (Jarzabkowski, 2010, p. 127). 
1.6 THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
 Figure 1 depicts the stages of my research process: research conceptualization, 
identification of the research question, data collection, analysis, and theory building.
 Figure 1 - Research Process 
 
 
 
 
Initial interest:  Causal mapping in decision-              
making. 
Initial literature review:  Causal 
mapping and group decision-
making. 
Pilot: Testing of a decision-making case study with 
student groups having taught them the principles of 
causal mapping (12 groups of 6 students). 
Deeper literature review:  Expanded the literature review to cover the role 
of epistemic objects, sociomateriality, and practice-based strategy research. 
Development of a conceptual framework and 
research question: Derived from the literature 
review of epistemic objects as material artifacts in 
collective decision-making context. 
Decision-making task: (7 cases)  
Convenience sampling driven approach to administer a 
decision-making teaching case study to informant groups that 
was timed and video-recorded.  Video recordings were 
supplemented by the researcher’s observations in field notes. 
Data analysis: Write-up of cases, coding 
structure development to analyze video 
evidence on ATLAS.ti seeking out 
similarities, differences, and patterns within 
and across cases. 
Iterative analysis: Iterating between 
data, literature, and empirical findings. 
Model, typology and contribution– Model of enactment 
of causal maps as a “decision-making” tool-in-use.  
Proposition development. 
Identification of 
research question 
and 
conceptualization 
Data collection 
Analysis and 
theory 
building 
Sense checking: Post-mortem meeting 
with one informant group; blind coding of 
three video cases. 
 1.7 CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis addresses the following research question: 
How do decision-making groups enact, interpret, and use epistemic objects 
such as causal maps to make sense and generate solutions to strategic decision 
problems? 
 Answering the research question provides a theoretical contribution to 
knowledge by developing a conceptual framework how causal maps, as situated 
epistemic objects are enacted, interpreted, and used as a sociomaterial decision-
making ‘tool-in-use’ by actors in a collective decision-making context.   
 The research shows how the enactment of causal maps in collective 
decision-making increases cognitive conflict in decision-making teams. Causal 
maps become a ‘safety net’ that allows decision-makers to engage in robust 
debate and consider multiple decision outcomes. In addition, the research 
reveals how causal maps act as a ‘shock absorber’ thereby preventing the 
emergence of affective conflict, and how the collective enactment of causal maps 
increases decision acceptance among the decision-makers by facilitating them to 
make their individual knowledge claims visible.  Finally, the research results 
indicate that the enactment of causal maps may eliminate managerial biases such 
as groupthink and the escalation of commitment bias.  
 The use of video evidence is a relatively novel method in strategy 
research.  Video can be used to capture the unfolding of strategic activity and 
record observable human behavior in relation to and in interaction with artifacts 
and other tools.  This research makes a methodological contribution especially to 
practice-based strategy research that is increasingly open to the use of video 
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evidence as a means of gaining a deeper insight to organizational agents’ 
strategic activity. 
  In terms of managerial contribution the thesis offers a deeper 
insight to the affordances of causal maps, and how managers can use causal 
mapping as a practical decision-making tool-in-use to improve the quality of 
decision-making processes by structuring conversations and debate, developing 
a shared understanding of decision problems, and achieving closure and decision 
acceptance.   
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 The practice lens on strategy has prompted the emergence of a particular 
research interest in the role that material artifacts have in strategy work.  Werle 
and Seidl (2015) state that there has been an explicit acknowledgment that all 
strategizing practices involve material artifacts of various types including slide 
decks, flipcharts, whiteboards, graphs, tables, graphic figures, documents etc.  
Paroutis, Franco and Papadopoulos (2015) consider strategy tools such as the 
BCG matrix, Porter’s Five Forces, and SWOT and other strategic management 
analysis concepts, models, and methods employed by agents in strategy making 
as material artifacts.  Although there is no universal classification of such tools, 
this “stuff of strategy” (Whittington 2007, p. 159) is an essential part of strategy 
work as it influences the way organizational agents ‘do’ strategy.   Realizing the 
importance of this ‘stuff’ in strategy work Jarzabowski and Kaplan (2014) 
developed a framework for examining the ways that the affordances of strategy 
tools either enable or constrain their use in managerial practice. 
 Building onto this literature I introduce causal maps as situated material 
artifacts and apply them as a sociomaterial ‘tool-in-use’ in the context of 
collective decision-making.  In this chapter I bring together a number of 
literature strands as follows.  I start with the concept of materiality in Section 2.2 
and review how the material relates to the social.  I also provide evidence from 
the literature how ‘strategizing materials’ (Dameron, Le, and LeBaron, 2015) 
could be categorized.   Section 2.3 considers how agents can interact with 
epistemic objects rather than use them as mere ‘tools’ for achieving a particular 
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end.  I then expand the discussion in Section 2.4 to argue the case for causal 
maps as ‘stuff of strategy’ and position them as situated material artifacts.  I 
consider their affordances in collective decision-making in Section 2.5 and 
highlight key group decision-making process issues and managerial biases as 
they pertain to causal maps in Section 2.6.   
2.2 MATERIALITY 
 In practice-based literature, materiality is defined as the “arrangement of 
an artifact’s physical and/or digital material into particular forms that endure 
across differences in place and time that are important to users” (Leonardi, Nardi 
and Kallinikos, 2012, p. 42).  The growing importance of materiality in practice-
based research is firstly based on the premise that materiality lies at the heart of 
strategy work as the practice of strategy is concerned with the way sociomaterial 
‘tools’ configure strategic interactions between actors and ‘things’  (Dameron, Le, 
and Lebaron, 2015).  Second, the material and the practice are entwined, and as 
Orlikowski (2007) points out, every organizational practice is always bound with 
materiality and it is an integral aspect of organizational life.   
 Despite this growing importance of materiality in practice-based research, 
materiality remains an elusive concept because different traditions within which 
the notion of materiality are dissimilar in terms of how the concept is 
constructed and how it is researched empirically (Dameron, Le, and Lebaron, 
2015).  A pragmatic attempt to define materiality is to categorize it into types of 
material that is used in strategy work.  In an extensive literature review of 
materiality Dameron, Le, and Lebaron (2015) propose five such categories: 
strategy tools, strategy objects and artifacts, strategy technologies, built spaces, 
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and human bodies.  These categories, attributes of each materiality type, their 
implications on organizational strategy work, and future research directions are 
presented in Table 1 below. 
 
 Table 1– Types of materiality 
  
 Strategy tools Strategy objects and 
artifacts 
Strategy technologies Built spaces Human bodies 
Category description Strategy tools allow for a 
formalized way to 
approach strategic analysis 
and decision-making  
(Jarratt and Stiles, 2010). 
 
Strategy tools are prevalent 
in strategy work that may 
be considered 
institutionalized (Suddaby, 
Seidl, and Le, 2013). 
Objects and artifacts are 
tangible, visible or audible 
residue of past acts of 
meaning, distinct from 
tools that are overtly 
instrumental and 
technologies that are more 
mediational (Dameron, Le, 
and LeBaron, 2015). 
Technologies in 
organizations extend 
beyond the traditional 
machinery or device 
developed from scientific 
knowledge (Oxford 
Dictionary). 
Strategy work that takes 
place within the confines of 
a physical space 
(Cornellisen, Mantere, and 
Vaara, 2014).   
 
 
The human body is an 
abiding and versatile 
presence in all strategy 
work (Dameron, Le, and 
LeBaron, 2015). 
Examples Scenario planning, SWOT, 
BCG Matrix (Jarzabowski et 
al., 2013; Wright, Paroutis, 
and Blettner, 2013; Dyson, 
2004; Schoemaker, 1995); 
Porter’s Five Forces 
(Paroutis, Franco, and 
Papadopoulos, 2015) 
Concrete and/or discursive 
(Higgins and Mcallester 
2004); textual and/or 
visual (Jarzabowski, Spee, 
and Smets, 2013); physical 
and/or digital (Leonardi, 
Nardi, and Kallinikos, 
2012); “stuff of strategy” 
(Whittington, 2006, 2007); 
epistemic objects (Werle 
and Seidl, 2015; Knorr 
Cetina, 1997); cardboard 
cube (Whittington et al., 
2006); Lego bricks 
(Heracleous and Jacobs, 
2008); planning documents 
(Spee and Jarzabowski 
2011; Vaara, Sorsa, and 
Palli, 2010). 
Computer software, 
PowerPoint (Kaplan, 
2011); technologies 
intertwined with textual 
devices (Caliskan and 
Callon, 2010) and human 
knowledge (Orlikowski, 
1992; Paroutis, Franco, and 
Papadopoulos, 2015). 
‘Strategic spaces’ 
(Jarzabowski and Kaplan, 
2014; Jarzabowski, Burke, 
and Spee, 2015) 
 
Physical locations such as 
boardrooms, offices, 
meeting rooms, and 
hallways.   
 
 
CEO physical dominance in 
strategy workshops 
particularly controlling the 
whiteboard and pen 
(Hodgkinson and Wright, 
2012); multimodal 
orchestration of discourse, 
artifacts, and bodies in 
strategy workshops 
(LeBaron and Whittington, 
2011); emotional displays 
in strategy meetings (Liu 
and Maitlis, 2014); the role 
of body in constructing 
strategic spaces for 
strategy work 
(Jarzabowski, Burke, and 
Spee, 2015). 
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 Strategy tools Strategy objects and 
artifacts 
Strategy technologies Built spaces Human bodies 
Attributes As formalized tools they 
encapsulate material 
elements such as linguistic 
labels, focal categories, 
analytical methods, and 
procedural steps. 
Objects and artifacts are 
not inherently meaningful 
but they acquire their 
meaning through social 
interaction such as 
strategizing. 
Physical features of 
technologies such as 
language, physical design, 
compatibility with other 
technologies and user 
options shape how 
technology may be used in 
strategizing. 
Physical features such as 
layout, color, furniture, 
brightness etc.  
The body is both an 
animate object and the 
organ of discourse as it 
belongs to the world of 
things and the world of 
words. 
Implications for strategy 
work 
Physical features and the 
affordances of strategy 
tools influence the final 
analytic output and 
strategic decisions based 
on this output (Dameron, 
Le, and LeBaron, 2015). 
 
 
Objects and artifacts 
achieve more than 
broadcast or foster 
strategic ideas through 
decontextualization and 
recontextualization by 
shaping power 
relationships and social 
order (Spee and 
Jarzabowski, 2011). 
 
Objects and artifacts 
influence each other during 
the emergence and 
evolution of organizational 
strategy (Werle and Seidl, 
2015; Knorr Cetina, 1997). 
Technologies are pervasive 
in organizations and they 
are integrated into work 
practices and influence the 
way people do strategy. 
 
Technologies have 
affordances that allow it to 
be used in a certain way 
but there are limitations to 
what the technology can do 
(Kaplan, 2011). 
Physical features impact 
work.  They may inhibit or 
encourage certain types of 
strategy practice.  The way 
an office is designed 
(Campbell, 1979), or the 
way a desk is arranged 
(Rosenfield, Lambert, and 
Black, 1985) can impact 
attitude and behavior. Wall 
color is known to affect 
mood (Wexner, 1952), 
which is relevant between 
emotion and strategizing 
(Liu and Maitlis, 2014). 
Strategies are articulated 
through conversation 
(Jarzabowski, 2005). 
 
Strategic discourse is 
always accompanied by 
human bodies and artifacts, 
which provide 
interpretation of each other 
(LeBaron and Whittington, 
2011).  
Future research directions 
 
With the exception of 
Jarzabowski and Kaplan 
(2014) we lack systematic 
studies of strategy tools 
and how their features 
impact strategizing  
(Dameron, Le, and LeBaron, 
2015). 
Our understanding of the 
interplay between various 
material artifacts and their 
respective effect on the 
strategizing process is 
required (Jarzabowski, 
Spee and Smets, 2012; 
Werle and Seidl, 2015). 
Systematic studies of 
technologies and how their 
features impact 
strategizing is required 
(Dameron, Le, and LeBaron, 
2015). 
More studies that engage 
with built spaces and 
strategizing are required 
(Dameron, Le, and LeBaron, 
2015). 
The role of human body in 
strategy work has been 
largely overlooked by 
researchers (Dameron, Le, 
and LeBaron, 2015).  The 
account how the body’s 
materiality, for example its 
anatomy and psychology in 
strategizing should be 
further investigated (Barad, 
2003). 
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 All these studies have made a significant contribution to further 
our understanding of the ways that various types of materiality are involved in 
strategy work.  They show that material gets created and used in strategizing 
and the studies reveal their affordances.   However, more research engagement 
across all materiality categories and their affordances is called for.  Dameron, Le, 
and Lebaron (2015) suggest that there are different ways to approach research 
into materiality that are dependent on the focus that one places on the two 
aspects of materiality: ‘physicality’ and ‘significance.’  ‘Physicality’ refers to the 
physical attributes of the focal objects and their ‘significance’ refers to the 
meaning ascribed to them.  The forms of materiality that were detailed in Table 1 
differ in the focus that is placed either on ‘physicality’ or ‘significance’ and how 
the relationship is construed between them.  In the recent special issue on 
materiality in the British Journal of Management, Dameron, Le, and Lebaron 
(2015, p. 56) differentiate between the degrees of focus to indicate how much 
emphasis certain types of materiality places “on the social interpretive element 
and how closely physical material and the social world are entwined.”  The 
authors label these views as ‘weak’ for ‘object focus’ where materiality is seen as 
mere physicality; ‘moderate’ for ‘object and subject focus’ that incorporates 
sensemaking activities where there is a relationship between an object and the 
social, but while being mutually dependent, they form distinct and separable 
building blocks; and ‘strong’ for ‘entanglement focus’ that perceives the social 
and the material as inseparable.  This labeling of materiality corresponds to the 
differing views of sociomateriality that were discussed earlier, pages 19- 20, of 
the thesis.  Common with the critical realist perspective of sociomateriality that 
enables the researcher to identify the ways in which the social interacts with the 
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material is considered the ‘moderate view’ by Dameron, Le, and Lebaron (2015).  
According to Leonardi and Barley (2010) this constitutes a ‘pragmatic vision’ 
that is most commonly represented in strategy studies that consider materiality 
as artifacts that endure across time and place and that these artifacts are 
important to users.  The material properties of artifacts offer tangible resources 
for agents to “do old things in new ways and to do things they could not do 
before” (Leonardi and Barley, 2008, p. 161). 
 My research is limited into one particular type of materiality, epistemic 
objects, as artifacts that can be considered as a resource for organizational actors 
to attribute knowledge and meaning to them (Werle and Seidl, 2015). As my 
focus is on how these objects are enacted, interpreted and used, and as I seek to 
understand the interaction between the epistemic objects and decision-makers 
in the strategizing process, I proceed in the next section with the consideration of 
epistemic objects in strategy making. 
2.3 EPISTEMIC OBJECTS 
    Epistemic objects, also often referred to as ‘knowledge objects,’ 
are defined as open-ended objects that act as a source of interest and motivation 
by the virtue of their opacity and material transcendence (Werle and Seidel, 
2015).   Moreover, they can be perceived as artifacts that enable actors to do old 
things in new ways or they can be used to do new things (Leonardi and Barley, 
2008).  
In contrast to other objects, epistemic objects are not definite things 
whose properties can be captured and described, but they emerge and evolve 
during the activity that they are used (Ewenstein and Whyte, 2009; Knorr-Cetina, 
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1997, 1999, 2001, 2011); Miettinen and Virkkunen, 2005; Rheinberger, 1997, 
2005).  A number of social theorists posit that modern sociality, including 
learning and knowing, is increasingly mediated by epistemic objects and 
material artifacts (Knorr-Cetina, 1997), and that these objects and artifacts 
mediate human activity (Miettinen and Virkkunen, 2005).  Organizational actors 
work with epistemic objects and material artifacts in their daily practices, be 
they problems they have to solve, models they create, projects they write, or 
information systems they use (Knorr-Cetina, 1997).  
 The literature on epistemic objects refutes the assumption that epistemic 
objects and material artifacts, such as flipcharts, post-it notes, or symbolic 
artifacts such as a ‘cube’, ‘pledge walls’ or Lego-based models have stable 
properties that predetermine their use (Whittington et al., 2006).  Schein (2004) 
notes that symbols and artifacts only gain strategic meaning through the 
interpretations strategy practitioners assign to them within the everyday 
enactment of their strategizing.  Since strategy work is knowledge work 
(Whittington, 2003, 2006; Jarzabkowski, Spee, and Smets, 2012), strategy 
practitioners imbue the artifacts with knowledge properties that are situated 
within the context of their work to make sense of a given situation.  Therefore, 
‘strategy artifacts’ do not have innate properties, but they become meaningful 
artifacts, or ‘tools-in-use’ (Jarzabkowski and Kaplan, 2014), within the context of 
the strategy work within which they are used by agents (Whittington et al., 
2006).  Thus, epistemic objects are not static, but they change continuously and 
acquire new properties during their use (Knorr-Cetina, 2001).  However, 
epistemic objects as ‘tools-in-use’ come with affordances that enable and 
constrain their use (Jarzabowski and Kaplan, 2014).  The materiality of the object 
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favors, shapes, or invites agents to use the object in creative ways, but it at the 
same time constrains a set of specific uses by the objects.   A chair may be used as 
a stepping stool, a table, a bookshelf, or a barrier, but its material limitation 
constraints its use as a pen or a cooker.  Therefore, the use of these objects 
depend not only on the material properties or the intended design of the tool, but 
also on the context and the interpretations of agents who may use them in 
creative and unpredictable ways within their overall material limitations 
(Jarzabowski and Kaplan, 2014).   
 Knorr-Cetina (2001) argues that learning, knowing, and collaboration is a 
relational process that involves both agents and epistemic objects. The 
characteristic of any epistemic object is its evolving nature, or what Knorr-Cetina 
(2001, p.181) calls the object’s “lack of completeness of being.”  The object’s “lack 
of completeness of being” supports and nurtures in actors a need to come to 
know the object, what Knorr-Cetina (2001, p. 187) refers to as a “structure of 
wantings.”  It is through the interplay between an object’s ‘lack of completeness 
of being’ and the actors’ ‘structure of wantings’ that learning, knowing, and 
collaboration emerges. Furthermore, since epistemic objects are always in the 
process of being materially defined they continually acquire new properties and 
change the ones they have.  Such a view of a continually evolving relationship 
between the object and the agents helps us theorize that the enactment of an 
epistemic object such as a causal map by decision-makers may result in 
collaborative endeavors that may produce novel insights to strategic problems. 
  Similarly, Kaplan’s (2011) inquiry into PowerPoint’s role in strategy work 
suggests that an artifact should not be characterized simply in terms of whether 
it is an effective or ineffective management tool.  Instead, the study indicates that 
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the use of PowerPoint enables a collaborative effort by managers to negotiate 
meaning in an uncertain environment, and the situated use of PowerPoint 
creates spaces for discussion that allows ideas to evolve.  Kaplan’s research 
shows how PowerPoint slides as an artifact are inter-related with discursive 
practices that shape the outcomes of investment decisions in a 
telecommunications firm.  Because Power Point deck functions as both a medium 
and an outcome of discursive process, its use is essential to the firm’s strategy 
making process (Kaplan, 2011).    
 In another research undertaking Vaara, Palli, and Sorsa (2010) illustrate 
how strategic plans, such as text documents, shape and are shaped by 
interactions between managers.  Plans that related to the activity of Finnish 
occupational health and safety inspection service were made into an epistemic 
object that led to the development of a new kind of inspection practice and the 
creation and implementation of a new set of tools necessary for carrying it out.  
This research suggests that epistemic objects and artifacts mediate managerial 
activity and they could be instrumental as generators of new conceptions and 
solutions: they communicate socially negotiated meanings, legitimate ways of 
thinking and action while de-legitimate others, and they may produce consent 
among decision-makers.  In addition, epistemic objects could be regarded as a 
central source of innovation and reorientation in societal practices through 
discursive practices that produce different interpretations depending on the 
agreement with the new discourse and its implications (Vaara, Palli, and Sorsa, 
2010).  It should be noted, however, that Kaplan (2011) and Vaara, Palli, and 
Sorsa (2010) research undertakings were limited to the role of discursive 
practices only in strategizing.  
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   Jarzabkowski, Spee, and Smets (2012) assessed the impact of epistemic 
objects as material artifacts on reinsurance agents’ appraisal of underwriting 
deals offered to them for the inclusion in their insurance risk portfolios to enact 
planned portfolio targets. Their study investigated the way reinsurance agents 
used spreadsheets, maps, and photos in their strategy work to make decisions on 
the deals offered to them by primary underwriters.  The study demonstrated that 
strategy work is socially accomplished as a learning and knowledge creating 
process within the situated use of material artifacts.  Moreover, the research 
found that the situated use of artifacts evolves with the unfolding use of 
subsequent artifacts.  This implies that artifacts are linked to each other and each 
artifact builds on the knowledge and understanding embedded in the other 
artifact resulting in an increased level of understanding and knowledge of the 
nature of the problem that is being addressed.  Research into causal maps as 
epistemic objects could provide additional insight how the decision-makers’ 
knowledge and understanding evolves within confounds of one particular 
artifact rather than the enactment across different types of artifact.  
2.3.1 BOUNDARY OBJECTS 
 Literature on boundary objects provides an additional dimension to 
epistemic objects as strategy work often involves actors across the organization. 
Top management teams are composed of senior managers across the 
organization and they collectively engage in strategy work including strategic 
decision-making (Hambrick, 1994; Crossland and Hambrick, 2011).  This 
literature explores how repositories, forms, sketches, drawings, workflow 
matrices, physical and IT objects such as PowerPoint, metaphors, and narratives 
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“play an important role in coordinating and in cross-disciplinary work” (Nicolini, 
Mengis, and Swan, 2012, p. 616), bridging divides, and sharing reference points 
(Jarzabowski and Kaplan, 2014).  Boundary objects, although they share similar 
properties with material and other epistemic objects, are often seen 
predominately in the context of their function as translation devices, or 
boundary spanning tools, between and across professional boundaries and work 
communities.  
 The idea of boundary objects derives from the field of science studies, and 
highlights the capacity of these artifacts to support collaboration and act as 
bridges across diverse groups of specialists (Carlile, 2002, 2004; Carlile and 
Rebentisch, 2003; Levina, 2005).  Although there is evidence in the literature 
that boundary objects facilitate cross-disciplinary collaboration and creativity, 
different objects can be perceived and understood differently by agents or 
groups taking part in the cross-disciplinary effort.  In order for boundary objects 
to provide support for a collaborative effort they should provide the motivation 
and drive for collaboration to take place.  In addition, these objects should allow 
participants to work across different types of boundaries, and they should 
constitute the fundamental infrastructure of activity (Nicolini, Mengis, and Swan, 
2012).  Most importantly, although boundary objects can create conditions for 
collaboration and interpretive flexibility, they may also possess the capacity to 
be experienced as epistemic objects that embody lack of ‘completeness of being’ 
and the ‘structure of wantings’ of what one does not yet know (Knorr-Cetina, 
2001).  As epistemic objects, boundary objects become embedded with deep 
emotional holding power that generates intimate attachment which in turn 
creates social bonds that act as a drive and desire toward a shared objective 
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(Knorr-Cetina, 1997).  In collective strategic decision-making context, the ability 
of boundary objects to possess the qualities of epistemic objects, and vice a versa, 
is vital as actors from diverse cross-functional backgrounds face many differing 
strategic problems and priorities, and they may provide the means of developing 
goal congruence among such managers.  Spee and Jarzabowski (2009) suggest 
that epistemic objects may provide a common language for strategic 
conversations between managers across hierarchical, functional and geographic 
boundaries.  Hence, causal maps as epistemic objects may incorporate the 
qualities of boundary objects to facilitate cooperation and cross-disciplinary 
work across professional boundaries and work communities. 
2.4 CAUSAL MAPS AS EPISTEMIC OBJECTS 
 Managerial and organizational cognition research lies at the base of the 
literature on causal maps.  Herbert Simon’s assertion that human rationality is 
inevitably bounded means that every environment or context contains more 
stimuli than the human observer can recognize or process (Huff, 2005). Hence, 
decision-makers are forced to construct a simplified representation of reality, or 
a ‘mental model,’ that they use in an effort to navigate an uncertain and 
ambiguous world (Weick, 1990).   
 Managerial and organizational cognition research has led to the 
development and application of mapping procedures to explore decision-makers’ 
mental representations of strategic problems (Huff, 1990; Fiol and Huff, 1992; 
Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002; Huff and Jenkins, 2002; Ambrosini, 2001, 2003; 
Ambrosini and Bowman, 2002, 2008).  These mapping techniques aim to provide 
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a ‘tool-in-use’ for revealing decision-makers’ subjective beliefs in a graphical 
form so that they can be examined (Eden, 1992; Eden et al., 1992).    
 Although a map is not a full representation of an individual’s or a group’s 
entire belief system it can be deemed to provide a visual artifact of the most 
valuable and important beliefs as they pertain to a problem or a situation (Huff, 
1990).  Mapping can, therefore, be considered as an effort to elicit an individual’s 
or a group’s tacit, cognitive frames to an explicit form that can be entered into a 
decision-making process that may otherwise remain hidden or unexplored (Huff 
and Jenkins, 2002; Weick, 1990).  
 One of the most popular mapping methods that have been developed to 
explicate cognitive frames in strategic decision-making is the technique of causal 
mapping (Axelrod, 1976).  These types of map depict the perceived pattern of 
causal relationships between a set of variables notated by nodes and arrows that 
link them together (Laukkanen, 1994).  Causal maps surface issues, assumptions, 
concerns, facts, assertions, and constraints within a structured system of 
causality.  These maps, therefore, enable decision-makers to make sense and 
develop a deeper understanding of the situation and the consequences of option 
outcomes surrounding a problem (Eden and Ackermann, 2010).  According to 
Weick and Bougon (1986, p. 107) maps “place concepts in relation to one 
another…they impose structure on vague situations.”   
 Kelly’s personal construct theory (1955) as well as Weick’s (1979) theory 
of ‘sensemaking’ underpin much of the theoretical development of causal 
mapping practice and the epistemic nature of causal maps as situated material 
artifacts.  Causal maps enable decision-makers to attribute cause and effect 
relationships in their attempts to make sense of a situation that in turn leads to 
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decisive action. Kelly’s cognitive theory describes how people make sense of the 
world in order to act on it.  Kelly perceives people as problem solvers who make 
sense of the world through the use of a system of constructs that enable them to 
develop a definition of the situation they face. The map is, therefore, an attempt 
to capture a situation through the eyes and minds of decision-makers who are 
engaged in interpreting and responding to the problem situation (Jenkins, 2003). 
 Similarly, Weick’s work on ‘sense making’ is a vital theoretical component 
in causal mapping as people strive to make sense through action.  According to 
Weick (1990), maps provide a simplified frame within which experience can be 
understood.  Some parts of the map confirm experience but parts of it are 
discrepant with it.  It is this discrepancy with current experience that activates 
‘self-correcting’ action.  Maps, however inaccurate, are bound up with action, 
“both the action that is ongoing when the map is first invoked, and the action that 
occurs subsequent to the discovery of the map” (Weick, 1990 p. 9).  According to 
Weick maps provide the managers the means to fashion disconnected 
abstractions into more plausible patterns.  However, managers have to overcome 
the myth that maps are a credible version of the totality of their experience that 
warrants an ability to act intentionally.  An important feature of a causal map is 
that it leads managers to anticipate some order ‘out there.’  Hence, it matters less 
what particular order is portrayed than that an order of some kind is portrayed 
and it prompts managers to take action. “The map animates managers, and the 
fact of animation, not the map itself, is what imposes order on the situation.  
Thus, trappings of rationality such as strategic plans are important largely as 
binding mechanisms.  They hold events together long enough and tight enough in 
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people’s heads so that they do something in the belief that their action will be 
influential” (Weick 1990, p. 8).   
 In other words, causal maps are epistemic objects that provide an anchor, 
a starting point, for managers to think about the problem situation.  Once activity 
gets under way, the map itself may become secondary.  In Weick’s view the 
accuracy of the map is not the main objective in decision-making, but it is the 
process of mapping that will lead to action that provides an impetus to change a 
static representation of the changing circumstances that managers face.  Again, 
to quote Weick: “…. if you are lost any old map will do…a map of a wrong 
competitor can get people talking so they find their way into the right niche” 
(1990, p. 4).   The action orientation of Weick’s maps is echoed by Huff (1990, p. 
16): “…causal maps allow the map maker to focus on action - for example, how 
the respondent explains the current situation in terms of previous events, and 
what changes he or she expects in the future.”    
 Although Weick and Huff theorize causal maps as action oriented 
epistemic objects that animate managers, it should be also be noted that the 
mapping process itself may lead into a development of novel insights to the 
problem.  Miettinen and Virkkunen (2005) state that epistemic objects such as 
causal maps are objects of inquiry that “produce novel and alternative ways of 
acting” (p. 438).  Furthermore, Weick’s theorizing about the central role of 
animation as the primary provider of order may be contrary to the evidence 
offered by research in epistemic objects.  As Kaplan (2011) points out Power 
Points as epistemic objects function both as a medium and an outcome of a 
discursive process that are essential to the firm’s strategy-making.  Therefore, it 
can be theorized that causal maps as epistemic objects animate decision-makers, 
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but the map itself, as an outcome of the mapping process, may also have an 
important role in the final decision.   
2.5 GROUP CAUSAL MAPS IN COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING 
 Group causal maps as ‘tools-in-use’ are of particular interest in strategy 
work as important top management team members often make decisions 
collectively. An effective use of group maps can be considered important in 
strategy work as a decision-making group can share these visual artifacts, and 
they may provide potential to influence the strategic direction of a firm 
(Schwenk, 1988, 1995). 
 In contrast to individually constructed causal maps, group causal maps 
aggregate the thinking of many people, including conflicting views, subtly 
different slants on the same issues, and different perspectives held by individual 
group members.  Group maps are socially constructed artifacts of simplified 
representations of the beliefs of the greater group.  They may not necessarily be 
a representation of reality perceived by any one or all group members.  Rather, a 
group map is a collectively constructed and shared account of a given situation 
by all group members.  The construction of group maps can be helpful in 
surfacing assumptions and identifying connections and interactions between 
issues that surround the problem.  A group map is thus a visual interactive 
model; it acts as a form of a transitional object that encourages dialogue (Eden 
and Ackermann, 1998).   
 Group mapping could be perceived simplistically as a form of 
brainstorming.  However, Eden and Ackerman (2010) draw a distinction 
between group causal maps and a free-flowing brainstorming of ideas.  Group 
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mapping that is used for decision-making is focused on surfacing issues and 
concerns.  These are usually activities or events that can either support or 
challenge the decision-making aspiration of the group.  In contrast to surfacing 
‘off-the-wall’ ideas in group brainstorming sessions and as the means of 
unleashing creativity, group causal mapping focuses on surfacing the group 
members’ current wisdom, experience, as well as issues surrounding the 
problem situation.  Therefore, group causal mapping is a process of engaging in a 
dialogue to surface causality between the problem and a number of potential 
solution outcomes that become visually elaborated as a map.  This process 
provides the means for the decision-making group to structure and merge 
differing perspectives that should lead eventually into a shared understanding of 
the issue in a holistic manner.  Eden and Ackerman (2010. p. 243) argue “…not 
only is a better understanding derived from seeing the whole and thus a better 
outcome, but a better appreciation of the organization’s context is also elicited.”  
 Nutt (2002) in his research into ‘failed’ decisions has pointed out that the 
development of sound group decision-making processes is critical in order for 
groups to achieve substantive decision outcomes.  Nutt (2002) considers the 
effective decision-making process to comprise of five stages: collecting 
information to understand the claims calling for action, establishing a direction 
that indicates the desired result, engaging in a systematic search for ideas, 
evaluating these ideas with the direction in mind, and managing the social and 
political barriers that can block the preferred course of action during the 
decision implementation stage. Therefore, to assess the viability of group causal 
maps in eliciting multiple perspectives and providing the means for managers to 
produce substantive decision outcomes, the mapping process has to be effective 
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in addressing complex group decision-making process challenges. 
2.5.1 EFFECTIVE GROUP CAUSAL MAPS 
 Eden and Ackermann (2010) have built on Nutt’s (2002) effective 
decision-making processes by suggesting that without addressing decision-
making process issues it is unlikely that multiple perspectives of the individuals 
in the decision-making group will be made explicit in causal maps.  They posit 
that in developing a group problem definition using causal maps attention must 
be paid to achieving both substantive mapping and process outcomes…”where 
process outcomes are an end in themselves but also significantly influence the 
extent to which substantive outcomes can be achieved” (Eden and Ackermann, 
2010, p. 241).  Therefore, in an effective group causal map there is a total lack of 
separation between the mapping process and the content that is being surfaced.  
The researchers suggest that an effective group causal map should possess the 
intertwined characteristics that are presented in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2 – Characteristics of effective group causal maps 
Substantive Mapping Outcomes Mapping Process Outcomes 
Maps surface multiple perspectives held 
by group members that pertain to the 
problem.  
Mapping addresses the fact that 
individuals have their own 
concerns/issues and claim that these 
factors are important for the group to 
address during the decision-making 
process. 
Issues in the map should be arranged in a 
hierarchical structure by understanding 
how one issue might motivate or support, 
or be supported by another issue. 
Mapping allows an opportunity for group 
members to make a point, release anger, 
tension, and frustration.  
Maps elaborate and build on the views of 
group members and they explain claims 
through causality. 
Mapping opens up the problem by 
encouraging divergence of opinions before 
a process of convergence of opinions 
commences.  
Maps detect and reveal emergent patterns 
and properties within the resultant 
hierarchical group map. 
Mapping seeks to gain ownership of the 
issues from the entire group.  As group 
members become increasingly involved in 
the mapping process they become more 
committed to the decision outcome. 
Maps enable creative and shared outcomes 
to emerge. 
Group members are more likely to become 
committed to the decision if they think 
that the process of reaching it was fair and 
just. 
 Mapping promotes shared understanding 
and joint learning. 
 Mapping provides an opportunity for self-
reflection for each group member and the 
group as a whole. 
 Mapping provides an opportunity for the 
development of personal and professional 
relationships that enables continuing joint 
working among group members. 
 
Source: Adapted from Eden and Ackermann (2010) 
 
According to Eden and Ackermann (2010), the achievement of both 
substantive and process outcomes of group causal maps can be viewed to meet 
Nutt’s (2002) criteria for effective decision-making: collecting information to 
 45 
understand the claims calling for action, establishing a direction that indicates 
the desired result, mounting a systematic search for ideas, evaluating ideas with 
a direction in mind, and managing and measuring social and political barriers 
that can block the preferred course of action.   
In addition, Eden and Ackermann (2010) posit that the shared and public 
construction of the group causal map increases individual ownership, acceptance, 
and the fairness of the decision-outcomes as the map shows evidence that all 
decision-making group members have been listened to and their claims have 
been displayed on the map.  
 Eden and Ackermann do not address the efficacy of group causal maps in 
mitigating managerial cognitive biases such as groupthink.  Nor is the 
relationship between cognitive and affective conflict in the context of collective 
decision-making addressed. However, these may have been implicitly assumed 
as the group mapping process is posited to provide a rigorous process for 
surfacing and evaluation of competing views to the decision problem as well as 
increased level of ownership if decision-makers view the decision-making 
process fair and just. 
2.5.2 AFFORDANCES OF GROUP CAUSAL MAPS 
 In order to assess the effectiveness of causal maps as a managerial 
decision-making ‘tool-in-use,’ one needs to consider the affordances that 
influence how managers approach decision-making problems.   Affordances are a 
form of materiality that enable or constrain a specific tool’s use (Gibson, 1986; 
Hutchby, 2001), and they therefore motivate skilled individuals to act and 
become aware of action possibilities (Demir, 2015). 
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 Recently, Jarzabowski and Kaplan (2015) developed a conceptual 
framework for examining how the affordances of strategy tools and the agency of 
strategists interacted to shape how and when tools were selected and applied.  
According to the authors, organizational actors and tools interact in the selection, 
application, and achievement of outcomes associated with the tools-in-use. 
While tools may the most appropriate for a specific type of problem solving it 
is not clear that managers inside organizations pick or use tools for these 
reasons. Jarzabkowski and Kaplan (2015) suggest that the choice of a tool is 
shaped by actors’ competence in their use and their boundedly rational 
satisficing where a variety of tools could be considered appropriate for solving 
a particular strategic problem.  In addition to gaining an understanding of the 
tool-in-use selection, practice research should also focus on the use of tools for 
creating common language about strategy and offering spaces for the 
negotiation of interests (Jarzabkowski and Kaplan, 2015).  
 At present there is little understanding of the affordances of strategy 
tools-in-use (Jarzabkowski and Kaplan, 2015), and in particular, how 
organizational actors visually interact with strategy tools-in-use and the role of 
tool affordances in this process.  One of the first studies on the visual 
interaction between actors and strategy tools and their affordances workshop 
was conducted by Paroutis, Franco, and Papadopoulos (2015).  The research 
was conducted in a facilitated workshop setting where the actors were engaged 
with the help of a consulting team in the construction of a strategy map to 
assess the organization’s strategy.  However, more research is called for, 
especially visual research, to explore the use of tools and their affordances in 
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different contexts such as decision-making.  In addition, as much of the 
research in strategy tools has a senior management bias, there is a need to 
expand future research to cover a wider selection of organizational participants 
to include both junior and middle managers as strategy practice is no longer the 
exclusive domain of the top management (Jarzabkowski and Kaplan, 2015). 
2.6 GROUP DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ISSUES 
 In contrast to the earlier literature such as Huff (1990), Laukkanen 
(1998), Hodgkinson and Sparrow (2002) much of the recent literature on causal 
mapping has underemphasized the cognitive issues such as managerial 
attribution biases that may have an impact on mapping effectiveness.  If 
epistemic objects such as causal maps can be used as an effective ‘tools-in-use’ to 
improve the quality of collective decision-making processes, then they need to be 
able to address the main group decision-making process issues. This section 
reviews group decision-making processes that are directly relevant to effective 
group mapping.  It should be noted, however, that this review does not include 
issues that may arise from social factors such as cultural differences (Hofstede, et 
al., 1997; Crossland and Hambrick, 2011).  Instead it covers aspects of group 
dynamics that are considered to be uniform across cultures such as cognitive 
biases (Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman, 2011; Thaler, 2015; Janis, 1972; 
1989). 
 In complex decision situations, groups have been shown to have better 
problem solving capabilities than individuals acting alone (Daft et al., 1993; van 
Ginkel and van Knippenberg, 2009).  This may be because group members bring 
a variety of information, critical judgment, solution strategies, and a wide range 
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of perspectives to the decision problem (Shaw, 1981).  However, groups can be 
subject to conflict and cognitive biases that may hinder the quality of decision 
outcomes and group members’ decision acceptance.  In addition to a range of 
cognitive biases (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982), the main group biases 
are risky shift (Stoner, 1968), groupthink (Janis, 1972, 1989), and the Abilene 
paradox (Harvey, 1988), and group conflict may arise when individuals with 
competing claims clash.  Group decision-making, therefore, produces a 
managerial conundrum. On the one hand, multiple perspectives provided by 
group members can add insight into the problem situation.  On the other hand, 
group diversity can produce fragmentation, conflict, action paralysis, or 
groupthink.   
 Jarzabowski and Kaplan (2104) point out that the sole focus should not be 
on whether strategy-makers ‘get it right’ in terms of firm performance.  Instead, 
the practice lens on strategy tools-in-use points us toward outcomes related to 
strategy making such as the settlement of a decision, the strategy makers’ overall 
satisfaction with the outcome, the degree of contestation in the process or the 
discretion of actors in the decision-making situation.  Expanding the criteria for 
the effectiveness of outcomes to assess, scholars should examine how and why 
actors use tools and how the use of a tool constrains and enables strategy making 
beyond organizational outcomes  (Jarzabowski and Kaplan, 2014). 
2.6.1 COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE CONFLICT 
 Research into group decision-making has shown that group member 
interaction may produce two types of conflict: cognitive and affective conflict 
(Hambrick, 1994; Amason, 1996).  Cognitive conflict has been shown to improve 
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decision-making quality, while affective conflict has been demonstrated to have a 
negative impact on group members’ decision acceptance (Amason, 1996; 
Mooney et al., 2007; Parayitam and Dooley, 2007, 2009).  Pioneering work by 
Amason (1996) provided a convincing argument that cognitive conflict is 
beneficial in decision-making, which has been corroborated in subsequent 
research (Amason and Schweiger, 1997; De Dreu, 2006; De Dreu and Van 
deVliert, 1997; Parayitam and Dooley, 2009).  In contrast, decisions that are 
based on team consensus with a low level of cognitive conflict is considered to 
increase the acceptance and ‘feel good’ factor among the decision-makers, but 
the low level of cognitive conflict in consensus based decision-making is 
considered to produce lower quality decision outcomes (Schweiger, Sandberg, 
and Ragan, 1986).  
 The accepted assumption in the literature is that cognitive conflict 
improves decision-making quality (Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Mooney et al., 2007; 
Schweiger, Sandberg, and Ragan, 1986).  This has prompted researchers to 
explore how to create cognitive conflict in collective decision-making situations.  
A great deal of research has accumulated on techniques such as devil’s advocacy 
and dialectical inquiry, which encourage critical interaction between decision-
making group members.  Devil’s advocacy and dialectical inquiry have been 
shown to create more cognitive conflict in decision-making groups compared to 
the consensus approach.  Schweiger, Sandberg, and Ragan’s (1986) research 
indicated that both dialectical inquiry and devil's advocacy led to higher quality 
assumptions and decision outcomes than the consensus approach in decision-
making. Dialectical inquiry was also deemed to be more effective than devil's 
advocacy with respect to the quality of assumptions brought to the surface.  
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However, informants in the consensus groups expressed more satisfaction and 
desire to continue to work with their groups and indicated a greater level of 
decision acceptance than those who were asked to apply dialectical inquiry and 
devil’s advocacy in their groups’ decision-making process. 
This type of manipulation of decision-making groups to increase the level 
of cognitive conflict is designed to improve the quality of the decision-making 
processes, as it results in the consideration of diverse perspectives (Amason, 
1996; Schweiger, Sandberg, and Ragan, 1986; Schweiger, Sandberg, and Rechner, 
1989; Schwenk, 1995). However, recent research suggests that although 
cognitive conflict may increase performance through better quality decision-
making, there is a danger that the beneficial cognitive conflict spills into a 
dysfunctional, affective, conflict that results in a inverse relationship between 
decision outcome and decision acceptance (Mooney et al., 2007; Parayitam and, 
Dooley 2011).   
Affective conflict tends to be emotional and such conflict focuses on 
personal incompatibilities or disputes (Jehn, 1995; Amason, 1996).  These 
disputes result from group members’ personal judgments that they are not fully 
able to articulate to other decision-making group members.  The more these 
personal judgments influence decisions, the more there is potential for decision-
making group members to speculate and find reasons to distrust the motivation 
and hidden agendas of their group members (Mooney et al., 2007).  Hence, too 
much affective conflict may hinder overall group performance as the decision is 
not accepted by some decision-making group members regardless of the quality 
of the decision outcome (De Dreu, 2006; Van Dyne, et al., 2002; Parayitam and 
Dooley, 2011).  Parayitam and Dooley’s (2011) research indicates that too much 
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cognitive conflict in a decision-making group may breed contempt.  Therefore, 
the researchers suggest that moderate levels of cognitive conflict should be 
maintained to ensure high quality decision outcomes, but in order to maintain 
group cohesion, managers should be mindful that cognitive conflict is positively 
correlated with affective conflict.  Although there is evidence that causal maps 
encourage debate and the shared construction of group causal maps may 
increase decision-acceptance (Eden and Ackerman, 2010) the dynamic how 
cognitive and affective conflict evolve during the mapping process has not been 
addressed. 
2.6.2 MANAGERIAL COGNITIVE BIASES 
 Managerial biases pose another challenge for group decision-making.  The 
growing recognition of the prevalence of cognitive biases in strategic decision-
making has resulted in a proliferation of studies to ascertain how managerial 
attribution biases affect strategic thinking, strategy development and 
implementation.  
 Hodgkinson et al. (1999) and Maule and Hodgkinson (2002) point out 
that bounded rationality and a variety of heuristics are deployed by managers in 
an effort to simplify reality.  This gives rise to cognitive biases, which in turn may 
result in inappropriate, or suboptimal strategic decisions, as managers make 
decisions under conditions of information inadequacy and other forms of 
uncertainty and ambiguity.  To deal with these challenges as they pertain to 
strategic decision-making processes, Maule and Hodgkinson (2002) undertook 
two experimental studies to establish whether or not the effects of a ‘framing 
bias’ could be eliminated, or attenuated, using an individual, self-constructed, 
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causal mapping technique.  Their research that was conducted with students, 
inexperienced decision-makers, and managers, as experienced decision-makers, 
suggests that causal mapping techniques may help managers to overcome 
‘framing biases’ of the sort identified by behavioral decision researchers, under 
controlled, experimental conditions.  However, the research findings have not 
been collaborated as demonstrated by Wright and Goodwin (2002) who 
replicated Hodgkinson et al. (1999) research.  Wright and Goodwin argue that 
the presence of confounding effects in the experimental design and the absence 
of appropriate control conditions in Hodgkinson et al. (1999) research meant 
that the incremental value of causal mapping was not demonstrated or explained.  
In addition, Maule and Hodgkinson’s (2002) causal mapping experiments were 
not administered to decision-making groups but they were administered to 
individual decision-makers.  Therefore, additional research is needed to 
administer causal mapping experiments not only to individual decision-makers 
but causal mapping should also be applied in a collective decision-making 
context to ascertain whether causal maps may eliminate cognitive biases in 
strategic decision-making.  
 In conclusion, epistemic objects and their affordances in collective 
decision-making remains an under-researched area.  The review of the literature 
reveals a number of gaps in our knowledge.  First, most practice-based studies 
have focused on discursive practices rather than studying the actual enactment 
of epistemic objects by decision-makers.  Second, most causal mapping studies 
have been conducted in environments where the map enactment has been 
facilitated by expert consultants.  Third, the relationship between cognitive and 
affective conflict, as well as decision acceptance in the enactment an epistemic 
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object has not been fully explored.  Fourth, the effectiveness of epistemic objects 
of eliminating managerial biases including groupthink has not been conclusively 
proven by prior research.  Finally, understanding how agents interact with a 
decision-making ‘tools-in-use’ in practice and whether such agent/epistemic 
object interaction may improve the quality of decision-making processes in a 
collective decision-making context remain an under researched areas of inquiry. 
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CHAPTER III: RESEARCH STRATEGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter provides a link between the research question that was 
identified through the literature review and the later sections of the thesis that 
follow on the research method and the empirical work that was carried out.  
According to Blaikie (2007) and Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) it is vital that a 
clear link between the research question and empirical research is established in 
terms of the logics of inquiry. 
 Laughlin (1995) states that research strategy is not a matter of extremes.  
It is often presented as either/or choices between objective versus subjective, or 
in other words, the choice between positivist versus constructivist orientations.  
However, according to Laughlin (1995) methodological choices are a matter of 
degree.   
 In my research I adopt a critical realist perspective that treats social 
context and the materiality as separate existing ‘entities.’  However, the social 
and the material become sociomaterial as actors imbricate social and material 
agencies through practice.  In order to gain insight into the sociomaterial 
practice, I will use activity theory (Leontiev, 1978) as a frame for my empirical 
research to consider the enactment of epistemic objects in collective decision-
making context by focusing on the interaction between the individual, the 
collective, the epistemic object itself, and the evolving stream of praxis. 
 I am mindful of the tension between the two contrasting epistemological 
‘building’ and ‘dwelling’ worldviews (Chia and Rasche, 2010; Chia and MacKay, 
2007).  Organizational actors may approach a strategic task with clear 
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intentionality, but one should not reject the proposition that the expression of 
intentionality may be a product of post-facto justification, or that agents create 
meaning to a task as they ‘deal with a work at hand.’   Adopting the Heideggerian 
onto-epistemological perspective to strategy practice (Tsoukas, 2010) bridges 
this divide and it enables me to be stay alert to strategy practice that may 
emanate from actors’ both intentional and non-deliberate coping activities.   
3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 In social sciences there are two contrasting extreme research positions: 
positivism and social constructivism.  The former research tradition posits that 
the social world exists externally and its properties can be examined through 
objective research methods.  This is in contrast to social constructivism that the 
existence of the social world is inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection, 
and intuition (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008).   
 Positivism and social constructivism differ in their ontological and 
epistemological assumptions in that the positivist paradigm considers that 
reality is external and objective and that knowledge is only of significance if it is 
derived from observations of this external reality.  In contrast, the social 
constructivist paradigm is based on the assumption that reality is socially 
constructed and determined by actors rather than objective external factors.  
Therefore, the focus of social constructivist research should be on what people, 
individually and collectively feel and think; attention should be paid to ways they 
communicate with each other, either verbally of non-verbally (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2008).  
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 The extreme positivist notion has been modified by relativists such as 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) and Latour (2005) who suggest that scientific laws 
may not be immutable and ideas may only gain acceptance as being ‘true’ after 
much debate and discussion that is tied to the personal careers and statuses of 
the researchers.  Furthermore, Knorr-Cetina (1983) states that the acceptance of 
any particular theory and the closure of a scientific debate on the theory may be 
highly influenced by the politics of business and commercial resources.  In social 
sciences where the subject of the study is people rather than physical objects, a 
variant of the relativist position has become known as the idea of critical realism.  
Critical realism starts with Bhaskar’s (1989) realist ontology and then 
incorporates an interpretive thread that makes a conscious compromise 
between the extreme positions.  Critical realism recognizes that social conditions 
may have real consequences whether they are observed and labeled by social 
scientists and that concepts are human constructions (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008). 
 Positivism has been the dominant perspective in much of strategic 
management research.  However, in order to understand the central questions of 
how agency and structure, and individual action and institutions are linked in 
social systems, cultures and organizations requires us to reject positivism as the 
means of understanding human activity within the ‘black box’ of strategy work 
(Golsorkhi et al., 2010). One alternative would be to work from a relativist 
position.  This would require that multiple perspectives be adopted through 
triangulation of views of large survey samples, and even so, it would only be a 
matter of probability that the views collected would provide an accurate 
indication of the underlying situation. The second alterative would be social 
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constructivism.  Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) state that researchers starting from 
the constructivist viewpoint do not assume any pre-existing reality and their aim 
is to understand how people invent constructs to help them understand what is 
going on around them.  Therefore, much attention is given to the use of language 
and conversations between people as they create their own social reality.  Social 
constructivist researchers should also recognize that as observers of this social 
construction they can never be separated from the actors’ sense-making process 
that are being observed, and “that theories which apply to the subjects of their 
work must also be relevant to themselves (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008, p. 63).  
 Placing the research within the social constructivist research paradigm 
provides me with a theoretical basis to examine micro-level social activity and 
the construction of social reality by actors in the real world context. However, a 
critical realist perspective of sociomateriality assumes that the material exists, 
such as the concept of causal maps that are independent of the actors, and the 
social and the material become sociomaterial as actors imbricate the social and 
the material through practices such as intentional or unintentional action, 
cognition, embodied material practices, and discourse. 
3.3 ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN 
PRACTICE-BASED STRATEGY RESEARCH 
 
 This section discusses the ontological and epistemological considerations 
in the context of practice-based research.  Different perspectives are compared 
and contrasted in terms of their applicability to my research problem and the 
empirical research undertaking.   
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3.3.1 ONTOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 Blaikie defines ontology as “a branch of philosophy that is concerned with 
the nature of what exists” (2007, p. 13).  The practice lens in strategy research 
breaks with the traditional objective ontological notion that strategy is 
something that organizations have.  Rather, the practice perspective in strategy 
understands strategy as something that people do (Johnson et al., 2003).  
According to Golsorkhi et al. (2010) this reconceptualization of strategy as a 
practice implies an ontological shift in three ways.  First, under the practice lens, 
strategy can no longer be considered as something stable that can be observed, 
but it constitutes a reality in flux.  Second, strategy is no longer located at the 
organizational level but it permeates across the organization from individual 
action to the institutional level.  Third, the world of strategy constitutes a social 
reality that is created and recreated in the interactions between a number of 
actors both inside and outside the organization.   
 Orlikowski (2010) distinguishes three ontological perspectives in 
practice-based research that are derived from different understandings of 
practice by researchers.  The first research orientation treats strategy practice as 
a ‘phenomenon’ that studies strategy as a practical activity and a direct 
experience.  This type of research makes a distinction between practice and 
theory and it recognizes that there is a gap between scientific knowledge and the 
lived reality.  To bridge this gap researchers who apply this phenomenological 
lens to practice seek to engage more deeply in the empirical details of 
organizational life on the ground level.  Research techniques in this type of 
research seek to get close to practitioners and their situated activities.  
Participant observation and ethnographical studies are the most common means 
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of capturing and obtaining a better understanding of the practitioners at work.  
 A key contribution of studies of strategy practice as a ‘phenomenon’ is the 
claim and evidence that practice is important (Orlikowksi, 2010).  Research must 
be empirically engaged in order to understand organizational reality and act as 
the basis for improving this reality.  The outcomes of such studies are more likely 
to be directly relevant to the practitioners and the contexts where the studies 
were conducted.  However, making generalizations from these types of studies is 
more challenging.  In particular, such study insights are bounded, both 
historically and contextually, and any theory that is built from participant 
observation studies is necessarily rooted in specific conditions.  Orlikowksi 
(2010) states that although these types of action research projects are valuable 
they should not seek to build or test theory, but focus on understanding living 
systems in action and how to change them (Orlikowski, 2010).   
 The second type of ontological orientation considers strategy practice as a 
‘theoretical practice perspective’ for studying social phenomenon.  Apart from 
studying the actual phenomenon, researchers draw on practice-centered theory 
in their studies (Golsorkhi et al., 2010).   Orlikowski (2010, p. 25) cites Lave 
(1988) in explaining the ‘theoretical practice perspective’ as the means of 
shifting attention to the routine, lived character of the everyday activity that 
serves as the object of analysis.  However, this everyday activity is not simply a 
focus on the mundane and the micro-aspects of the organization.  Instead, the 
‘theoretical practice perspective’ argues that that it is through the situated and 
recurrent nature of everyday activity that theoretical consequences are 
produced and they become reinforced or changed over time.  This theoretical 
view of practice entails a specific theoretical grounding and the main 
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contribution of the practice perspective is the claim that practices shape reality, 
and analytical rigor is gained by treating practices as a focal lens through which 
to inquire into social reality.  This ontological view is echoed by Werle and Seidl 
(2015) that the ‘theoretical practice perspective’ is well positioned to address 
organizational phenomena that are posited to be relational, dynamic, and 
emergent because it entails a theoretically grounded understanding of recursive 
interaction among people, activities, artifacts, and contexts. 
 The third and the last of Orlikowski (2010) ontological perspectives is the 
notion of strategy practice as a particular ‘ontology’ that conceives practice as 
constitutive of all social reality where the actors and agency are treated as a 
product of their practices.  This perspective assumes that if social life is 
constituted in practices, then so do practices of social science participate directly 
in the constitution of social reality.  This perspective has profound 
epistemological implications to social science research.  Orlikowksi (2010) states 
that in order for such ontological perspective to be adapted, then 
“representational epistemology needs to be displaced” (p. 30), as one could no 
longer adhere to the generally accepted belief in the ontological distinction 
between representations and entities to be represented.  However, Orlikowksi 
(2010) acknowledges that although strategy practice as ontology may provide 
interesting insights to contemporary organizational life, such an orientation 
would necessarily challenge the established institutional norms, practices, and 
criteria of organizational research that is based on representational 
epistemology. 
 The majority of practice-based research in strategy is founded on the first 
two ontological perspectives.  The first ontological perspective of strategy 
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practice as ‘phenomenon,’ has been often been critiqued for producing anecdotal 
studies, however interesting they might be, and for their weakness in theoretical 
development (Orlikowksi, 2010; Jarzabowski, 2005; Johnson et al., 2007).  Hence, 
recent practice-based research tends to be grounded on the ontological basis 
that considers practice as a ‘theoretical perspective’ that provides theoretically 
grounded understanding of human activity.  For example, Lave (1988) drew on 
practice theory to offer an argument that cognition did not only take place ‘in the 
head’ but it should also be understood as enacted in practice. Furthermore, 
technology studies such as Giddens (1984) and Orlikowski (1992, 1996, 2000) 
have applied structuration theory of memory traces to show how users 
recurrently enact technology structures, or technologies-in-practice, and how 
they shape outcomes that emerge from the use of technologies.  Finally, activity 
theoretical perspective has been applied in the study of organizational and 
strategy practices (Blackler, 1993, 1995; Groleau, 2006; Jarzabowski 2003, 
2005).  This extension allows the activity theoretical lens to be applied to the 
study of the interaction between practitioners, practices, and the praxis as an 
integral part of an organizational activity system.  Jarzabkowski (2010) states 
that activity theory is a particularly suitable perspective for the study of socially 
accomplished practice as it draws attention to the interaction between the 
individual and the wider social group.  In other words, the focus on individual is 
always sensitive to the collective practices and social interactions of the system 
in which the individual acts.  This orientation “enables a study of strategy 
practitioners that also pays attention to the strategy practices that they draw 
upon and the strategy praxis in which they are engaged” (Jarzabkowski 2010, p. 
129). 
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 Jarzabowski (2010) presents an activity system model that that can be 
applied to an interrelated study of practitioners, practices, and the praxis.  The 
model is depicted in the Figure 3 below. 
Figure 2 - An activity system model for studying strategy practice 
 
 
Source: Jarzabowski (2010) 
 In the figure subject (A) are actors who are conceptualized as strategy 
practitioners.  Strategy practice is understood in relation to the collective (B) 
that comprises the other practitioners with whom individual actors (A) interact 
in pursuit of goal-directed activity (C).  According to Leontiev (1978) activity is 
both goal oriented and that it is directed towards a shared outcome. Following 
this, different actors in the activity system input their individual actions into an 
Culturally and historically situated and evolving 
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evolving activity 
system over time 
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ongoing activity of an activity system.  Thus, actors (A) associate with the 
collective (B) in constructing goal oriented activity (C) within the mediating 
activity system framework (D). According to Engestrom (1993) the mediation 
occurs through situated strategy practices such as strategy artifacts, strategy 
processes, and strategy language that enable interaction between the actors and 
they community.   The strategy making activity flows over time (E) as is 
indicated by the curved arrows that represents that “the system is not static but 
is in a constant state of becoming” Jarzabowski (2010, p. 130).  The implication 
of this dynamic activity is that although it may be studied at any given point in 
time it is constantly being constructed and it can give an insight into the 
interactions between actors, their community and the praxis that is 
accomplished in these interactions.   
3.3.2 EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 Epistemology is “a theory of knowledge…of how human beings come to 
have the knowledge of the world around them (however this is regarded), of 
how we know what we know” (Blaikie 2007, p. 18).  The dominant 
epistemological view in strategy research, including strategy-as-practice 
research is based on two key assumptions.  The first assumption is that 
individuals are treated as discretely bounded entities.  The second assumption is 
that there is a clear divide between the mental and physical realm, i.e. that 
cognition and mental representations precede any meaningful and purposeful 
action.  This implies that any action is a deliberately designed and planned form 
of activity.   Therefore, strategic action is explained with reference to the 
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meaning and intention of actors that assumes an application of the means-ends 
logic of such strategic activity (Chia and Rasche, 2010).   
 Chia and MacKay (2007), however, critique this dominant approach in 
practice-based research on the basis of ‘methodological individualism’ that seeks 
to explain strategic behavior in terms of self-contained agents who act 
purposefully and consciously in their environment.  If individuals are perceived 
to be separated by invisible ‘walls,’ then this tends to obscure and distort our 
understanding of the life in the society (Elias, 1978).  This logic narrows the 
focus of research on what individual agents say or do to each other thereby 
excluding activities that are shaped by cultural, social, and historical norms and 
practices.  Although Tsoukas (2010) has some sympathy with the contention of 
the individualist bias in strategy making he nevertheless acknowledges the role 
intention plays a role in strategy making.  He states: “it is not often appreciated 
that while the making of strategy may occur in both non-deliberate and 
deliberate ways, strategizing is a conscious activity, typically involving deliberate 
actions” (Tsoukas 2010, p. 48). 
 Another epistemological conundrum is presented by what can be 
considered as strategic activity.  Jarzabowski et al. (2007) consider activity as 
strategic only when it is consequential for strategic outcomes, directions, 
survival, and competitive advantage.  According to Tsoukas (2010) this strict 
definition of what constitutes strategic activity conflates strategy making with 
intentionality, and it ignores activities that are considered strategic by actors, but 
which may not have organizational consequences.  Furthermore, Chia and 
Mackay (2007) point out that agents may act purposefully without having a 
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purpose in mind as they focus on solving problems at hand.  This intentionality 
that is not fully articulated may have strategic consequences. 
 Given this epistemological tension among the practice-based researchers 
Chia and Rasche (2010) draw on Heidegger to develop two contrasting 
epistemologies for strategy practice research.  Consistent with Heideggerian 
terminology Chia and Rasche (2010) call these two epistemological orientations 
as the ‘building worldview’ and the ‘dwelling worldview’ respectively.  Table 3 
below presents these contrasting epistemologies. 
Table 3– Contrasting epistemologies 
Building worldview Dwelling worldview 
Actors are self-conscious, intentional and 
self-motivated. 
Actors are non-deliberate, relationally 
constituted nexus of social activities. 
Actions are guided by predefined goals 
directing efforts towards outcomes 
through purposeful action. 
Actions are directed towards overcoming 
immediate impediment through purposive 
practical coping. 
Consistency of action is assumed to be 
ordered by deliberate intent. 
Consistency of action is assumed to be 
ordered by a modus operandi through an 
internalized disposition. 
Source: Chia and Rasche (2010) 
 According to Chia and Rasche (2010) the ‘building worldview’ 
epistemology is the dominant perspective in much of the strategy-as-practice 
research.  Such research is built on the assumption of an autonomous strategic 
actor relying on explicit knowledge to deliberately analyze, plan, and 
purposefully act to attain predefined goals. Moreover, Ingold (2000) points out 
that this view supposes that there is a pre-cognitive separation between the 
world and the strategy actors that necessitates them to construct a mental model 
of the world prior to engaging with it.  Although the attention of practice-based 
research is directed at the more micro-level everyday sense making activities, 
the focus remains on “what organizational strategists actually do and the rational 
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choices they make” (Chia and Rasche 2010, p. 41).   
 In contrast to the ‘building worldview,’ the ‘dwelling worldview’ involves 
an intimate encounter, a ‘being-in-the-world’ that suggests immediate 
unreflective familiarity, habit and custom.  People engage in ‘wayfinding’ 
(Hutchins, 1995) that creates pathways that radiate outwards from their 
concrete existential situations, or continually becoming of ‘being’ as they find 
their way through a world (Ingold, 2000). Chia and Rasche (2010) invoke 
Heidegger who writes: ‘Being-in . . . is an existential . . . “in” is derived from “inn” 
– “to reside”, “habitare”, “to dwell”’ (Heidegger, 1962: 80).  In other words, 
‘being-in-the-world’ implies an intimate familiarity that one has about ‘inhabiting 
a home.’  Heidegger believed that it is through this everyday dwelling activity 
that we achieve some form of intelligibility and not solely through having ideas 
and mental images.  In a similar manner, Polanyi (1969) emphasized the 
importance of personal, socially and experimentally derived knowing when he 
wrote about the significance and primacy of indwelling in his discussion of tacit 
knowledge in contrast to the explicit, codifiable knowledge. 
 Chia and Rasche (2010) do not contend that all research into strategy 
practice should eschew manifest elements of strategic activity, but they propose 
that practice research should not be limited to intentional activity alone.  Hence, 
research should make an effort to include the more mundane everyday coping 
actions of actors as well considering how engaging in practices is constitutive of 
actors themselves as subjects (Ezzamel and Willmott, 2008).  Furthermore, Chia 
and Mackay (2007) state that instead of individuals, organizations and their 
processes, activities and practices, it is practices and the transmitted regularities 
associated with them that should form the primary focus of attention for practice 
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researchers.  This is because the consistency of actions taken and observed over 
a period of time belies an immanent strategy that is historically and culturally 
transmitted through everyday practice.  
 This implies that to understand strategy emergence we need to develop 
research sensitivity to the unspoken, the inarticulate, and even oftentimes 
unconscious aspects of strategy making. Such forms of internalized knowing 
must therefore be gleaned from informants. Peripheral awareness and attention 
to seemingly insignificant details and events are a prerequisite for developing 
this research sensitivity (Chia and MacKay, 2007).  
 The question for the practice research in general, and my research in 
particular, becomes one of a choice of orientation and focus. Given the two 
contrasting epistemological orientations, should practice-based research be 
fenced around one or the other epistemological views?  A possible solution to 
bridge this epistemological divide is presented by an onto-epistemological 
orientation developed by Tsoukas (2010).  I will consider his proposed practice-
based research approach in the following section. 
3.3.3 HEIDEGGERIAN ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGY IN PRACTICE-BASED RESEARCH  
 Tsoukas (2010) states that the divide between the ‘building’ and ‘dwelling’ 
worldviews is not insurmountable.  He argues that an onto-epistemological 
framework that is inspired by Heideggerian phenomenology allows us to see 
how strategy making can be studied in its various manifestations.  Such a 
framework will allow: (1) practice-based research to overcome its individualist 
bias while allowing space for creative action, and (2) analytically relate 
deliberate and non-deliberate activity.  
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 Heideggerian phenomenology can be understood as a study of 
consciousness that is experienced from the first-person point of view. The 
central structure of a person’s experience is its intentionality when it is being 
directed toward something.   An experience is directed toward an object by the 
virtue of its content or meaning together with appropriate enabling conditions.  
Hence, conscious experience is the starting point of phenomenology, but 
experience blends with less overtly conscious phenomena.  A person is only 
vaguely aware of things in the margin of attention, and he is only implicitly 
aware of the wider horizon of things in the world around him. Moreover, as 
Heidegger emphasized, in practical activities such as walking along, hammering a 
nail, or speaking our native tongue, people are not explicitly conscious of their 
habitual patterns of action.  Hence much of intentional mental activity may not 
be conscious at all, but it becomes conscious if there is a breakdown in the 
habitual action and people come to realize how they feel or think about 
something (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013).   
 Tsoukas (2010) applies Heideggerian phenomenology to put forward an 
argument that practice-based research should be based on an onto-epistemology 
that acknowledges that strategies and sociomaterial practices may develop in 
various ways with a different degrees of intentionality.  Therefore, researchers 
should be alert to exploring the tacit understandings and internalized styles of 
practical activity including the body and its constitutive involvement in skilled 
action and the use of sociomaterial tools such as artifacts as well as language by 
actors.  As members of sociomaterial practices, organizational agents act on the 
basis of distinctions they have internalized through their involvement in strategy 
practice.  Such distinctions would constitute a background that enables actors to 
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relate spontaneously to the tasks at hand and, therefore, act non-deliberately or 
purposefully without having a purpose in mind.  In other words, actors do not 
pay explicit attention to what they do, they do what makes sense to them 
(Schatzki, 2007; Chia and Mackay, 2007) At the same time, researchers should 
also make space to consider deliberate modes of acting, and what is recognized 
as strategy is the outcome of the propensity to act deliberately and non-
deliberately in particular ways, and strategy is immanent in practical action 
(Chia and Holt, 2006). 
   Tsoukas (2010) defines non-deliberate acting as ‘practical coping’ with a 
developing situation.  Such coping is not mediated by mental representations but 
it comes about from an on-going integration of one’s activity as a practitioner 
within a particular sociomaterial practice. The latter has a teleo-affective 
structure of acting with an orientation towards an end, as Heidegger defines it, 
that makes action purposive and sensible.  Action that is often discernible in 
practical coping is mainly due to agents’ acting from the same background that 
shapes their actions.  Hence, strategy emerges over time from this coherent 
coping of actors within evolving practical situations.  
 When organizational actors encounter breakdowns in the spontaneous 
flow of their activities, habitual patterns, they develop explicit awareness and 
move to ‘deliberate coping.’ Actors pay explicit attention to what they do and 
retrospectively try to make sense of it through the articulation or re-
interpretation of their activity. Weick (1995) describes this as a patterned 
stream of actions when actors retrospectively make sense of what they do when 
they become explicitly aware of what they do as a result of some difficulty they 
have encountered.  Retrospective strategizing is evident in Porac et al. (1989) 
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study of the Scottish knitwear manufacturers.  Although the researchers attached 
labels such as ‘focus strategy’ to describe the Scottish knitwear industry’s 
strategy, the industry participants had to do with what they had available to 
them to carry out strategic actions.  In a sense their strategy was a product of 
non-deliberate coping that was shaped by the historical and cultural norms and 
the resources that were available to industry participants. 
 Strategy and strategic thinking therefore emerges as a process of 
deliberate actions and thinking that are combined with the non-deliberate 
practical concern for the task at hand.   
 Finally, when agents become aware of the organization, the latter 
becomes a detached object of reflection to be described in terms of abstract 
properties. It is here where, according to Tsoukas (2010), strategizing takes 
place.  Strategizing typically occurs in strategic planning sessions, strategy away-
days, and strategic episodes at large. In strategizing, organizational actors move 
from coping with practical situations to being thematically aware of the 
properties of the objects of attention.  Although strategizing involves abstraction 
and the formulation of intentionality, it still remains as a sociomaterial process 
that involves the use of tools, objects and artifacts, technologies and other forms 
of materiality including body and language.   
 Tsoukas’s onto-epistemology bridges the gap between the two 
contrasting ‘building’ and ‘dwelling’ worldviews and its emphasis on the 
sociomaterial practices in strategizing provides a solid basis for my empirical 
research into how decision-makers enact, interpret, and use epistemic objects in 
practice.  
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CHAPTER IV: METHOD  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 This section presents my research method.  The ground assumptions that 
underpin my research are that organizational world is socially constructed and 
the actors in organizations know what they are trying to do.  The actors can 
explain their thoughts, intentions, and actions (Gioia et al., 2013), although some 
actors may explain their actions retrospectively as some of their actions may 
occur non-deliberately by focusing on doing what needs to be done (Chia and 
MacKay, 2007).   
 These assumptions necessitate a research approach that gives voice to the 
informants without imposing prior constructs or theories on them as ‘a priori’ 
explanation for understanding or explaining their experience (Graebner et al., 
2012).  This means that a concerted effort must be made to give voice to the 
informants in the early stages of data gathering, analysis, and the reporting of the 
research, which will create rich opportunities for the discovery of new concepts 
rather than affirmation of existing constructs (Gioia et al., 2013).  
 My research was structured as an inductive, multiple-case research 
undertaking to build theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Multiple case studies allow the 
replication of logic in which cases were treated as experiments, with each case 
acting to confirm or disconfirm inferences drawn from the other cases (Yin, 
1994).  The case method was chosen as it enables the researcher to answer ‘how’ 
questions that are more explanatory that deal with operational links that need to 
be traced over time (Yin, 2009) and they allow real-life phenomenon to be 
understood in-depth in contextual conditions (Yin and Davis, 2007).  In addition, 
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the case method copes with technically distinctive situation in which there will 
be many more variables of interest than data points (Yin, 2009).  
 This chapter proceeds as follows.  In Section 4.2 I justify why an 
interpretive qualitative research method is appropriate for my research.  As my 
research is an inductive undertaking to build theory from multiple case studies, 
Section 4.3 provides a discussion of the case method and the section outlines the 
research setting and the case profiles.  I also address the role of prior theory in 
theory-building case research in this section.  Section 4.4 details the research 
instrument that was used to obtain data.  Data capture and the data analysis 
process and method are discussed in Section 4.5.  The chapter concludes with 
Section 4.6 that addresses the questions of research validity, reliability, and 
generalizability. 
4.2 INTERPRETIVE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS 
 Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) argue that in order to capture the socially 
constructed reality by organizational actors a qualitative research approach is 
required that captures actors’ experiences and their subjective perspectives.  
Such research must be non-intrusive, capable of tracing the unfolding narrative, 
and it should be interpretive in nature (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). 
 My analysis contains ethnomethodological elements as this method is 
designed to focus the researcher’s attention on practical activities, rather than on 
large-scale social events (Blaikie, 2007).  Although some scholars argue that 
ethnomethodology is not considered as an appropriate research approach to 
build theory as it is not concerned with providing causal explanations of 
observably regular, patterned, repetitive actions (Blaikie, 2007), I nevertheless 
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adopted elements from this method in order to give voice to the informants and 
capture both verbal and non-verbal communication from the cases.   This 
approach is justified in the literature as the expansion of research beyond 
discursive practice of strategizing is called for (Jarzabowski, Spee, and Smets, 
2012) and ethnomethodology allows the researcher to more fully capture human 
action. 
 My research adopts an interpretive approach to build theory.  This is 
based on the assumption, that human understanding and action is derived from 
the interpretation of information and events by the people who experience them 
(Rainbow and Sullivan, 1979).  Therefore, human understanding and action 
depend on the meaning assigned to any set of events  (Daft and Weick, 1984).  
Meaning, however, is a socially constructed phenomenon (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966; Weick, 1979).  As a result, meaning is unavoidably subjective and it is 
constrained by the context of goals that organizational actors seek to achieve.  
Understanding and action, including strategic action, is derived from the 
framework of meaning ascribed by the organization’s members (Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991).  The implications of these assumptions in my research are 
that: (1) the study of interpretation and meaning that informants attribute to the 
enactment of causal maps as epistemic objects is fundamental to the research; 
(2) understanding the phenomenon of map enactment in the context of collective 
decision-making requires an accounting of the subjective meaning ascribed by 
the informants; (3) the voice of the informants from the cases is the foundational 
basis in the formulation of higher order themes of how causal maps operate as 
epistemic objects. 
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4.3 CASE STUDIES 
 The central notion of case study research is to build theory inductively.  
Theory building from cases involves using one or more cases to create 
theoretical constructs and propositions from case-based empirical evidence 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  Cases provide rich empirical descriptions of phenomenon 
that is derived from a variety of data sources (Yin, 1994) and the resultant 
theory emerges from patterns within and across the cases (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007).  The emphasis of construct development and testable 
theoretical propositions make cases “one of the best (if not) the best of the 
bridges from rich qualitative evidence to mainstream deductive research” and it 
is likely to produce theory that accurate and interesting (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007, p. 25). 
4.3.1 THE ROLE OF PRIOR THEORY IN CASE RESEARCH 
 Sound empirical research is grounded in literature that identifies the 
research gap and the research question that addresses the gap.  However, when 
building theory from cases, the researcher has to justify why the research 
question is better addressed through theory building than theory-testing 
research.  This requires the researcher to justify that the existing research does 
not address the research question at all or inadequately (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007).  For theory driven research that extends existing theory, the 
researcher has to frame the proposed research within the context of the existing 
theory and show why inductive theory building is needed (Lee, Mitchell and 
Sablynski, 1999). 
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 Graebner et al. (2012) state that many theory-building research projects 
misleadingly claim that no prior theory exists in order to support qualitative 
approaches to elaborate theory from cases.  However, this is contrary to detailed 
literature reviews upon which many theory-building research undertakings are 
based.  Scholars point out that because the field of organization has a dearth of 
process theories, in practice many process studies involve some component of 
theory building and that qualitative methods such as case research may be 
appropriate for examining processes even in areas of relatively mature theory 
(Langley 2007).  Therefore, the justification for using case-based data should not 
primarily rest on the state of prior theory, but on the research that focuses on 
individuals’ subjective perspectives or understanding phenomena that involves 
complex temporal dynamics or causal mechanisms that are often embedded in 
nuanced social interactions (Graebner et al., 2012). 
 Denis et al. (2001) study of organizational learning acknowledged the role 
of prior theory in their theory-building case research.  Their approach was partly 
deductive (theory inspired) and partly inductive (data inspired).  The 
researchers considered this mixed approach fruitful because it allowed them to 
gain creative insights from data without necessarily denying or reinventing 
concepts that had been useful previously.  In line with Denis et al. (2001) and 
more recent case study research on strategic sense-making (Garreau, Mouricou, 
and Grimand, 2015), and the materiality of strategizing (Werle and Seidl, 2015), 
my multiple case study research in the enactment of causal maps as epistemic 
objects uses both theory and data inspired logic iteratively to foster the 
development of a richer theoretical framework beyond what is covered in the 
literature.  Although epistemic objects and group decision-making processes 
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possess a rich and mature research tangent, the enactment of causal maps as 
epistemic objects in the context of collective decision-making remains an 
unexplored area and the use of case research provides the means to study and 
understand this complex social phenomena.  Finally, the multiple case study 
research may facilitate insights from one case to generate theoretical 
propositions that serve as a basis for further probing of the emerging constructs 
in other cases.  As Denis et al. (2001) state, it is the combination of deduction and 
induction through time and the sequential “replication logic” that provides the 
basis for theoretical inferences.  
4.3.2 CASE PROFILES AND THE RESEARACH SETTING 
 My research is based on seven (7) case studies of four (4) groups of final 
year undergraduate and graduate business studies student groups at Regent’s 
University London and two (2) MBA student groups at London South Bank 
University.  The case data for the student groups was collected from the end of 
spring term 2013/2014 through the autumn term 2014/2015.  One (1) case was 
derived from a group of experienced decision-makers at Royal Free London NHS 
Foundation Trust in December 2014 as a part of a workshop on effective 
decision-making.    
 All case groups were recruited on the basis of voluntary participation and 
hence represented convenience sampling.  Convenience sampling of students has 
been widely used, especially in behavioral economics (Thaler, 2015). 
Hodgkinson et al. (1999) used undergraduate students who they described as 
inexperienced decision-makers and postgraduate students whom were 
described as experienced decision-makers in individually constructed causal 
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mapping experiments.  It should be noted that the research conducted with 
inexperienced and experienced decision-makers failed to reveal significant 
differences between informants who were advanced undergraduates and 
informants who were experienced practitioners completing MBA degrees 
(Hodgkinson et al., 1999).  Hence, informants in my student groups can be 
considered as inexperienced decision-makers, apart from two executive MBA 
student groups whose members had an average of four years of managerial work 
experience and could be considered as experienced decision-makers. 
 All student groups represented different nationalities and ethnic 
backgrounds.  However, the composition of student informant groups 
represented an institutional bias as London South Bank University draws a 
significant proportion of its students from British black ethnic minority groups 
living and working in London and Regent’s University London, as a private not-
for-profit university, has a large number of continental European and Southeast 
Asian students with few British native students.  The informants in the 
experienced decision-maker case were employed at Royal Free London NHS 
Foundation Trust.  The informants came from different hospitals within the 
Royal Free London NHS Trust, but they had a common interest, as they were 
members of ‘effective management and decision-making community of interest’. 
Informants in this group included two (2) consultant doctors, one (1) senior 
nurse, a matron, and two (2) operational managers. 
 The seven case profiles and the decision outcomes are summarized in the 
table below. 
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Table 4 - Cases in chronological order of recording 
 
Group Profile Composition Location Equipment Video Run 
Time 
Decision Outcome 
Rangers A group of four final year undergraduate students on 
BA International Business course. 
 
All informants had been previously taught the 
principles of causal mapping as a part of their 
strategic management course. 
 
All informants had prior course-work experience in 
the use of causal maps as a decision-making tool. 
Age range 22-24. 
2 men 
2 women 
 
All informants had previously attended 
lectures together although they had not 
previously worked together as a group. 
Seminar 
room at 
Regent’s 
University 
London. 
Video camera. 
Selection of different 
color Post-it notes. 
A selection of marker 
pens. 
Note paper. 
Whiteboard. 
1hr 17 min Reject the deal.  The decision was 
unanimous. 
 
Flyers A group of four final year undergraduate students on 
BA International Business and BA in Management 
course. 
 
Two informants had been previously taught the 
principles of causal mapping as a part of their 
strategic management course. 
 
The other two informants had prior course-work 
experience in the use of causal maps as a decision-
making tool. 
Age range from 22 to 28. 
4 men 
 
Two informants had previously 
attended lectures together. 
Two informants came from a different 
course than the two who had previous 
causal mapping experience. 
 
This was the first time the informants 
worked together as group. 
Seminar 
room at 
Regent’s 
University 
London. 
Video camera. 
Selection of different 
color Post-it notes. 
A selection of marker 
pens. 
Note paper. 
Whiteboard. 
55 minutes The group could not reach a 
decision.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ducks A group of six executive MBA students. 
 
All informants had been previously taught the 
principles of causal mapping as a part of their 
strategic management course. 
 
Four of the six informants had prior course-work 
experience in the use of causal maps as a decision-
making tool. 
Age range 25 to 33. 
4 women 
2 men 
 
All informants had previously attended 
lectures and undertaken group work 
together. 
Seminar 
room at 
London 
South 
Bank 
University. 
Video camera. 
Selection of different 
color Post-it notes. 
A selection of marker 
pens. 
Note paper. 
Whiteboard. 
43 minutes Reject the deal.  The decision was 
unanimous. 
Bruins A group of four full-time MBA students. 
 
All informants had been previously taught the 
principles of causal mapping as a part of their 
strategic management course. 
 
All informants had prior course-work experience in 
the use of causal maps as decision-making tool. 
Age range 24 to 28. 
3 women 
1 man 
 
All informants had previously attended 
lectures and undertaken group work 
together. 
Seminar 
room at 
London 
South 
Bank 
University. 
Video camera. 
Selection of different 
color Post-it notes. 
A selection of marker 
pens. 
Note paper. 
Whiteboard. 
50 minutes Accept the deal with modifications 
to terms.  The decision was not 
unanimous. 
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Group Profile Composition Location Equipment Video Run 
Time 
Decision Outcome 
Oilers A group of four graduate students on MA Marketing 
course. 
 
One informant had been taught the principles of 
causal mapping as a part of her strategic 
management course and had prior course-work 
experience in the use of causal maps as a decision-
making tool. 
Age range from 24 to 27. 
4 women  
 
All informants had previously attended 
lectures together. 
 
This was the first time the informants 
worked together as a group. 
Seminar 
room at 
Regent’s 
University 
London. 
Video camera. 
Selection of 
different color 
Post-it notes. 
A selection of 
marker pens. 
Note paper. 
Whiteboard. 
25 minutes 
(incomplete 
recording) 
Reject the deal.  Informant with 
mapping experience assumed the 
role of a leader but the decision 
seemed to be unanimous. 
Black-
hawks 
A group of four graduate students on MA Global 
Management course. 
 
None of the informants had prior experience in 
using causal mapping as a decision-making tool. 
Age range from 24 to 31. 
2 men 
2 women 
All informants had previously attended 
lectures together. 
 
This was the first time the informants 
worked together as a group. 
Seminar 
room at 
Regent’s 
University 
London. 
Video camera. 
Selection of 
different color 
Post-it notes. 
A selection of 
marker pens. 
Note paper. 
Whiteboard. 
57 minutes. Reject the deal.  Strong conflict 
between the male informants.  The 
informant who advocated the 
acceptance of the deal never bought 
into or supported the final group 
decision although the decision 
seemed to be unanimous. 
Wolveri
nes 
An experienced decision-making group from Royal 
Free NHS Foundation Trust 
 
2 x Consultant  
Head of pediatric nursing 
Senior Matron 
Senior operational manager (most junior of the 
group) 
 
Informants knew each other and they had 
experience in working together across the Trust 
hospitals with the exception of the senior 
operational manager. 
 
Informants were taught the principles of causal 
mapping as a part of a workshop on effective 
decision-making. 
 
None of the informants had prior experience in 
using causal mapping as a decision-making tool. 
Age range: N/A 
3 women 
2 men 
 
This was the first time informants 
worked together as a group. 
Conference 
room at 
Royal Free 
Hospital, 
Hampstead, 
London. 
 
 
Video camera. 
Selection of 
different color 
Post-it notes. 
A selection of 
marker pens. 
Note paper. 
Whiteboard. 
60 minutes Reject the deal.  The decision was 
unanimous although a male 
informant (consultant) advocated 
deal acceptance.  However agreed 
with accepted the group logic 
behind rejecting the deal.  
 80 
4.4 RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
 All case groups were set a decision-making task using causal mapping as a 
decision-making tool to reach a decision on teaching case study “John Hamond at 
First National Bank” that presented a strategic decision problem.   
 Prior to the final administering of the research instrument, a pilot study 
was conducted during autumn term 2013/2014 with final year undergraduate 
business studies students at Regent’s University London.  The pilot was 
conducted as a part of the students’ strategic management module where causal 
mapping as a strategic decision-making tool-in-use was covered and two pilot 
teaching case studies were administered to different groups.  A total of 12 groups 
of six students participated in the pilot, six groups for each pilot teaching case.  
The cases were sourced through the Case Centre located at Cranfield University.  
The search criteria for the cases were that the cases had to be no longer than five 
pages so that they could be read in 30 minutes; the cases had to involve a 
strategic decision problem either to the organization or the decision-maker; the 
cases did not involve quantitative analysis or require previous industry or 
technical knowledge.  Five cases were identified and two cases were selected as 
they did not require any calculations or detailed industry knowledge, nor were 
the cases technically complex.   
 The final teaching case study “John Hamond at First National Bank” was 
selected from the pilot as it stimulated more debate among the students than the 
other pilot case during the pilot, the decision problem in “John Hamond at First 
National Bank” teaching the case was framed as an escalation of commitment 
bias, and unlike the other pilot case, it had a ‘correct’ answer to it, e.g. not to 
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make the loan available to the new prospective client.  The problem framing in 
the “John Hamond at First National Bank” teaching case as an escalation of 
commitment bias corresponded to my research interest.  Moreover, previous 
research by Hodgkinson et al. (1999) and Maule and Hodgkinson (2002) had also 
been carried out by using an escalation of commitment bias case study.  
However, their research was administered to individuals rather than groups.  In 
addition, the pilot study revealed that the “John Hamond at First National Bank” 
was quicker to administer within a reasonable time frame of one hour than the 
other pilot case.  Finally, “John Hamond at First National Bank” teaching case 
study presented a strategic problem for both the individual decision-maker, the 
lending manager, as well as for the organization, the bank, of acquiring a new 
potentially financially attractive client.  
 Instructions on how to undertake the decision-making exercise were 
piloted during the pilot sessions and the final wording of the instructions was 
clarified based on the questions that students asked about them during the pilot 
stage. 
 The student informant groups were given the teaching case study one day 
in advance to read it and the managerial group was given the case at the 
beginning of a workshop and 30 minutes reading time was allocated for the 
managerial group informants to read the case.  All informant groups were 
instructed at the beginning of the session to use causal mapping as a decision-
making tool during the decision-making task.  The task was timed to last one 
hour.  Five of the seven informant groups had at least one group member who 
had previous experience in causal mapping as a decision-making tool.  One 
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student group and the managerial group had no members with prior experience 
in causal mapping. 
 The decision-making task was preceded by 45 minutes of 
instruction/review of causal mapping and a brief exercise on the mechanics of 
causal mapping.  The mapping instructions were based on a causal mapping 
protocol developed by Eden and Ackerman (2010).  This causal mapping 
protocol is attached as Appendix I.  Other materials that were made available to 
case informants were a whiteboard, marker pens and pencils, different colored 
post-it notes, and an instruction sheet to the decision task, and a sheet for 
recording the final decision made by the group and its underlying assumptions.  
After the exercise the group was asked to retroactively reflect on their mapping 
experience.   
 A fresh copy of the teaching case study was given at the beginning of the 
session to all informants. The case study is attached as Appendix II, and the 
decision task protocol is attached as Appendix III.  
4.5 DATA CAPTURE AND THE ANALYSIS PROCESS 
 My primary data collection method was to collect qualitative data using 
video recordings supported by my observations during the mapping sessions 
that I wrote down into a field notebook.  In addition, the informant groups were 
asked to retroactively reflect on the mapping process immediately after the 
decision-making task.  The mapping process and the informant reflections were 
captured on the video.   
 As the aim of my research was to gain an understanding how decision-
makers interacted as teams with epistemic objects and with each other, video-
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based research was selected as the means of dealing with and capturing a 
dynamic, particular, and subjective reality as opposed to methods that are based 
on the understanding of reality as static, general, and objective phenomena.   
 Video evidence based research is a relatively new method in strategy 
research but it enables the capture of micro-behaviors and interactions that are 
the ‘stuff’ of strategic practice (Johnson et al., 2007).  Moreover, video recordings 
capture real time behaviors and activity and they constitute a permanent record 
that can be verified by others.  While strategy-as-practice research has 
traditionally focused on discourse analysis, video recordings may provide 
additional ontological opportunities for researchers.  Specifically video 
recordings may provide added insight to materiality as organizations have 
‘things’ such as objects, artifacts, and tools that are central to work and warrant 
careful attention and consideration.  Video evidence may provide insight in how 
people interact with these ‘things’ by relating to them, and how they are 
coordinated and organized (Jarzabowski, 2014).  Furthermore, video recordings 
can capture the human body at the center of social interaction and organizational 
activity.   Finally, video recordings capture talk, text, pictures, drawings, gestures, 
facial expressions, and embodied maneuvers that can be analyzed in activities 
such as decision-making, negotiating, team interactions, and communicating 
(Jarzabowski, 2014). 
 Given the opportunities that visual research methods avail themselves to 
gain a deeper insight to strategy practice, the study of visual is a growing 
phenomenon in organization and management research (Bell and Davidson, 
2013; Warren, 2009).  Visual data such as pictures, graphs, film, web-pages, and 
architecture (Bell and Davidson, 2013) are “socially meaningful material objects 
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that are created, employed, and manipulated in organizational context, making 
them a constitutive part of social practices” (Meyer et al., 2013, p. 505).  Such 
visual data are important for identifying different contextualized types of 
materiality (Collier and Collier, 1996).  A small but a growing number of 
empirical practice-based studies derived from visual data include recent 
research to the production of strategic knowledge in workshops (Paroutis et al., 
2015), materiality of strategizing (Werle and Seidl, 2015), emotion in strategy 
work (Liu and Maitlis, 2014), and material artifacts in the practices of doing 
strategy (Jarzabowski, Spee, and Smets, 2013.)   
4.5.1 DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS 
 Data analysis is at the heart of building theory from cases, but it is both 
the most difficult and the least codified part of the research process (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Graebner et al., 2012).   
 Eisenhardt (1989) recommends a three-step case analysis process.  The 
first step is within-case analysis that typically involves a detailed write-up for 
each case.  These write-ups are often pure descriptions, but they are central to 
the generation of insight.  This early stage data analysis is often presented in 
tabular displays although Eisenhardt (1989) acknowledges that there is no 
standard format for such analysis.  However, the aim of this early stage research 
is to become intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity that 
allows unique patterns of each case to emerge before an attempt is made to 
generalize across cases. The second stage of data analysis involves across-case 
search for patterns.  The number of cases in my research facilitates a selection of 
categories or dimensions and then looks for within-group similarities coupled 
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with intergroup differences.  Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) applied this tactic 
to assign cases into various categories revealing both patterns of within-group 
similarity and across-group differences.  At the final stage of the case analysis 
process the overall impressions, tentative themes, and possibly even 
relationships between variables begin to emerge through an iterative process.  
The analysis task is to systematically compare the emergent frame with the 
evidence from each case in order to assess how well or poorly it fits the within-
case data.  According to Eisenhardt (1989) the research challenge at the final 
third stage is for the researcher to compare theory with the emerging data thus 
iterating toward a theory that closely fits the data from the cases.  It is this 
process that enables good theory to be built because it takes an advantage of the 
new insights garnered from the data and it yields an empirically valid theory. 
 Gioia et al. (2013) and Mantere et al. (2012) propose an approach that 
complements Eisenhardt case method that allows a systematic presentation of 
case data at the level of 1st and 2nd order analysis.  The 1st order analysis uses 
informant centric terms and codes, and the 2nd order analysis applies researcher-
centric concepts, themes, and dimensions.  The 1st order analysis tries to adhere 
faithfully to informant terms, while the 2nd order analysis provides a theoretical 
realm for the researcher to assess whether the emerging themes suggest 
concepts that may help describe and explain the phenomena that is being 
observed.  Once a workable set of themes and concepts has been achieved, or the 
research has reached theoretical saturation, the research will culminate with an 
investigation whether it is possible to distill the emergent 2nd order themes 
even further into aggregate dimensions.  Together, the tandem reporting of both 
informant and researcher voices allow not only a qualitatively rigorous 
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demonstration of links between data and the induction of new concepts but for 
“the kind of insight that is the defining hallmark of high-quality qualitative 
research” (Gioia et al. 2013).  Furthermore, the 1st order terms and 2nd order 
themes and the final aggregate dimensions provide the basis for building a data 
structure to help the researcher to configure data into a sensible visual aid and a 
graphic representation of the research that progressed from raw data to 
informant centric terms and theoretical themes in the analysis process  
4.5.2. CASE DATA ANALYSIS PROTOCOL 
 Informed by the case and Gioia methods (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007; Gioia et al., 2013; Denis et al., 2001; Mantere et al., 2012), 
my case research progressed from a detailed, empirical analysis of the case 
evidence to a greater generality in three analytical rounds.  The three rounds of 
the case analysis and the data structure of the research are depicted in Figure 3 
below. 
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Figure 3 - Case analysis and data structure 
1st order concepts      2nd order themes  Aggregate Dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Eisenhardt, 1989 and Gioia et al., 2013 
 The first analysis round began by writing a detailed account of the causal 
map enactment process from the viewpoint of the informants for each of the 
seven cases.  I attempted to place myself in the position of the informants as they 
began enacting the map.  I relied on visual and verbal clues that I perceived to 
include emotions and behaviors such as hesitation, confusion, uncertainty, 
assertiveness, cooperation etc.  The case write-ups are attached as Appendix IV.  
Like Mantere et al. (2012) I used Atlas.ti software to catalog and arrange the 
within-case data that allowed me to construct an event history for each case.  The 
emphasis of the case write-ups was focused on what appeared to be important 
events (Mantere et al., 2012) during the map enactment process from informant 
groups’ perspective.  These important events included the informants’ 
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intensification of debate, the iterative process of reflection and further map 
enactment, and the emergence of the final decision and its final justification. 
 At this stage it was important to keep an open mind what was unfolding 
in front of me.  However, it has to be acknowledged that my initial observations 
and analysis were influenced by the literature on epistemic objects and group 
decision-making.  Hence, I was aware that I was looking for signs when some 
important events may have included evidence of when and why maps became 
epistemic objects, what role did the emerging maps play in the unfolding 
discussion, how and when maps influenced the emergence of cognitive and 
affective conflict, and what emotional attachment was attributed to the maps by 
the informants.  I noted down my initial reflections in field notebook and I used 
the informant groups’ retrospective reflections at the end of the mapping 
process to augment my initial observations.  Gioia et al. (2013) point out that this 
1st order coding produces a great number of themes as little effort should be 
made at this stage to distill them.   
 At the second round of coding, my attention focused on comparative 
analysis of across-case evidence to seek similarities and differences among the 
cases.  Themes that emerged from this level of analysis included when and why 
some maps appeared more or less influential in engaging the group members 
and generating debate of alternative decision outcomes. 
 At the 2nd order analysis it is also fruitful to select pairs of cases to 
identify similarities and differences between each pair.  According to Eisenhardt 
(1989) this tactic may help the researcher to look for and identify subtle 
similarities and differences between cases.  At this stage of analysis the 
researcher becomes a knowledge agent (Gioia et al., 2013) who thinks at 
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multiple levels simultaneously taking into account the informant terms and 
codes, and the more abstract 2nd order theoretical level of themes, dimensions, 
and the larger narrative that seeks to understand the phenomenon of what’s 
going on.  Developing tentative answers to this question by the way of gestalt 
analysis (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991) led to the emergence of nascent concepts 
that didn’t seem to have adequate theoretical references in the existing 
literature.   
 At the final round of analysis Gioia et al. (2013) suggest that the 
researcher cycles between emergent data, themes, concepts, and dimensions and 
the relevant literature, not only to see whether what has been found have 
precedents, but also whether new concepts have been discovered.  Upon 
consulting the literature, this final round of the research process can be viewed 
as a transition from inductive to a form of abductive research as the research 
data is considered in tandem with existing theory (Gioia et al., 2013).  My 
research culminated in investigating whether the emergent themes that were 
derived from the data and informed by the literature could be distilled into 
higher order aggregate dimensions to provide an explanation of the map 
enactment phenomenon.   
4.6 RESEARCH VALIDITY, RELIABAILITY, AND GENERALIZABILITY 
 Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) state that the issue of research validity, 
reliability and generalizability depends on the philosophical perspective of the 
research.   Given my constructivist ontology, three tests should be applied to 
research:  (1) whether “the study clearly gain(s) access to the experiences of 
those in the research setting?”  (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008, p. 109);  (2) whether 
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there is “transparency about how sense was made from the data?” (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2008, p. 109), and (3) whether the “concepts and constructs derived 
from this study have any relevance to other settings?” (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008, p. 109). 
 Research validity was sought through research design, the pilot testing of 
the research instrument and, the method of observation to establish that the 
meaning of the phenomena was discovered.  Bryman (1989, p. 379) states that 
data triangulation should be carried out through the use of “multiple observers, 
theoretical perspectives, sources of data and methodologies.”  An independent 
coder was used to undertake a double coding of video data.  Where agreement 
about some coding or codes was low, data was revisited and mutual discussions 
were held between the primary researcher and the second coder to develop a 
consensual interpretation.  In addition, I conducted one ‘sensemaking’ session 
with two members of the managerial decision-making group to present my 
observations and the analysis of their particular case to challenge my 
conclusions.   
 Reliability was sought by data capture through video recordings, a 
detailed field notebook where I recorded my observations during the decision-
making sessions, retroactive informant reflections that were video recorded, and 
by the write-ups of each individual case that focused on the significant events 
during the map enactment process.  These methods were detailed in the method 
chapter of the thesis to make the techniques that I employed in my empirical 
research transparent to other researchers. 
 The research findings chapter that follows adds transparency by clearly 
recording how empirical findings emerged through the analysis process.  
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However, the qualitative research process and the coding of data are a series of 
interpretations and subject to a researcher bias.  In addition, my views and 
thoughts may change over time with additional experience of similar situations 
being gained through future research.  Finally, additional limitations of the 
research may include the following: (1) Convenience sampling that was based on 
voluntary participation in the decision-making groups may not be representative 
of the population as a whole.  However, as a qualitative research undertaking the 
thesis makes no claim for the findings to be generalizable to the population in 
general.  (2) The mapping sessions were conducted in different study rooms 
rather than in controlled laboratory conditions.  The differences in the physical 
features and the layout of the rooms may have had an impact how the informants 
interacted with each other and the whiteboard on which the maps were 
constructed.  However, I feel that the research process was robust and it 
provided a reliable account of the map enactment process and the meaning that 
informants attributed to the mapping process.  
 Socially constructed structures and processes are idiosyncratic as they 
are fashioned and performed by individuals acting in unique contexts.  This and 
the limited number of seven cases pose a question whether such research can be 
generalized.  For purist interpretivist researchers the answer would be a 
resounding no.  However, Gioia et al. (2103) argue that if the research generates 
concepts and principles with obvious relevance to other domains where these 
concepts and principles are portable from one setting to another then it is 
feasible to generalize from research beyond theory.  
 Eisenhardt (1989) and Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest that case 
research should yield good theory that is parsimonious and testable. Gioia et al. 
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(2013) agree with this but they take a more moderate stance in their view of 
proposition development as they consider that propositions often impose a 
positivist hallmark on an interpretivist research approach.  They recognize that 
propositions make research more accessible and useful to other scholars as the 
propositions may provide a roadmap for future qualitative research for further 
theoretical development.  Moreover, in line with Eisenhardt (1989) they note 
that propositions can act as a bridge between qualitative and quantitative 
research as they can demonstrate to quantitatively oriented researchers that 
qualitative findings may offer guidance in developing emergent constructs into 
measurable constructs (Gioia et al., 2013). 
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CHAPTER V: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 This chapter presents the research findings that were derived from the 
data contained in seven video recorded case studies.  In addition to the analysis 
and the dissemination of the research findings this chapter aims to provide a 
clear record of the process how my empirical findings emerged through the data 
coding and the analysis. This is to ensure the transparency in the research 
process.   
 The chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 5.2 provides insight into the 
analysis process that I used to start making sense of the rich qualitative data and 
the analysis output.  This is followed by Section 5.3 where I provide a temporal 
analysis of the map enactment process.  The map enactment process was 
revealed in five stages of problem identification, planning and mapping 
mechanics, individual idea generation, map enactment, and the final decision. 
The output of this analysis stage was a generation of additional questions that 
provided further focus for me to gain added insight and depth to my research.  
Section 5.4 details the development of the coding scheme, within and across the 
case analysis and the conceptual model of causal map enactment.  The chapter 
closes with the aggregation of codes to higher order themes and the generation 
of propositions for future research in Section 5.5. 
5.2 GETTING ACQUAINTED WITH THE DATA 
 In order to become familiar with the rich qualitative video data I 
commenced the analysis process by watching each of the case videos through to 
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familiarize myself with the general flow of the individual and group activity in 
the enactment of causal maps as a decision-making tool.  A total of seven hours of 
video data was recorded, one hour for each case.    
 At first I could not identify any real discernable patters within and across 
the cases in the mapping activity beyond the superficial activities of individual 
idea generation and note posting on the board.  Moreover, I was surprised how 
little the actual mapping processes in the seven cases reflected the elegant 
mapping processes outlined in the causal mapping literature.  
 It was not until I circled back to the literature that I realized that each 
case represented an effort by the informants to make sense of a messy strategic 
problem and develop their own individual and collective understanding of the 
decision problem (Weick, 1979, 1990).  As the maps represented a social 
construction of reality interpreted by each informant group independently from 
the other groups then it could be feasible that the sensemaking and the mapping 
processes that the different informant groups used in enacting the maps 
produced visually different outcomes, although the final conclusions to the 
problem, the decision outcome, could have been the same for each group.  In 
addition, as the informant groups were tasked to enact the maps without any 
external intervention they were messy in contrast to the elegantly constructed 
maps in the literature that had benefited from consultant or facilitator guidance.  
The groups in my research had to develop their own mapping mechanics as the 
map enactment progressed without a specific template beyond the basic 
instructions how to undertake causal mapping or expert guidance.  This is an 
important factor to consider in terms of the affordances of maps as a managerial 
tool-in-use whether mapping can be undertaken without expert facilitation.  
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 Having watched the videos and consulted the literature with the 
questions that arose from the first video viewing sessions, I watched the videos 
through again and began making notes what I was seeing in the data.  The data 
analysis was highly iterative at this early stage with more new insights being 
revealed each time I watched the videos.  I also referred to my observations that 
I had recorded in my field notebook and the retrospective reflections by the 
informant groups. My field notes and informant reflections added depth and 
support to the emerging trends that I was slowly beginning to identify in the data.   
 At the next stage of data analysis I began writing up the case studies.  
These case studies are included as Appendix IV to the thesis.  I initially wrote a 
rough draft from memory of what I had seen in the cases having watched the 
videos.  My focus was to identify key moments of activity such as the informants 
leaving the table, posting individual notes on the board, debating the placement 
of the notes, adding new notes, drawing connectors between the notes, reflecting 
what had been posted, debating the outcomes, reaching the final decision, and 
justifying the final decision outcome.  
 Once I had identified some key moments in each of the cases I watched 
the videos again and added more substance and additional key moments to the 
initial draft case documents. Guided by the activity theory model (Jarzabowski, 
2010) and the Gioia method (Gioia et al., 2013; Mantere et al., 2012) I attempted 
to give a voice to the informants by trying to observe how each individual 
informant interacted as a member of the collective and how they used the map to 
make knowledge clams and make sense of the decision problem.  I then focused 
my attention to the collective, i.e. each group, and how they collectively enacted 
the causal map.  By using these theoretical frameworks and through the writing 
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of the cases I began to see patters and differences emerging within and across 
the cases. 
 Once I had finished writing the more fully developed case studies, I began 
developing a framework to produce a structured way to analyze the data and 
present my initial findings.  I broke each case study into two interlinked 
analytical activities: (1) the analysis of the map enactment process and (2) the 
development of the coding scheme that I could apply within and across the cases.  
I was guided by both Gioia method (Gioia at al., 2013) and Eisenhardt (1989) 
case method to cycle between emergent data, themes, concepts, dimensions, and 
the relevant literature to see if the emerging findings had precedents but also to 
ascertain if I was discovering new concepts.  Gioia et al., (2013) comment that 
upon consulting the literature with the emerging evidence, the research process 
transitions for inductive to abductive research.   Therefore, it is important to 
maintain a combination of knowing and not knowing to balance the discovery 
“without reinventing the well-ridden wheels” (Gioia et al., 2013).  
 The following two sections present (1) the analysis of map enactment 
process and (2) the development of a coding scheme and resultant analysis 
across all informant groups.  The analysis was derived from video observations 
and supported by my field notes, the written case studies, and the retrospective 
reflections by the informant groups at the end of the mapping sessions. 
5.3 OVERVEW OF THE MAP ENACTMENT PROCRESS 
 The map enactment process across all cases was revealed in five steps of 
problem identification, planning and mapping mechanics, individual idea 
generation, map enactment, and the final decision.  To some extent the overall 
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map enactment process was preprogrammed and constrained by the 
instructions provided to the groups how to undertake the decision-making 
exercise with causal maps (Appendix III – Decision-making protocol).  The 
informant groups were instructed to read the decision-making case study first 
independently, note down thoughts independently first, and then commence the 
map construction as a group.   The five steps of the mapping process are depicted 
in the Figure 4 below.  
Figure 4 – The mapping process 
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5.3.1 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
 At the beginning of the session all informant groups identified the 
decision problem presented in the “John Hamond at First National Bank” 
teaching case study as a binary problem, a “yes” or a “no” decision.  This 
agreement about the alternative decision outcomes was unanimous in all 
informant groups once the informants had read the teaching case study and the 
binary option was expressed by all informant groups before they proceeded to 
discuss how to undertake mapping and prior to individual idea generation. 
 The “John Hamond at First National Bank” teaching case study posed a 
decision problem: “It was now 1.00 PM on Friday, March 31.  The Kitchener 
Group’s contract-to-buy would expire at the end of business that day.  John Hamond 
wondered what to do?”  All informant groups framed the question as ‘whether’ or 
‘not’ lend money to the bank’s client, The Kitchener Group.  All groups enacted a 
map with a binary outcome (1) to lend and (2) not to lend as the starting point of 
the mapping process. This narrow framing could have been the result of the way 
the decision-making teaching case study was structured with a ‘correct’ outcome.  
However, the data showed that the map construction led into the laddering of 
the consequences of the binary decision and the informant groups explored a 
number of ways of making the deal work.  I interpreted this exploration of 
decision-options as innovative solution seeking activity.   
 The binary decision outcome was the first note(s) posted on the board by 
all groups, see Exhibit 1 below. 
 
 
 
 99 
Exhibit 1 – Binary decision problem definition 
 
 
 
Planning the mapping mechanics 
 Having identified the binary decision outcome, informants made an effort 
to discuss how to proceed with the mapping mechanics. All informant groups 
found this part of the mapping process difficult.  Although the groups had been 
instructed how to undertake mapping, there seemed to be hesitancy in all groups 
how to get started. This hesitation was evident from the limited discussion that 
took place at the beginning of the mapping session how to proceed.  None of the 
groups reached a consensus about the mapping mechanics.  However, once some 
notes were posted on the board after the individual idea generation by one or 
two informants this seemed to encourage the other informants to leave the desk 
and start posting notes on the board.  There was no particular order to the initial 
posting of notes except that the binary decision was posted in the middle of the 
board.  Once the map enactment got underway all groups seemed to develop a 
particular mapping mechanics that suited their own way of thinking and how the 
discussion of the decision problem evolved during the map enactment.  
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 The mechanics of mapping was an iterative process and the map was 
defined and redefined throughout the map enactment.  Although the maps 
looked different across the informant groups they all demonstrated a laddered 
pattern of seeking out and defining the pros and cons and consequences of 
decision alternatives.  In effect, the enacted maps conformed to the causal nature 
of the causal maps in the literature. 
5.3.2 INDIVIDUAL IDEA GENERATION 
 Having had a limited discussion about the general mapping mechanics, 
individual informants across all groups began the mapping exercise by writing 
down their own thoughts on post-it notes while seated at the desk, see Exhibit 2 
below.  This activity was preprogrammed into the mapping instructions.  
However, some groups had to be prompted to commence the mapping on the 
board.  These groups were the ones with the least previous experience in causal 
mapping.  Although these groups knew that they should enact a map on the 
board, they seemed hesitant to use the causal map as a decision-making tool.  A 
comment was made after the mapping exercise by informants in the groups that 
had to be prompted to get started with the map enactment on the board that 
they were more comfortable in trying to reach the decision “the old way” by 
sitting around the table making individual notes while discussing the decision 
problem. 
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Exhibit 2 - Individual idea generation at the start of the mapping process 
 
 
  
 Once informants began posting their individual notes on the board, some 
informants wrote new notes in addition to their initial post-it notes and posted 
them onto the board. This was particularly pronounced during the early stages of 
the map enactment. In some groups informants added new notes on the board 
throughout the map enactment process, see Exhibit 3 below.  The groups that 
added new notes throughout the map enactment produced a more complex map 
and exhibited a greater degree of debate about the decision outcomes in terms of 
their pros and cons as well as the consequences of the decisions. 
Exhibit 3 - Individual idea generation during the mapping process 
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5.3.3 MAP ENACTMENT 
 This was a messy process with much debate and moving of post-it notes 
on the board and drawing of connectors to create causal connections between 
the notes.   All groups worked in an iterative way creating the map as the 
mapping progressed.  There was a noticeable increase in the sound level as the 
groups became increasingly involved and animated with the mapping.  This was 
a moment when the groups became fully engaged with the map as the focal point 
of attention.  This increased focus on the map also reduced the degree of face-to-
face discussion between individual informants.  The discussion and the points 
made by informants were addressed to the map rather than to each other.  
 All groups exhibited a pattern of map construction that was followed by 
reflection when the group members looked and reflected jointly and severally at 
the map.  This was followed by more map construction either by moving notes 
around on the board, drawing additional connectors, or writing new notes and 
adding them onto the board.   
 Exhibits 4 and 5 demonstrate the intense focus on mapping by the 
informants and how statements and knowledge claims were made by informants 
pointing at the map.  Groups who did not fully engage on the mapping by 
congregating around the board demonstrated a lower degree of group 
engagement with the map.  This is demonstrated by Exhibit 6 where the 
informants consult the map but they do not become animated by it nor do they 
make statements by pointing at the map.  Rather, the discussion between the 
informants ebbed and flowed in a subdued fashion around the table. 
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Exhibit 4 - Map enactment and intense focus 
 
Exhibit 5 - Making a point 
 
 
Exhibit 6 – Consulting the map 
 
 104 
5.3.4 FINAL DECISION 
 The groups continued with iterative reflection, construction, reflection 
and so on, until they seemed to run out of thoughts or new ideas to post, move 
existing notes around the board, draw connectors, and there was a noticeable 
abatement of debate.  Perhaps this was due to the time constraint in the 
experiment, but the video evidence supports that the groups ran out of ideas 
naturally and a discussion about the decision was made by looking at the causal 
connections and clusters of post-it notes on the map.   My research indicates that 
for most groups the map enactment came to a natural conclusion once the 
informants ran out of ideas to discuss or new thoughts to post on the board.  
None of the groups had allocated an informant to act as a timekeeper and I only 
had to prompt one group to make a decision, as they would have run over the 
allocated time of one hour. 
 At the final decision stage all groups circled back to the initial problem 
definition and there was evidence as demonstrated in Exhibits 7 and 8 that 
individual informants took turns in articulating and justifying the decision based 
on their own perceived understanding of the process that the group had gone 
through the map enactment.  Exhibits 7 and 8 come from the same group that 
clearly illustrates this individual decision justification activity at the end of the 
mapping process. 
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Exhibit 7 – Justifying the decision and articulating it individually 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 8 – Justifying the decision and articulating it individually 
 
 
 
  
 Exhibit 8 is especially interesting as the informant articulating the 
decision and pointing at the notes on the board had been quiet during map 
enactment but her justification of the decision and the engagement with the map 
shows that she had been fully absorbed in the map enactment process and the 
decision although she had been rather shy during the map enactment, perhaps 
due to language aptitude.   
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 Finally, the decision outcome was explained by using the map as the 
justification and explaining the variables that influenced the outcome, see Exhibit 
9 below.   
Exhibit 9 – Explaining the final decision 
 
 
 
 
 The above analysis gave me a better understanding of the mapping 
process and it highlighted the critical areas where my research should focus in 
detail: the map enactment and the how the final decision emerged from it.  
Furthermore, this analysis generated additional questions that had not been 
explored clearly in the literature: 
1. When and how do the maps become epistemic objects?  To understand 
this I was faced with the challenge of trying to understand how and when 
the individual informants became members of the collective, and how and 
when the collective began to interact and attribute meaning and 
knowledge to the emerging map on the board? 
2. The map construction animated informants as was evidenced by the 
increased volume and the intensity of discussion.  As there seemed to be 
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limited evidence of affective conflict among the informants in the cases, I 
wanted to find out what was the relationship between cognitive conflict 
that was clearly evident from the intensity of discussion and debate 
during the map enactment process, and affective conflict. 
3. Individual informants justified the final group decision by articulating the 
decision in their own words and using the map as a reference point.  This 
indicated that there was high degree of usage of the collectively enacted 
artifact that led into a high degree of individual buy-in to the collectively 
made decision.  This opened up a question what was the relationship 
between the enactment of the causal map and the decision acceptance by 
individual informants. 
 In order to gain a deeper understanding of the map enactment process 
both within and across the cases, and seek answers to these additional questions, 
I moved to the second level of analysis by developing a coding scheme that I 
could apply across all cases.  The development of the coding scheme and the 
resultant analysis are presented in the section below. 
5.4 CODING DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS 
 In order to gain a deeper understanding of map enactment and answer 
the additional questions that emerged from the first round of analysis I set out to 
develop a coding scheme.  To develop such a coding scheme I initially circled 
back to the literature on decision-making processes that was discussed in the 
literature review of the thesis.  In addition, I referred to mapping practices 
discussed in strategy-as-practice literature (Jarzabkowski, 2005; Jarzabkowski 
and Seidl, 2008), coding practices for management team interactions (Beck and 
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Fisch, 2000; Currall et al., 1999; Liu and Maitlis, 2014), methodological literature 
on seeking qualitative rigor in inductive research (Gioia et al., 2013), and how to 
present empirical evidence in inductive theory building (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007).   
 Examples of strategic decision-making coding categories in the literature 
included issue initiation, proposition making, counter-proposing, elaborating 
activity, information seeking and giving, voting, agreeing, rejecting, and selecting 
and deselecting a proposal (Liu and Maitlis, 2014).  Although these categories 
seemed very general and generic they nevertheless provided top-level behaviors 
to focus on initially when I commenced the development of a coding scheme. 
 The rich video data lends itself well to the analysis of naturally occurring 
human interactions from multiple perspectives: (1) the map enactment activity 
by individual informants and informant groups, (2) discourse, and (3) displayed 
emotion.  Discourse analysis has been the default option in strategy-as-practice 
literature but this focus has neglected the role of epistemic objects as material 
artifacts in strategizing (Jarzabkowski and Seidl, 2008).  Therefore, the way 
epistemic objects interact with human activity has remained a relatively 
unexplored area (Werle and Seidl, 2015) and my coding scheme focused in 
gaining a better understanding of this interaction.  In order to address this 
shortcoming in the literature, my effort was to observe the behaviors and the 
interplay of the informant group members among themselves, as well as 
members of a collective and the map enactment.  
 Displayed emotion is an additional lens to analyze the data.  Recent work 
on emotion in strategy making has been conducted by Liu and Maitlis (2014).  I 
did not make this the focus of my research although I refer to displays of emotion 
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in terms of cognitive and affective conflict.  The reason for the exclusion of 
emotion from the research frame is justified on the basis that the literature that 
focuses on this aspect of strategy-making is derived from studies of micro-
behaviors of informants often carried out in controlled laboratory environments 
or through close micro-observational techniques.  Such analysis employs 
microethnography that involves the microscopic analysis of recorded pieces of 
human activities and interactions (Streeck and Mehus, 2005).  However, displays 
of emotion are situated in discourse in general (Mangham, 1998) and they are 
present in strategy discourse in particular as they are embodied and conveyed in 
discursive acts (Perinbanayagam, 1991).  To isolate emotion in strategic activity, 
although a valuable lens to gain further insight into strategizing, would 
necessarily exclude the map enactment process by the individual informants and 
the collective beyond that of the emotional content. 
 In terms of presenting empirical findings Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) 
suggest that although it is not generally realistic to support every theoretical 
proposition with every case within the text itself, the use of extensive tables and 
other visual devices that summarize the related case evidence are central to 
signaling the depth and detail of empirical grounding.  These construct tables 
summarize the case evidence and indicate how the focal construct is “measured,” 
thus increasing the “testability” of the theory and creating a particularly strong 
bridge from the qualitative evidence to theory-testing research (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007: 29).   Adopting this approach my coding analysis is articulated in 
tables such as the codebook (Table 6) and the across-case analysis (Table 10) 
that will be presented later. 
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5.4.1 CODING SCHEME 
 I developed a coding scheme by using Atlas.ti qualitative analysis 
software package.  I transferred video data into Atlas.ti and began the coding 
development by identifying ‘key moments’ of activity during the mapping 
process for each video case.  I paid particular attention to the individual and 
group dynamics in the map enactment process.   
 Guided by the top-level coding categories derived from the literature on 
decision-making, e.g. issue initiation, proposition making, counter-proposing, 
elaborating activity, information seeking and giving, voting, agreeing, rejecting, 
and selecting and deselecting a proposal, I developed summative and essence-
capturing codes for each of the video cases. The resulting codes were more 
detailed and nuanced in their description compared to the above-mentioned top-
level coding categories thus giving added insight into the map enactment by the 
informants. 
 I used process coding, or action coding, to analyze the video case 
data.  Process coding uses gerunds to connote action in the data.  Charmaz and 
Belgrave (2002) point out that general conceptual action such as negotiating, 
struggling etc. can be coded as such through process coding.  Process coding is 
considered particularly appropriate for qualitative studies that search for 
“ongoing action/interaction/emotion taken in response to situations, or 
problems, often with the purpose of reaching a goal or handling a problem” 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008, pp. 96-7). 
 At the next stage of the analysis I wrote comments for each of the codes, 
gerunds, to describe the action and interaction between the group informants 
and the emerging map across all the video cases.  I then circled back to the data 
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and added additional codes and comments until I reached saturation with my 
coding.  Finally, I reviewed all the codes and their descriptors across all the cases 
and distilled them into common codes and descriptors that accurately reflected 
the activity across the cases.  Table 5 below summarizes the analytical steps in 
coding development. 
 
Table 5 – Analytical steps of coding development 
 
Analytical steps Activity description 
Transfer video into Atlas.ti. Transfer video into the qualitative 
analysis package that allowed 
coding development in situ.   
Assign codes to video data. Process coding was used to 
connote activity in the video data 
for each case. 
 
Coding for each case was carried 
out until a saturation of codes was 
reached. 
Code definition. Developed descriptors for each of 
the codes. 
Initial coding of the cases. The initial coding produced the 
following number of codes per 
individual case: 
Blackhawks – 54 
Bruins – 27 
Ducks – 33 
Flyers – 33 
Oilers – 19 
Rangers – 43 
Wolverines – 47 
Code review. Reviewed the codes and their 
descriptors for each case. 
 
Distilled codes and their 
descriptors into common codes 
that reflected the activity across 
the cases. 
 
Generated 23 unique codes. 
 
 A total of 23 unique codes were identified across the video cases.   These 
final codes were distilled from the total code list across the cases as per the 
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above table.  Much of the coding that was eliminated was redundant duplicate 
coding of the same activity.  
 The resulting codebook is presented in the Table 6 below.  The table lists 
23 unique codes including sitting and standing, their descriptions and the 
frequency of occurrence across and within all the cases.  The higher the 
frequency of occurrence of a specific code within the cases demonstrates a 
higher level of code specific activity in that particular case.  The final row of the 
table provides the sum total for the frequency of coded activity for all cases 
jointly and on the individual case basis.  However, it should be noted that coding 
is a subjective activity that may be subject to researcher bias. Hence, other 
coders could identify and assign more or fewer coding frequencies in the cases. 
Nevertheless, as the following analysis demonstrates, the code frequencies in my 
data allows for significant similarities and differences to emerge between the 
cases
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Table 6 - Codebook 
 
Data specific codes  Description Total 
frequency of 
occurrence 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Rangers) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Flyers) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Ducks) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Bruins) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Oilers) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Blackhawks) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Wolverines) 
Idea generating. 
- Sitting. 
- Standing. 
Ideas are generated 
individually to start with 
while sitting at the table. 
 
New ideas are added onto the 
map as the map construction 
progresses.  At this stage 
informants are standing at 
the board. 
7 
 
 
 
 
11 
1 
 
 
 
 
3 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
 
 
 
 
- 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
Problem defining. Initial problem defining takes 
place at the beginning of the 
mapping process.   
18 2 2 1 3 1 5 4 
Hesitating. Hesitation to get started with 
the mapping. 
 
Hesitating to stand up from 
the table and start posting 
notes on the board. 
5 
 
 
 
5 
- 1 
 
 
 
1 
- 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
1 
 
 
 
1 
1 
 
 
 
1 
1 
 
 
 
1 
Facing each other. Predominately addressing 
each other face to face.   
 
(The informants face each 
other less frequently as the 
mapping progresses.  More 
attention is focused at the 
map and discussion is carried 
out between informants 
facing the map.) 
14 2 1 1 1 3 5 2 
Constructing. Constructing the map 
together, adding new notes as 
new ideas emerge, moving 
notes to new locations, 
drawing connectors between 
notes and using laddering to 
think about consequences. 
41 8 4 6 7 2 8 6 
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Data specific codes  Description Total 
frequency of 
occurrence 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Rangers) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Flyers) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Ducks) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Bruins) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Oilers) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Blackhawks) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Wolverines) 
Facing the map. The group is engaged with 
the map, facing it.   
 
(This activity is demonstrated 
by informants pointing at the 
map, facing the map, rather 
than each other.  This 
behavior becomes 
pronounced when the groups 
are fully engaged with the 
mapping.) 
46 8 4 6 6 3 10 9 
Engaging. There is simultaneous 
discussion and construction 
of the map.  This activity is 
combined with a noticeable 
increase in the volume of 
discussion. 
36 8 2 6 6 1 5 8 
Non-engaging. An informant who either 
withdraws from a group or 
does not make a contribution 
to the group discussion or the 
mapping process. 
5 - - - 1 - 4 - 
Discussing A free flowing discussion 
about how to go about 
constructing the map and the 
emerging issues.   
36 8 3 5 4 2 4 10 
Reflecting Once the map begins to take 
shape informant groups fall 
silent and reflect on the map.   
After reflection groups begin 
discussing the map again and 
may add additional notes and 
generate new ideas. 
 
(This activity is demonstrated 
by iterative behavior of map 
enactment – reflection – map 
enactment etc.) 
25 6 1 3 4 1 5 5 
Dominating. An individual informant 
dominates the discussion 
9 1 - 2 2 2 - 2 
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Data specific codes  Description Total 
frequency of 
occurrence 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Rangers) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Flyers) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Ducks) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Bruins) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Oilers) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Blackhawks) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Wolverines) 
and/or takes over the 
mapping. 
Consulting. 
 
A dominant informant asks 
other informant group 
members for their views. 
7 3 - 2 - - - 2 
Contrasting. 
 
The informants compare and 
contrast the positive and 
negative factors that relate to 
the decision problem by 
pointing at them on the map. 
13 3 1 2 2 - 1 4 
Clarifying. 
 
As the map enactment is an 
iterative process the map is 
used to clarify the thinking of 
the group.   
 
(This behavior is 
demonstrated by informants 
asking the others to clarify 
their thinking by pointing at 
the map and making 
statements and asking 
questions.) 
24 7 - 3 4 - 3 6 
Explaining. Explaining is a part of the 
construction process as 
informants explain and often 
point at their knowledge 
claims on the map and how 
they fit into the overall map 
construct. 
27 6 3 3 3 1 4 7 
Agreeing. Informants use the map to 
agree to the claims made on 
the map by pointing at the 
map and notes. 
10 2 - 2 1 - 2 3 
Disagreeing. Voicing objections to 
different views. 
13 2 3 - 1 - 5 2 
Deciding. The informant groups cycle 
between agreeing, 
contrasting, clarifying, and 
justifying once the map has 
14 2 - 3 2 - 5 2 
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Data specific codes  Description Total 
frequency of 
occurrence 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Rangers) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Flyers) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Ducks) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Bruins) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Oilers) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Blackhawks) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Wolverines) 
been finalized before 
reaching a final decision with 
the aid of the map.   
Finalizing the map The map has been 
constructed and the 
informants are beginning to 
run out of ideas.  Claims on 
the map are agreed upon, 
contrasted, clarified, and 
justified 
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Justifying. The map is used by 
informants to justify the 
decision by pointing at the 
map. 
 
(This occurs at various stages 
of the mapping process but 
most clearly at the decision 
stage.) 
13 3 1 - 3 - 2 4 
Voting. Group takes a vote on the 
decision outcome by the 
show of hands.  
3 - - - 1 1 1 - 
Total All coded activity 
frequency. 
389 76 30 49 56 21 75 82 
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 Coding is a subjective activity, and as was already stated, different 
researchers may assign more or fewer code frequencies, or even develop 
different codes to the activities in the cases other than the ones I developed in 
the codebook.  However, the code frequency calculation in the above table 
indicates that the cases could be examined in sub-groups based on their differing 
levels of activity.  This type of analysis is in line with Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 
(1988) research where the researchers assigned cases into various categories 
revealing both patterns of within-group similarity and across-group differences.  
The three sub-groups based on similar coded activity frequency are presented in 
the Table 7 below. 
Table 7 – Sub-groups based on coded activity frequency 
 
Group  Code activity frequency 
Blackhawks 
Rangers 
Wolverines 
75 
76 
82 
Ducks 
Bruins 
49 
56 
Oilers  
Flyers 
21 
30 
 
 The table shows that three groups, e.g. Blackhawks, Rangers, and 
Wolverines exhibited the most coded activity and Oilers and Flyers the least 
activity.  Ducks and Bruins fell between these other groups with a medium level 
of activity.  In order to undertake the analysis to gain insight to these three 
groups I first needed to produce a conceptual map of the map enactment process 
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for the cases as a whole and develop a detailed analysis of each of the cases 
within the code categories.  This analysis allowed me to identify unique patterns 
for each case that would then allow across-case comparisons on a sub-group 
basis. 
5.4.2 CONCEPTUAL MAP 
 With a large number of codes the challenge I had was to produce a 
conceptual map of the map enactment process across all the cases.  Using Atlas.ti 
conceptual mapping facility I produced a detailed map of the map enactment at 
an aggregate level.  I linked the 23 codes with connectors to show their 
relationship with each other.  The map is included as Appendix V in the thesis.  It 
should be noted that the shortcomings of Atlas.ti emerged at this stage as the 
titles of connectors between the code nodes were preprogrammed into the 
software and they could not be changed.  However, the software allowed me to 
create a visual model of the map enactment process and undertake a basic 
manipulation of nodes to show how the mapping activity evolved from initial 
idea generation to the final decision making stage. 
 In order to give the conceptual map further clarity I redrafted the 
conceptual map from the Atlas.ti generated map by retaining the 23 codes but 
changing the descriptors and links of the connectors to more accurately reflect 
the map enactment process.  This redrafting was derived from the video 
evidence for the cases.  The revised conceptual map is presented in Figure 5 
below. 
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FIGURE 5 – CONCEPTUAL MAP 
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  The conceptual map shows the intense activity that results once the 
informant groups started engaging with the map enactment on the board.  As I 
pointed out earlier in Section 5.3, the overview of the map enactment process, 
some informant groups had to be prompted to commence mapping on the board 
and stand up from the table where they had generated ideas individually.  The 
data also showed that group discussion regarding the mapping and problem 
definition was muted, superficial, and hesitant when the informants sat around 
the table addressing each other face to face.  The retrospective reflections of the 
mapping process revealed that the groups that were prompted to commence 
mapping commented that they found getting started with the mapping difficult. 
An informant from Wolverines stated: 
“We usually have meetings and make decisions sitting around the table…. 
sometimes somebody may use a flipchart to make bullet points while others sit 
around.” 
An informant from Oilers echoed this view: 
“We always meet to discuss case studies in the library…we sit around and make 
notes on either laptop or notepads....” 
 These comments indicate that most groups were used to working by 
sitting around a table and either making notes individually or appointing a note 
taker.  Hence, having to stand up and engage in collaborative work on a real-time 
basis creating a visual epistemic object was a novel approach to working for 
these informant groups.   
 Besides for being a novel way of working could the hesitancy by the 
groups who had the least experience with mapping to get stared with the 
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mapping be explained that mapping is a skilled activity that needs to be learned 
for it to be used effectively as decision-making tool-in-use?  Mapping as a skilled 
activity was highlighted by Ambrosini (2001) in her research into tacit 
organizational routines.  Some case evidence may suggest that mapping is a 
skilled activity.  An informant from Blackhawks reflected that the reason for the 
group’s initial hesitancy to get started with the mapping was for not knowing 
how to get started with the map enactment.  He stated: 
“We understood to mapping concept but we did not really understand how we 
could get started with it.” 
 This may well have been the case, but once Wolverines began the map 
enactment process they became the most active group with code activity 
frequency of (81) although none of the group members had any previous 
experience in causal mapping.  Furthermore, Blackhawks had no previous 
experience with mapping and they were the third most active group with code 
activity frequency of (75).  This indicates that although previous experience with 
mapping may remove the initial hesitancy to get started using the mapping tool, 
it can be learned quickly through trial and error as long as the concept of 
mapping is understood. 
 Once the mapping got underway, informants in active mapping groups 
began engaging with the mapping process. The map enactment was an iterative 
activity and the decision problem was defined and redefined throughout the map 
enactment process until the mapping activity reached its natural saturation.  The 
map enactment was characterized by intense discussion, explaining, reflection, 
new idea generation, and continuous problem refinement.  Cognitive conflict was 
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evident from knowledge claims and counterclaims made by the informants, but 
there was limited evidence of affective conflict apart from the case of Blackhawks.  
The two male informants in Blackhawks disagreed over the decision outcome 
and this conflict seemed to spill into an affective conflict.  However, it is 
noteworthy that the conflict between the two informants did not result in a face-
to-face confrontation but both informants addressed the map with their 
conflicting opinions.   It should be noted, however, that this conflict was probably 
spurred on by one of the male informants who was negatively disposed to the 
mapping from the beginning of the exercise.  He reflected at the end of the 
mapping session that “mapping was a waste of time, as I could have made the 
decision in ten minutes myself,” a view that was challenged by other informants 
during the retrospective reflection of the mapping session.   
 This same male informant also stated to the group during the map 
enactment that he had previous work experience in banking and finance and 
hence he knew how lending decisions were made.  He promoted a positive 
lending decision, which would have produced a ‘wrong’ answer to the teaching 
case.  Furthermore, it was interesting to observe that this informant was the 
least engaged informant in the group having made up his mind about the ‘correct’ 
decision outcome from the outset. 
  There was little evidence of an emergence of a dominant informant who 
unduly controlled the mapping process in groups that demonstrated a high level 
of mapping activity.  Dominant informants emerged in Ducks and Bruins, but this 
did not seem to have a significant impact on the level of cognitive conflict in 
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these teams.  All members felt comfortable making knowledge claims and 
remained fully focused on the map enactment. 
 The case data supports the argument that causal maps are epistemic 
objects.  Table 8 below is an extract from the codebook (Table 6) that shows the 
code frequencies for what can be described as knowledgeable activities that the 
map enactment animated in informants.  These activities accounted for 61% of 
all data specific codes. 
Table 8 – Sub-groups based on coded activity frequency 
Data specific 
codes  
Description Total frequency 
of occurrence 
Constructing. Constructing the map together, adding new notes as new ideas emerge, moving 
notes to new locations, drawing connectors between notes and using laddering 
to think about consequences. 
41 
Engaging. There is simultaneous discussion and construction of the map.  This activity is 
combined with a noticeable increase in the volume of discussion. 
36 
Discussing A free flowing discussion about how to go about constructing the map and the 
emerging issues.   
36 
Reflecting Once the map begins to take shape informant groups fall silent and reflect on the 
map.   
After reflection groups begin discussing the map again and may add additional 
notes and generate new ideas. 
(This activity is demonstrated by iterative behavior of map enactment – 
reflection – map enactment etc.) 
25 
Clarifying. 
 
As the map enactment is an iterative process the map is used to clarify the 
thinking of the group.   
(This behavior is demonstrated by informants asking the others to clarify their 
thinking by pointing at the map and making statements and asking questions.) 
24 
Explaining. Explaining is a part of the construction process as informants explain and often 
point at their knowledge claims on the map and how they fit into the overall map 
construct. 
27 
Agreeing. Informants use the map to agree to the claims made on the map by pointing at 
the map and notes. 
10 
Disagreeing. Voicing objections to different views. 13 
Deciding. The informant groups cycle between agreeing, contrasting, clarifying, and 
justifying once the map has been finalized before reaching a final decision with 
the aid of the map.   
14 
Justifying. The map is used by informants to justify the decision by pointing at the map. 13 
Total All coded activity frequency. 239 
 
 Once the maps began to emerge on the board they became vested by 
knowledge claims posted by informants and the maps became vested by 
individual and collective knowledge.  When informants had posted their initial 
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notes on the board they began discussing the map and posting additional 
knowledge claims on new notes on the board and their attention became 
increasingly focused at the map.  This was a significant moment in map 
enactment as informants began facing the map instead of each other; they began 
moving notes on the board, and adding new notes to make a greater sense of the 
decision problem.  This moment was further characterized by the informants 
becoming physically more connected by congregating in a tight-knit group 
around the map.  This is evident from Exhibit 10 below. 
 
Exhibit 10 – A closely-knit group in front of the map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Moreover, arguments and counterarguments were directed at the map, 
instead face-to-face.  It can be theorized that in addition of emerging as an 
epistemic object, the map became a type of a ‘safety net’ that made informants 
feel comfortable to express their opinions at the map without feeling intimidated 
by having to address co-informants directly.  The map also became a type of a 
‘shock absorber’ that allowed informants to engage in a free expression of 
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opinions and robust debate.  These finding are supported by the male and two 
female Bruins informants who reflected at the end of the mapping session that in 
mapping: 
 “You can push your own view in a polite way;”  
“Allows you to write down your own opinions and you don’t feel isolated with your 
opinions because they blend in with the others;” 
“It’s easier to communicate as the others don’t focus on you so that you don’t have 
to aggressively defend your own view;” 
 The final decision emerged once mapping had reached its saturation 
without any additional notes being posted or connectors drawn between the 
notes.  At this stage the decision problem was revisited and informants took 
turns in articulating and clarifying the decision problem and reiterating the 
agreed decision in their own words using the map as a decision support aid or an 
aid memoir.  The decision that was made seemed to represent the most creative 
decision possible within the confines of the “John Hamond at First National Bank” 
teaching case study as the consequences of the alternative decisions had been 
laddered during the map enactment.  It can be theorized that the map enactment 
process created significant individual and group buy-in to the final decision 
outcome as informants had jointly and severally engaged in the map enactment 
by making their own knowledge claims being made visible on the board and they 
had been discussed collectively.  Hence, the map enactment by the decision-
making groups seemed to increase decision acceptance as a result of the effort 
that was expended on the creation of the map.   
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 Finally, Table 9 below lists the pros and cons of mapping that I noted 
down in my flied notes and gleaned from the retrospective reflections by the 
informant groups at the end of the mapping sessions. 
 
Table 9 – Pros and cons of mapping 
 
Advantages of mapping Disadvantages of mapping 
Mapping allows different perspectives to 
emerge. 
Difficult to know how to get started with 
mapping in practice. 
Mapping allows new ideas to emerge. Mapping is messy. 
The visualization of the knowledge claims 
reduces confusion. 
Mapping is time consuming. 
The map allows new scenarios to be 
identified. 
Mapping can be confusing, especially at the 
beginning. 
Mapping helps with problem visualization. Mapping represents a new way of working 
that is contrary to the established norm. 
The mapping of the consequences of 
decision alternatives allows creative 
solutions to emerge. 
 
Mapping allows one’s opinions to be 
posted for discussion. 
 
Mapping makes communication easier as 
the group’s focus is on the map. 
 
Mapping forces people to work together.  
Mapping allows own opinions to be 
‘pushed’ gently. 
 
Mapping reduces the need to aggressively 
defend one’s own opinion as the 
knowledge claim has been posted. 
 
Mapping is a non-judgmental as the focus 
is on the map, not the individual. 
 
Mapping allows with the arriving to and 
agreeing with the conclusion. 
 
 
 The advantages and the disadvantages of mapping are in line with 
previous research on the characteristics of effective mapping by Eden and 
Ackermann (2010).  However, although mapping is messy and all informant 
groups had trouble deciding on the mapping mechanics from the outset and 
some groups had difficulty to get started with the mapping, once the mapping got 
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underway the groups seemed to master the mapping logic quickly through trial 
and error.  Additional advantages of mapping by the informant groups in my 
research indicate that mapping increases cognitive conflict, but it does not spill 
into affective conflict.  Moreover, apart from one informant group, all groups that 
were able to come to a decision rejected the deal.  As the teaching case “John 
Hamond at First National Bank” was written as an escalation of commitment bias 
case with a ‘correct’ answer to reject the deal, the evidence offers some support 
that causal mapping eliminates managerial biases including groupthink. 
 Finally, as the coding analysis and informant reflections indicate causal 
maps are epistemic objects and that the activity that informants undertake in 
map enactment results in a high degree of cognitive conflict, but it does not spill 
into affective conflict as the maps act as a ‘shock absorber’ and a ‘safety net.’  The 
map enactment results in a high level of decision acceptance of the final decision 
outcome as all informants individually and collectively have a stake in the map 
construction.  This is a result of the informants’ own knowledge claims having 
been made visible on the map and having received due collective consideration 
during the map enactment process and the effort that was expended on the map 
enactment by informants individually and collectively may produce further 
commitment to the decision outcome.   
 The next section takes a closer look at the across-case similarities and 
differences to gain a yet deeper understanding to the mapping.  This analysis is 
required for the final theoretical development of the research. 
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5.4.3 ACROSS-CASE ANALYSIS  
 This section presents a detailed analysis of the codes across the cases.  
Data is presented in the Table 10 below.  In order to facilitate across-case 
analysis, the cases are presented in a sub-groups based on the frequency of 
activity occurrence as outlined in Table 7 eralier.  Data manipulation on a sub-
group basis is undertaken to gain a deeper understanding of the key themes that 
allow maps to emerge as an effective decision making tool-in-use.  Informant 
centric codes are collated into aggregate dimensions in Table 10 that allows 
proposition development for future research. 
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Table 10 – Across-case analysis 
 
Data specific codes  Description Blackhawks Rangers Wolverines  Ducks Bruins  Oilers 
 
Flyers 
Idea generating. 
- Sitting. 
- Standing. 
Ideas are generated 
individually to start with 
while sitting at the table. 
 
New ideas are added onto the 
map as the map construction 
progresses.  At this stage all 
informants are standing at 
the board. 
The group did 
not add new 
notes during the 
map construction 
but decided to 
create another 
map on a 
separate sheet of 
paper that 
replaced the 
original map. 
New notes 
were added 
throughout the 
mapping 
process. 
New notes 
were added 
throughout the 
mapping 
process. 
 New notes 
were added 
throughout the 
mapping 
process. 
 
Additional 
notes were 
written on the 
board by hand. 
No new notes 
were added 
onto the board 
but some notes 
were written 
on the board 
by hand. 
 Limited idea 
generation and 
limited mapping.  
The group 
remained sitting 
most of the time. 
 
No new notes 
were added 
during the map 
construction. 
Limited idea 
generation and 
limited mapping.  
The group 
remained sitting 
most of the time 
until the group 
decided to split 
into pairs and 
undertake a 
devil’s advocate 
approach. 
 
One of the sub-
groups stood at 
the board and 
added notes 
during the 
mapping process. 
Problem defining. Initial problem defining takes 
place at the beginning of the 
mapping process.   
 
Problem definition is 
revisited at the deciding stage 
at the end of the mapping 
process. 
Limited initial 
problem 
definition beyond 
pros and cons of 
the binary 
decision. 
 
The problem was 
redefined 
especially after 
the second map 
as constructed 
replacing the 
initial map on the 
board. 
 
Explored ways of 
making the deal 
work. 
Limited initial 
problem 
definition. 
 
The problem 
definition was 
defined and 
redefined 
throughout the 
mapping 
process. 
 
Explored ways 
of making the 
deal work. 
Limited initial 
problem 
definition. 
 
The problem 
definition was 
defined and 
redefined 
throughout the 
mapping 
process. 
 
Explored ways 
of making the 
deal work. 
 Limited initial 
problem 
definition. 
 
The problem 
definition was 
defined and 
redefined 
throughout the 
mapping 
process. 
 
Explored ways 
of making the 
deal work. 
 
 
Limited initial 
problem 
definition. 
 
The problem 
definition was 
defined and 
redefined 
throughout the 
mapping 
process. 
 
Explored ways 
of making the 
deal work. 
 
 Limited initial 
problem 
definition. 
 
Limited 
reference to the 
problem during 
the mapping 
process. 
 
Limited initial 
problem 
definition. 
 
Limited 
reference to the 
problem during 
the mapping 
process. 
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Data specific codes  Description Blackhawks Rangers Wolverines  Ducks Bruins  Oilers 
 
Flyers 
Hesitating. Hesitation to get started with 
the mapping. 
 
Hesitating to stand up from 
the table and start posting 
notes on the board. 
Hesitant start to 
mapping. 
 
 
No hesitation 
to get started 
with mapping. 
Limited 
hesitation to 
get started 
with mapping. 
 Limited 
hesitation to 
get started 
with mapping. 
Limited 
hesitation to 
get started 
with mapping 
apart from one 
informant. 
 Hesitant start to 
mapping. 
 
Hesitant start to 
mapping. 
 
Facing each other. Predominately addressing 
each other face to face.   
 
This activity becomes less 
frequent as the mapping 
progresses. 
Focus on the map 
construction 
became more 
pronounced 
when the new 
map was 
constructed on a 
separate piece of 
paper. 
Limited face to 
face discussion 
beyond the 
initial stages of 
the mapping 
process. 
Limited face to 
face discussion 
beyond the 
initial stages of 
the mapping 
process. 
 Some face-to-
face discussion 
throughout the 
mapping 
process. 
Limited face to 
face discussion 
beyond the 
initial stages of 
the mapping 
process. 
 Mainly a face-to-
face discussion 
sitting at the 
table. 
Mainly a face-to-
face discussion 
sitting at the 
table. 
Constructing. Constructing the map 
together, adding new notes as 
new ideas emerge, moving 
notes to new locations, 
drawing connectors between 
notes and using laddering to 
think about consequences. 
Effectively 
constructed 
three maps: 
initial map on 
board and a map 
on the piece of 
paper that was 
transferred onto 
the board and 
added to. 
Intense map 
construction 
activity. 
Intense map 
construction 
activity. 
 Mapping was 
mainly taken 
by one 
individual but 
in consultation 
with other 
informants. 
Intense map 
construction 
activity. 
 Limited map 
construction.   
Limited map 
construction 
especially by one 
pair.  The other 
pair did engage 
with map 
construction. 
Facing the map. The group is engaged with 
the map, facing it.   
 
Individual informants point 
to the map and do not 
address each other face to 
face. 
 
This behavior becomes 
pronounced when the groups 
are fully engaged with the 
mapping. 
This was 
pronounced as 
three maps were 
constructed. 
Very 
pronounced. 
Very 
pronounced. 
 Very 
pronounced at 
times, but as 
two 
informants sat 
at the table 
they group did 
turn to face 
them at times. 
Very 
pronounced. 
 Limited. Limited. 
Engaging. There is simultaneous 
discussion and construction 
of the map taking place.   
 
There is a noticeable increase 
in the volume of discussion. 
After a hesitant 
start three of the 
four informants 
became fully 
absorbed with 
map construction 
and debate. 
 
Very 
pronounced. 
Very 
pronounced. 
 Very 
pronounced. 
Very 
pronounced. 
 Limited. Limited. 
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Data specific codes  Description Blackhawks Rangers Wolverines  Ducks Bruins  Oilers 
 
Flyers 
A noticeable 
increase in 
volume. 
Non-engaging. An informant who either 
withdraws from a group or 
does not make a contribution 
to the group discussion or the 
mapping process. 
One informant 
was negatively 
disposed to the 
mapping exercise 
and did not fully 
engage with the 
mapping having 
decided 
independently 
what the solution 
should be. (To 
lend, contrary to 
the ‘right’ answer 
to the case. 
None. None.  Two 
informants 
remained 
seated 
throughout the 
mapping 
process. 
 
They had not 
previously 
participated in 
mapping. 
One informant 
was quiet and 
did not make 
much of a 
contribution 
probably due 
to language 
issues.  
However, she 
explained the 
map and the 
decision at the 
end. 
 None. None. 
Discussing. A free flowing discussion 
about how to go about 
constructing the map and the 
emerging issues.   
 
This is also an activity that 
incorporates disagreements, 
consultation, and further 
problem definition.   
Initially no 
discussion how 
to map but this 
became an issue 
when the new 
map was 
constructed. 
 
Lively discussion 
among three 
informants. 
Some 
discussion 
how to 
undertake 
mapping. 
 
Intense 
discussion. 
Limited 
discussion 
how to 
undertake 
mapping. 
 
Intense 
discussion. 
 Limited 
discussion 
how to 
undertake 
mapping. 
 
 
Intense 
discussion. 
Limited 
discussion 
how to 
undertake 
mapping. 
 
Intense 
discussion. 
 Some discussion 
how to 
undertake 
mapping. 
 
 
Limited 
discussion. 
Some discussion 
how to 
undertake 
mapping. 
 
 
Limited 
discussion. 
Reflecting. Once the map begins to take 
shape informant groups fall 
silent and reflect on the map.   
 
After reflection groups begin 
discussing the map again and 
may add additional notes and 
generate new ideas. 
Construction-
reflection-
construction 
Construction-
reflection-
construction 
Construction-
reflection-
construction 
 Construction-
reflection-
construction 
Construction-
reflection-
construction 
 Limited 
reflection. 
Limited 
reflection. 
 Dominating. An individual informant 
dominates the discussion 
and/or takes over the 
mapping. 
No dominant 
informant. 
No dominant 
informant. 
No dominant 
informant. 
 Dominant 
informant who 
mainly held 
onto the 
marker pen. 
Dominant 
informant but 
consultative. 
 Dominant 
informant who 
had previous 
experience in 
mapping. 
 
Led the 
discussion but 
did not 
encourage the 
No dominant 
informant. 
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Data specific codes  Description Blackhawks Rangers Wolverines  Ducks Bruins  Oilers 
 
Flyers 
group to 
undertake 
mapping. 
Consulting. A dominant informant asks 
other informant group 
members for their views. 
Not relevant. Not relevant. Not relevant  Yes. Yes.  Yes. Not relevant. 
Contrasting. The informants compare and 
contrast the positive and 
negative factors that relate to 
the decision problem by 
pointing at them on the map. 
The binary 
decision, pros, 
and cons were 
discussed and 
pointed at on the 
map. 
The binary 
decision, pros, 
and cons were 
discussed and 
pointed at on 
the map. 
The binary 
decision, pros, 
and cons were 
discussed and 
pointed at on 
the map. 
 The binary 
decision, pros, 
and cons were 
discussed and 
pointed at on 
the map. 
The binary 
decision, pros, 
and cons were 
discussed and 
pointed at on 
the map. 
 
The group 
expanded the 
solution search 
beyond the 
binary 
decision. 
 Limited 
interaction with 
the map. 
Limited 
interaction with 
the map. 
Clarifying. As the map enactment is an 
iterative process the map is 
used to clarify the thinking of 
the group.  This is behavior is 
for informants to clarify the 
thinking of others by pointing 
at the map and making 
statements and asking 
questions. 
Clarifying of 
thinking was 
through the 
creation of 
multiple maps. 
This activity 
continued 
through the 
whole map 
enactment 
process. 
This activity 
continued 
through the 
whole map 
enactment 
process. 
 This activity 
continued 
through the 
whole map 
enactment 
process. 
This activity 
continued 
through the 
whole map 
enactment 
process. 
 Limited. Limited. 
Explaining. Explaining is a part of the 
construction process as 
informants explain and often 
point at their knowledge 
claims on the map and how 
they fit into the overall map 
construct. 
Explaining was 
accompanied by 
pointing to the 
notes on the map. 
Explaining was 
accompanied 
by pointing to 
the notes on 
the map. 
Explaining was 
accompanied 
by pointing to 
the notes on 
the map. 
 Explaining was 
accompanied 
by pointing to 
the notes on 
the map. 
Explaining was 
accompanied 
by pointing to 
the notes on 
the map. 
 Limited. Explaining was 
accompanied by 
pointing to the 
notes on the map 
for one sub-
group.  The other 
group’s map was 
not developed 
beyond a few 
notes and not 
referred to in 
explaining. 
Agreeing. Informants use the map to 
agree to the claims made on 
the map by pointing at the 
map and notes. 
Agreement was 
accompanied by 
pointing at notes 
on the map. 
Agreement was 
accompanied by 
pointing at notes 
on the map. 
Agreement 
was 
accompanied 
by pointing at 
notes on the 
map. 
 Agreement 
was 
accompanied 
by pointing at 
notes on the 
map. 
Agreement was 
accompanied by 
pointing at notes 
on the map. 
 Map was not 
used for this. 
Map was not 
used for this. 
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Data specific codes  Description Blackhawks Rangers Wolverines  Ducks Bruins  Oilers 
 
Flyers 
Disagreeing. Voicing objections to 
different views. 
Pronounced 
conflict between 
the two male 
informants that 
spilled into an 
affective conflict. 
 
Arguments were 
made by pointing 
at the map. 
Arguments 
were made by 
pointing at the 
map. 
Arguments 
were made by 
pointing at the 
map. 
 Arguments 
were made by 
pointing at the 
map. 
Arguments 
were made by 
pointing at the 
map. 
 Limited 
disagreement. 
Disagreement 
resulted from the 
group using 
devil’s advocacy 
approach.  This 
resulted in a 
disagreement 
that could not be 
reconciled in the 
end. 
Deciding. The informant groups cycle 
between agreeing, 
contrasting, clarifying, and 
justifying once the map has 
been finalized before 
reaching a final decision with 
the aid of the map.   
Limited review of 
the map in the 
end and a vote 
was suggested 
but not acted on. 
Yes. Yes.  Yes. Yes.  No. Could not make a 
decision. 
Finalizing the map. The map has been 
constructed and the 
informants are beginning to 
run out of ideas. 
 
Claims on the map are agreed 
upon, contrasted, clarified, 
and justified 
Limited evidence 
of final 
justification. 
Yes. Yes.  Yes. Yes.  No real evidence 
of this. 
No real evidence 
of this. 
Justifying. The map is used by 
informants to justify the 
decision by pointing at the 
map. 
 
This occurs at various stages 
of the mapping process but 
most clearly at the decision 
stage. 
Occurred during 
the map 
enactment but 
little evidence of 
this at the end of 
the mapping 
process. 
Decision 
justified by 
using the map 
as a reference. 
 
Individual 
informants 
articulated the 
decision 
individually 
using the map 
as a reference. 
Decision 
justified by 
using the map 
as a reference. 
 
Individual 
informants 
articulated the 
decision 
individually 
using the map 
as a reference. 
 Decision 
justified by 
using the map 
as a reference. 
 
Individual 
informants 
articulated the 
decision 
individually 
using the map 
as a reference. 
Decision 
justified by 
using the map 
as a reference. 
 
Individual 
informants 
articulated the 
decision 
individually 
using the map 
as a reference. 
 No reference 
made to the map 
in decision 
justification. 
No decision was 
made and no 
reference to the 
map was made. 
Voting. Group takes a vote on the 
decision outcome by the 
show of hands.  
Voting was 
suggested but 
not acted upon. 
No. No.  Voting took 
place after the 
decision had 
been made to 
check 
unanimity. 
No.  Voting was 
suggested but 
not acted upon. 
No. 
  The across-case analysis indicates that those groups e.g. Blackhawks, 
Rangers, and Wolverines that engaged fully in map enactment produced a more 
detailed map.  In addition, in these groups there was evidence of more cognitive 
conflict, limited face-to-face discussion, alternative decision outcomes being 
debated, and there seemed to be a higher level of informant buy-in to the final 
decision outcome with the exception of the male informant in Blackhawks that 
was discussed earlier.   
 The emergence of a dominant informant in the case of Ducks and Bruins 
seemed not to have a negative impact on the group dynamic.  This may have 
been a result of the individual informants having had the opportunity post their 
own knowledge claims on the board and having made an individual contribution 
to the emergence of the final map. 
 The groups with the least engagement with map enactment were Oilers 
and Flyers.  Oilers remained seated around the table for most of the time and 
there was limited group engagement with mapping. The group made a decision 
after 10 minutes of debate and then decided to create a map to ‘test’ their 
decision outcome.  One informant was allocated the task of posting notes on the 
board written down by the other informants. Another noticeable difference 
between Oilers and Flyers and the other informant groups was that the level of 
debate remained muted throughout.  The pre-emptive decision that was taken by 
Oilers perhaps also muted debate, as the mapping could have been perceived as 
an unnecessary activity by the group.  The informants in Oilers looked at the map 
on the board from time to time, but the map did not seem to become an integral 
part or the focus of the group’s attention.  Video data shows that the 10 minutes 
of discussion that preceded the decision was not animated or questioning of the 
 135 
alternative decision outcomes, nor were the pros and cons of alternative decision 
outcomes debated.   Exhibit 11 shows the map enactment by Oilers and 
contrasting this to maps of the active groups in previous Exhibits 4, 7 and 9 the 
Oilers’ map looks underdeveloped. 
Exhibit 11 – An underdeveloped map 
 
 
 
  
Flyers did not reach a decision as the group decided to divide itself into two sub-
groups and apply devil’s advocacy to the decision problem. Although one pair 
engaged with map enactment, the other pair remained seated at the table as is 
shown in Exhibit 12.   
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Exhibit 12 – Devil’s advocacy mapping 
 
 
 
  
 In the end Flyers could not agree on the decision and one of the 
informants reflected at the end of the mapping session that “there should have 
been an objective decision maker to make a decision based on our discussion.” 
Moreover, as both pairs in Flyers did not engage with the mapping together on 
the board, the level of discussion remained limited and muted throughout. 
 The across case analysis shows that in order for mapping to be used as an 
effective tool-in-use, decision-making groups have to engage in mapping 
collectively.  In addition, remaining seated at the table acts as a barrier for 
effective map enactment that stifles the expression of competing knowledge 
claims, debate, and ultimately decision-acceptance and ownership. 
5.5 THEORETICAL DEVELOPEMNT 
 The final stage of the analysis process is the development of aggregate 
dimensions from the 1st order informant centric codes and concepts and the 2nd 
order themes.  This is in line with the Gioia et al. (2013) and Mantere et al. 
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(2012) approach to derive the theoretical realm of the research. Figure 7 
outlines the emerging theoretical themes and dimensions. The resulting themes 
and aggregate dimensions in the Figure 6 below will be used as the basis for 
proposition development (Gioia et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 6 – Theoretical themes and dimensions 
1st order concepts      2nd order themes    Aggregate Dimensions 
 
       
   
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 The 1st order concepts that were derived from informant centric codes 
have been amalgamated into two groups.  One group comprises codes that are 
associated with the informants making and generating multiple knowledge 
claims and decision options.  The second group includes coded activities where 
informants directly interact with the causal map while enacting it, and where the 
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Problem defining 
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Consulting 
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Multiple knowledge 
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Safety net 
 
 
 
 
Cognitive conflict 
 
Groupthink 
 
Cognitive biases 
 
Innovative solutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Affective conflict 
 
 
Decision acceptance 
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causal map demonstrates the qualities of a shock absorber and a safety net.  The 
connectors between the two groups of 1st and 2nd order concepts and themes 
indicate that the causal map as a shock absorber and a safety net are linked with 
the emergence of multiple knowledge claims and decision options generated by 
informants in interaction among themselves as well as the causal map as an 
epistemic object.  
 Comparing and contrasting my research findings with the relevant 
literature on group decision-making suggests that causal maps as epistemic 
objects in the collective decision-making context are associated with key group-
decision making process issues of cognitive and affective conflict, groupthink, 
cognitive biases, decision acceptance, and innovative solution development.  
These issues are identified as aggregate dimensions in the above figure. 
 My research findings suggest that epistemic objects facilitate 
organizational actors to make sense of a problem situation, the map enactment 
enables decision-makers to surface multiple decision perspectives, elaborate and 
build on the emerging alternative knowledge claims, and create innovative, de-
biased and shared outcomes to strategic problems.  The map as a safety net 
allows informants to engage in robust debate and make competing knowledge 
claims visible. However, the causal map also acts as a shock absorber that 
moderates cognitive conflict and prevents it from becoming affective conflict 
between informants.  This moderating impact may also improve the level of 
decision acceptance by informants (Nutt, 2002; Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002; 
Eden and Ackermann, 2010).   
 Gioia et al. (2013) and Eisenhardt (1989) suggest that good inductive 
theory building research should generate testable propositions for future 
 139 
research.  In order to achieve this I constructed a conceptual framework that 
presents the aggregate dimensions that were derived from the 1st order 
concepts and 2nd order themes.  The theoretical construct in Figure 7 below is 
structured as five testable propositions that were revealed from my empirical 
research.   
 
Figure 7 - Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Five testable propositions are depicted in the above figure as follows: 
 P1 - The construction of an epistemic object as safety net in a collective 
 decision-making context creates cognitive conflict that allows multiple 
 perspectives to be surfaced and debated.  
 P2 - The construction of an epistemic object in a collective decision-
 making context results in innovative problem solutions. 
Epistemic 
object 
(causal map) 
 
Decision 
acceptance 
 
Cognitive 
conflict 
 
Cognitive bias 
(groupthink) 
 
Affective 
conflict 
Innovative 
problem 
solutions 
P2 
(+) 
P1 
(+) 
P3 
(-) 
 
(+/-) 
P5 
(-) 
 (+) 
 
(-) 
P4 
(-) 
 
(-) 
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 P3 - The construction of an epistemic object as shock absorber in a 
 collective decision-making context mitigates affective conflict. 
 P4 - The construction of an epistemic object in a collective decision-
 making context mitigates cognitive biases including groupthink. 
 P5 - The construction of an epistemic object in a collective decision-
 making context increases decision acceptance by the decision-making 
 group members. 
 The conceptual map proposes that epistemic objects as a safety net 
increases cognitive conflict (P1) as multiple perspectives are surfaced and 
debated by informants.  The enactment of epistemic objects such as causal maps 
may produce innovative problem solutions and insights (P2) as informants 
surface multiple perspectives and ladder the consequences of the various 
potential decision outcomes during the map enactment process. The conceptual 
map proposes that epistemic objects act as a shock absorber that absorbs 
conflict and allows ideas to be freely debated thereby reducing affective conflict 
(P3). It is proposed that mapping mitigates cognitive biases including groupthink 
as multiple perspectives are surfaced by informants in a decision-making 
situation that is characterized by the presence of cognitive conflict (P4). As 
epistemic objects act as a safety net and a shock absorber and as individual 
informants’ knowledge claims are made visible for collective consideration 
during the map enactment process, it is proposed that epistemic objects such as 
causal maps increase decision acceptance by individual informants of the 
collectively made decision (P5).  
 To summarize, my inductive theory building research that was derived 
from multiple case studies provides us with new insight to how epistemic objects 
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are enacted, interpreted and used in a collective decision-making context. The 
case studies show how the decision-makers enacted, interpreted, and used 
causal maps to create new knowledge and meaning, and how this the shared 
meaning and knowledge evolved through map enactment to the final decision. 
The conceptual framework that was derived from rich qualitative data gives us a 
framework for future research to deepen our understanding of this dynamic 
interaction between the individual decision-makers, the decision-maker group, 
epistemic objects that mediate decision-making activity, and the impact this 
interaction may have on the quality of collective decision-making processes.   My 
research contributions and future research directions are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
 My research was motivated by a call for practice-based research on how 
managers think, act, and interpret strategic decisions in practice (Nutt and 
Wilson, 2010), and advance our understanding of the ‘stuff’ of all kinds that 
strategy work entails (Whittington, 2007), a key concern of the strategy-as-
practice perspective (Vaara and Whittington, 2012).  Much of the practice-based 
research has emphasized the discursive nature of practice and neglected the role 
of epistemic objects as material artifacts in strategy making (Vaara and 
Whittington, 2012; Jarzabowski and Spee, 2009).  Therefore, there is a “dearth of 
research into material artifacts and how they are engaged in strategizing” 
(Jarzabkowski, Spee, and Smets, 2012, p. 2).  Consequently, the way epistemic 
objects interact with human activity in strategy making remains a relatively 
unexplored area (Jarzabowski and Kaplan, 2014; Werle and Seidl, 2015).   
 To address this research gap the primary research question was 
formulated as follows: 
How do decision-making groups enact, interpret, and use epistemic objects 
such as causal maps to make sense and generate solutions to strategic decision 
problems? 
A further set of questions emerged from the initial data analysis of the 
seven video recorded cases of the collective map enactment process.  The sub-
questions were articulated as follows: 
 How and when do the maps become epistemic objects?   
 What is the relationship between cognitive conflict, affective conflict, and 
the causal map? 
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 What is the relationship between the enactment of the causal map and 
decision acceptance by individual informants? 
 In order to discharge these questions I adopted a sociological eye to 
strategy work that enabled me to focus on the rich interactions within which the 
actors and strategy tools were engaged in strategizing (Whittington, 2007). The 
sociological eye encourages the researcher to pay close attention to strategy 
tools in the context they are used and make an attempt to understand the 
purposes for which they are applied, and their potential to produce an variety of 
outcomes, some of which may be unanticipated (Jarzabowski and Kaplan, 2015).  
Seeing strategy tools through the sociological lens and treating them as 
sociomaterial tools-in-use (Orlikowski, 2000; Orlikowski and Barley, 2001) shifts 
the discussion about strategy tools away from their characteristics as good or 
bad technologies to produce intended outcomes as ‘technologies of rationality’ 
(March, 2006) or tools of ‘procedural rationality’ (Simon, 1978) to a discussion 
that aims to gain a deeper understanding of how tools are used in strategy work 
in environments that are characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity.  Stated 
differently, practice-based research from a sociological perspective is directed at 
understanding epistemic objects as tools-in-use that are fluid artifacts that, 
through their selection and application by particular actors in particular contexts, 
may produce a variety of outcomes for different stakeholders, including the 
degree of exploration provoked, resolution achieved, satisfaction with the 
process, discretion or competence of the actor, and routinization of the tool-in-
use in organization’s practice (Jarzabowski and Kaplan, 2015). 
 My research makes a theoretical contribution to knowledge by developing 
a conceptual framework how causal maps, as situated epistemic objects are 
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enacted, interpreted, and used as a sociomaterial decision-making ‘tool-in-use’ 
by actors in a collective strategic decision-making context.  The study of 
epistemic objects as material artifacts in collective strategic decision-making 
offers a particularly interesting research context as strategic decision problems 
are characterized by complexity, ambiguity, decision-outcome uncertainty, and 
the importance of strategic decisions often requires a buy-in and agreement by a 
number of agents from various parts and across the organization (Hambrick, 
1994).  
 Epistemic objects as situated material artifacts enable decision-makers 
make sense of complex decision problems and develop potential solutions to 
them.  In addition, epistemic objects promote collaboration that motivates 
participants to work across organizational boundaries (Nicolini, Mengis, and 
Swan, 2012).  To make sense and develop solutions to strategic problems, 
material artifacts are considered to have affordances that enable actors to 
engage in collaborative activity to negotiate meaning by creating platforms for 
discussion (Kaplan, 2011), engage in collective construction of new shared 
meaning (Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012), and appraise potential solutions to 
problems (Jarzabowski, Spee and Smets, 2013).   My research builds on this 
literature by offering added insight how the enactment of causal maps without 
expert facilitation enables decision-makers to make sense of complex problems 
and seek innovative problem solutions. My research also shows that map 
enactment increases cognitive conflict in decision-making teams.  Causal maps 
become a ‘safety net’ for actors that motivate decision-makers to engage in 
robust debate and consider multiple decision outcomes.  In addition, my 
research reveals how causal maps act as a ‘shock absorber’ thereby preventing 
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the emergence of affective conflict, and how the collective map enactment 
increases decision acceptance among the decision-makers by facilitating them to 
make their individual knowledge claims visible to other members of the 
decision-making group.  Finally, my research results indicate that the enactment 
of causal maps may eliminate managerial biases such as groupthink and the 
escalation of commitment bias.  
 The affordances of causal maps may be constrained by their time 
consuming nature, messiness, and that they present a way of working that 
requires a basic competency by actors to be able to use mapping effectively as a 
decision-making tool.  Much of causal mapping literature in strategic episodes is 
situated in contexts where experts have been present to facilitate the map 
enactment process  (Bryson et al., 2004).  Ambrosini’s (2001) research to the 
surfacing of tacit sources of competitive advantage considered that causal 
mapping was a skillful activity.  In my research decision-making groups had to 
undertake the mapping task without expert facilitation.  Research showed that 
the decision-making groups who had prior experience in causal mapping were 
faster to get started with map enactment than the groups with no previous 
experience in mapping.  However, the two groups where none of the informants 
had prior mapping experience and who had only been taught the rudimentary 
basics of causal mapping at the beginning of the decision-making exercise were 
able to produce complex maps through trial and error.  These two groups were 
nevertheless able to use the maps to make sense of the decision-problem, ladder 
alternative solutions, and their maps motivated the informants to engage in 
robust debate about potential decision outcomes.  The map enactment by the 
groups that had no previous mapping experience and the way these groups used 
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the maps to make sense of the decision problem and develop solutions to it did 
not differ from the map enactment process of the groups with previous causal 
mapping experience.   
 All decision-making groups in my research framed the decision problem 
presented in the research instrument  “John Hamond in First National Bank” 
teaching case study as a binary decision: to approve or deny the loan to the new 
prospective client.  This binary decision-outcome represented narrow framing of 
the decision-problem.  In the literature, narrow problem framing has been 
associated with ‘poor’ decision-making processes.  Nutt’s (1993) study of 168 
managerial decisions found that of the teams he studied, only 29% considered 
more than one alternative.  In addition, in a study of teenagers’ decisions 
Fischhoff (2008) found that 65% of teenagers’ decisions had no explicit 
alternative beyond the ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ or only one alternative was considered that 
resulted in a narrowly framed decision-problem.  According to Nutt (1993) 
narrowly framed ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decisions failed 52% of the time over the long run, 
in contrast to only 32% of decisions where two or more alternatives were 
considered by decision-makers.  Extrapolating from Fischhoff and Nutt’s 
research findings, the informant groups in my decision-making task seemed to 
fall into the same narrow framing trap as the informants in Fischhoff and Nutt’s 
studies.   It should be noted, however, that the “John Hamond in National Bank” 
teaching case study had a ‘correct’ answer that was not to approve the loan.  All 
informant groups considered a number of ways how to get the loan approved, 
but they were constrained by the information that was presented in the teaching 
case study. The depth of debate of the two alternative decision outcomes and the 
laddering of the alternative decision outcome consequences indicated that the 
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informant groups engaged in innovative solution development to the decision 
problem.  
 My research findings indicate that the enactment of causal maps in 
collective decision-making context surfaced multiple perspectives and 
knowledge claims by the decision-making groups.  The process of the surfacing 
of multiple perspectives and knowledge claims is a collective sensemaking 
process (Weick, 1990) that mediates decision-makers’ activity (Miettinen and 
Virkkunen, 2005).  This collective sensemaking process also creates cognitive 
conflict as multiple perspectives and knowledge claims are discussed during the 
enactment of the epistemic object.  The enactment of the epistemic object 
engages the decision-makers to debate multiple perspectives and knowledge 
claims as the enactment process opens up the decision problem by encouraging 
divergence of opinions and views (Eden and Ackerman, 2010).  This divergence 
of opinions creates cognitive conflict when decision-group members debate 
different views about the decision problem (Mooney et al., 2007).  As the 
enactment of the epistemic object becomes the focus of decision-makers’ 
attention it creates a space for discussion that encourages actors to negotiate 
meaning through a discursive process that allows ideas to evolve (Kaplan, 2011).  
 My research shows that causal maps became epistemic objects once some 
knowledge claims were posted on the board.  As the epistemic object lacks the 
‘completeness of being’ it nurtures decision-makers’ need to come to know the 
object through a ‘structure of wantings’ (Knorr-Cetina, 2001).  This need to come 
to know the object creates further meaning in the decision-making group as the 
object’s construction leads into a generation of multiple perspectives and 
knowledge claims.  The enactment of the maps with notes that were posted on 
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the board motivated informants to engage in iterative sensemaking activity of 
the decision problem by adding new notes to the exiting ones on the board, 
moving notes that had been posted on the board around to new locations, and 
drawing connectors between the notes.  All groups enacted the map through a 
process of map construction and collective reflection that was followed by 
further map construction.  This iterative process of map construction and 
reflection continued until the informant groups had ran out of new ideas to post 
or move the existing notes around on the board. 
 In addition to gaining epistemic qualities the maps became a ‘safety net’ 
that encouraged informants to post their own knowledge claims on the board 
without feeling intimidated by having to express their knowledge claims verbally 
to others and it allowed individual informants to address their own concerns and 
issues that they considered important for the group to consider. Moreover, those 
informant groups that actively engaged with map enactment and focused on the 
emerging map rather than face-to-face discussion exhibited a higher degree of 
cognitive conflict that was evidenced by animated debate among the informants.  
This surfacing of diverse perspectives and knowledge claims resulted in the 
elaboration of ideas and the laddering of the consequences of the alternative 
decision outcomes. Literature shows that the surfacing of competing 
perspectives and knowledge claims is instrumental in generating new 
conceptions, innovative problem solutions, and the elimination of cognitive 
biases (Vaara, Palli, and Sorsa, 2010; Hodgkinson et al., 1999; Maule and 
Hodgkinson, 2002).   
 Cognitive conflict, although beneficial to the quality of decision-making 
processes, may trigger affective conflict that can be destructive to the functioning 
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of a decision-making group in terms of the group’s failure to achieve individual 
and collective decision acceptance.  This may also damage the group’s ability 
work together in the future (Amason, 1996; Mooney et al., 2007; Parayitam and 
Dooley, 2007, 2009).  Affective conflict arises if individual informants interpret 
differing opinions by one or more decision-making group members as a personal 
attack, or as a manifestation of a hidden agenda (Jehn, 1995).  My research 
findings show that the maps acted as a ‘safety net’ that mitigated the tendency of 
cognitive conflict to trigger affective conflict.  As the decision-makers began to 
work in collaboration with each other to solve the decision problem they became 
behaviorally integrated.  This behavioral integration motivated the informants to 
effectively air ideas without affective repercussions (Eisenhardt et al., 1997).  
Moreover, the maps become the target of frustration and anger (Eden and 
Ackerman, 2010), a type of a ‘shock absorber’ as the informants’ anger, 
frustration, and disagreement was directed at the map rather than each other.  
My research shows that the maps became a ‘shock absorber’ that enabled 
informants to engage in a robust debate over the competing knowledge claims 
put forward by the other informants in the decision-making group.  The evidence 
of the maps as a ‘shock absorber’ was demonstrated by informant behavior of 
facing the map rather than each other while debating or disagreeing what was 
posted on the board.  Additionally, informants addressed the board by pointing 
at the map rather the addressing each other during the episodes of intensive 
debate.  
  My research shows that the enactment of causal maps continued through 
the elaboration and consideration of diverse opinions and views held by the 
informants until all views and knowledge claims had been exhausted (Eden and 
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Ackermann, 2010).  It was at this stage when all knowledge claims were 
exhausted that the final decision was made.  Knorr-Cetina (1997) points out that 
epistemic objects become embedded with deep emotional holding power that 
generates intimate attachment which in turn creates social bonds that act as a 
drive and desire toward a shared objective.   As the enactment of the epistemic 
object is a form of modern sociality that includes learning, knowing, and 
collaboration (Knorr-Cetina 1997), and as such objects mediate human activity 
(Miettinen and Virkkunen, 2005), it can be theorized that the map enactment 
created decision acceptance by the decision-making group members. Eden and 
Ackermann (2010) note that that decision-group members are more likely to 
become more committed to the decision if they think that the process of reaching 
it was fair and just as evidenced by the sense that their own concerns, issues and 
claims had been addressed during the construction of the epistemic object.  As 
the informants became increasingly involved with map enactment the more 
committed to the decision outcome they became.   There is evidence in 
behavioral economics literature that the so-called ‘IKEA-effect’ (Norton et al., 
2011) may increase commitment to decisions that are derived from enacted 
objects.  The literature notes that we tend to attach more value and emotion to 
something we make ourselves (Franke, Schreier, Kaiser, 2009).  People take 
pride and ownership in something that they have constructed themselves 
however mundane the task or the accomplishment, such as putting together a 
pre-fabricated IKEA bookcase rather than buying a ready assembled case from a 
shop.  Hence, it can be theorized that the enactment of a map by the decision-
making group may increase decision acceptance as a result of the effort that was 
expended on its construction.   
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 There is weak evidence in the literature that the construction of epistemic 
objects may eliminate cognitive biases (Hodgkinson et al., 1999; Maule and 
Hodgkinson, 2002).  Their research provided preliminary but contested evidence 
(Wright and Goodwin, 2002) that the enactment of causal maps as epistemic 
objects eliminated ‘escalation of commitment bias.’  Moreover, Hodgkinson et al. 
(1999) and Maule and Hodgkinson (2002) experiments were administered to 
individual decision-makers alone and there is no evidence in the literature that 
group causal maps would have the same effect in eliminating cognitive biases, 
including groupthink and the ‘escalation of commitment bias’ in decision-making 
groups.  My research indicates that group causal mapping eliminated ‘escalation 
of commitment bias.’  The decision-problem that was administered to the 
informant groups in the research instrument  “John Hamond in First National 
Bank” teaching case study was framed as an ‘escalation of commitment bias’ with 
the ‘correct’ answer not to approve the loan to the new prospective client.  Five 
groups reached the ‘correct’ decision not to approve the loan.  One group could 
not reach a decision and one group proposed that a way was to be found that 
would allow the loan to be approved.  This latter group proposed a change to the 
decision parameters in the “John Hamond at First National Bank” teaching case 
study.  In addition, my research provides evidence that the cognitive conflict that 
was evident in the map enactment process eliminated groupthink.  Most groups 
worked without a dominant informant.  However, a dominant informant 
emerged in two groups but there was no suggestion in the data that the 
dominant informant shut down the debate prematurely, or that the presence of 
the dominant informant reduced the level of debate in these groups.  In addition, 
individual informants in the groups with the dominant informant justified the 
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agreed group decision in their own words as the final decision was reached and 
agreed. 
 Finally, my research makes a contribution visual organization studies.  A 
number of studies point to the potential of visual methods for practice based 
research (Bell and Davison 2013; Meyer et al. 2012).  Bechky (2008) notes that 
visual evidence of the use of artifacts is a rich source of data.  Although visual 
research methods are yet to be fully established in management research and 
journals, it is argued that visual analysis will become a crucial aspect of future 
research on strategizing (Jarzabowski and Kaplan, 2014).  Given the 
opportunities that visual research methods avail themselves to gain a deeper 
insight to strategy practice, the study of visual is a growing phenomenon in 
organization and management research (Warren, 2009).  Visual data such as 
pictures, graphs, film, web-pages, and architecture (Bell and Davidson, 2013) are 
“socially meaningful material objects that are created, employed, and 
manipulated in organizational context, making them a constitutive part of social 
practices” (Meyer et al., 2013, p. 505).  Such visual data are important for 
identifying different contextualized types of materiality (Collier and Collier, 
1996).  A small but a growing number of empirical practice-based studies 
derived from visual data include recent research to the production of strategic 
knowledge in workshops (Paroutis et al., 2015), materiality of strategizing 
(Werle and Seidl, 2015), emotion in strategy work (Liu and Maitlis, 2014), and 
material artifacts in the practices of doing strategy (Jarzabowski, Spee, and Smets, 
2013.)  The use of video-based research to observe and record how people 
interact with objects, artifacts, and tools may provide significant future 
opportunities for researchers. Video evidence may provide insights how human 
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activity unfolds through time and space, how the human body and motion affect 
social interaction, and how talk, text, pictures, drawings, gestures, facial 
expressions, and embodied maneuvers orchestrate the basic social functioning 
such as negotiating, team interactions, and communicating (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2014).  
 The managerial contribution of my research was to address the 
affordances of epistemic objects as a strategic decision-making tool-in-use.  
Jarzabowski and Kaplan (2015) state that there has been much debate about the 
usefulness of management education and management tools.  The main concern 
has been that managers do not use the tools taught at business programs, or if 
they do, they are not operated as they are ostensibly designed to do.  An analysis 
of causal mapping as a practical decision-making activity may provide us with a 
greater insight into how managers use epistemic objects in practice for 
structuring conversations, achieving shared understanding and closure to 
decision problems.  Such research may have implications on how strategy tools 
are taught in a classroom and it may provide guidance for the future 
development of strategy tools for effective strategizing. 
6.1 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 My research was based on seven case studies that raise issues regarding 
the generalizability of the findings.   Socially constructed structures and 
processes are idiosyncratic as they are fashioned and performed by individuals 
acting in unique contexts.  This and the limited number of seven cases pose a 
question whether such research can be generalized.  For purist interpretivist 
researchers the answer would be a resounding no.  However, Gioia et al. (2103) 
 154 
argue that if the research generates concepts and principles with obvious 
relevance to other domains where these concepts and principles are portable 
from one setting to another then it is feasible to generalize from research beyond 
theory.  
 Qualitative research and the coding of data are a series of interpretations 
and subject to a researcher bias.  Although this limitation was addressed by using 
a second coder for the data, the nature of qualitative research as a series of 
human interpretations will never eliminate researcher bias totally and other 
researchers may interpret the data differently. In addition, my views and 
thoughts may change over time with additional experience of similar situations 
being gained through future research.   
 Additional limitations of the research may include the following: (1) 
Convenience sampling that was based on voluntary participation in the decision-
making groups may not be representative of the population as a whole.  However, 
as a qualitative research undertaking the thesis makes no claim for the findings 
to be generalizable to the population in general although the principles of the 
research may be transferable to other settings.  (2) The mapping sessions were 
conducted in different study rooms rather than in controlled laboratory 
conditions.  The differences in the physical features and the layout of the rooms 
may have had an impact how the informants interacted with each other and the 
whiteboard on which the maps were constructed.  However, I feel that the 
research process was robust and it provided a reliable account of the map 
enactment process and the meaning that informants attributed to the mapping 
process.  (3) One could argue that the informants were not representative of 
managerial decision-makers in general as the informant groups encompassed 
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undergraduate and postgraduate students and only one group of managerial 
decision-makers. However, it should be recognized that human sensemaking is 
always influenced by social, cultural, and circumstancial conditions of the 
decision-makers.  (4) It is possible that that the use of a case study as the basis 
for the collective decision-making task did not reflect real-world strategic 
decision situations and the informants approached the decision-task as a risk-
free exercise.  However, it can be theorized that the benefits of epistemic objects 
in collective decision-making could be even more pronounced in real-world 
decision-situations where risks to the decision-problem are real. 
My thesis opens up a number of opportunities for future research.  The 
research findings have looked at one particular type of strategy work: to 
understand how causal maps, as material artifacts, are enacted, interpreted, and 
used by actors in collective decision-making.  It is suggested that the research 
can provide a basis for future research of other material artifacts in decision-
making such a flip charts, graphs and how other visual artifacts are enacted, 
interpreted, and used in collective decision-making.  In addition my research did 
not take account of national, cultural, and social influences.  A possible extension 
of my research is to administer the decision-making teaching case in different 
national and cultural contexts using the same research design. 
Furthermore, Jarzabowski and Kaplan (2015) suggest that managers may 
create new tools for their own purposes that may or may not be based on the 
standard portfolio of management tools taught on management programs.  
Another research undertaking could be to understand what types of decision-
making artifacts are developed by managers and why, as so many different 
frameworks and techniques are already available.   
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Much of the work on causal maps has a senior management bias 
(Ambrosini, 2001; Ambrosini and Bowman, 2002, 2008; Eden and Ackermann, 
2010). However, scholars have pointed out that middle managers have an 
important role in strategizing (Balogun and Johnson, 2004).  It would seem 
natural that different actors may use epistemic objects differently based on their 
level of experience and the types of strategic decisions they face (Jarzabkowski 
and Kaplan, 2015).  A possible extension of the research could be to assess how 
different organizational actors at different organizational levels use causal maps 
in different decision-making situations. 
In order to conduct practice-based research on strategy work, methods 
used should be able to capture the rich qualitative data on how strategy work is 
socially organized.  Research should be able to capture conversations, gestures 
and bodily conduct, organizational practices of decision-making, problem solving, 
knowledge sharing, and collaboration in order for strategy work to become an 
observable activity (Alby and Zucchermaglio, 2006).  Current work is 
predominately dominated by observational field studies (Kaplan and Orlikowski, 
2013).  Although this approach will remain the main source of data it is limited 
by the difficulty in keeping track of organizational actors’ interactions requiring 
the researcher to be present at the right place at the right time (Bechky, 2008). 
One possible research method is the application of controlled experiments to 
understand at a micro-level how epistemic objects shape group interactions.  
Hodgkinson et al. (1999) observed that a major methodological challenge in 
researching the use of epistemic objects such as causal maps is the need to 
develop procedures that are suitable for the mass assessment of organizational 
actors’ mental representations and interactions in dealing with strategic issues 
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and problems.  To address this challenge these researchers have proposed a 
partial solution through a greater use of experimental techniques using case 
studies in controlled experiments. 
  Finally, the conceptual framework presented this paper should be 
subjected to testing and it provides a basis for future research to examine the 
implications of epistemic objects in strategic decision-making and as a tool-in-
use in strategy work.    
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APPENDIX I – CAUSAL MAPPING PROTOCOL 
 
Mapping logic 
 
 The direction of an arrow should indicate the direction of causality and 
influence: e.g. means to ends, options/actions to outcomes. 
 One person’s means can be another person’s ends: 
- For example: A  B might be what one person thinks, while 
another person may think B  A is correct. 
- For example: ‘turning things around’ means we have to win every 
battle in the next 5 years’ may be coded with ‘winning every battle’ 
as the desired outcome from ‘turning things around’, or alternatively 
‘winning every battle’ is required in order to ‘turn things around’, 
depending on the participant’s perception. 
- Bear in mind that some ‘objective’ truths might be subject to 
debate. 
- For example: ‘putting more policemen on the beat will reduce crime’ 
may be an objective truth to one person; nevertheless, another 
person might argue the objective truth is that more crime leads to 
more policemen on the beat. 
- Sometimes A  B can be treated as so consensual that it need not 
be debated e.g. ‘obvious’ arithmetic relationships. 
- For example: more sales causes more sales revenue 
 Means to ends are most difficult to judge when considering a hierarchy of 
criteria – that is, values and goals: 
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- For example: is ‘be unhappy and upset much of the time’ more 
disastrous than ‘crawl into my shell and give up’?  That is, does ‘be 
unhappy’ lead to ‘into shell’ or vice versa?  This can only be judged by 
the person being mapped, or at least this choice must be open to 
consideration. 
- It sometimes helps to work with the hierarchy of goals, such as 
‘objectives’ led to ‘goals’, which led to ‘ideals and values’.  So 
objectives are shorter term and more easily measurable; whereas 
goals are expressive of desirable longer term outcomes; whereas 
ideals and values are unlikely ever to be attained but guide 
purposeful behavior. 
- Avoid mapping time sequences, which are not causal relationships 
(as this will produce flow diagrams or process maps that are not 
amenable to same sort of analyses or meaning as causal maps. 
 
Mapping technique 
 
 Ensure that the map does not contain duplication of links. 
- For example: where the map shows A  B  C  D along with A 
 C and C  D and A  D, ensure that the latter three links show 
different causal chains through additional material. 
 Avoid double headed arrows as these are implicit feedback loops 
suggesting either: 
- Muddled thinking that can be resolved by determining means and 
ends. 
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- A legitimate feedback loop consisting of additional statements that 
might provide more intervention options. 
Source: Adapted from Eden and Ackerman (2010) 
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APPENDIX II – CASE STUDY 
 
 
JOHN HAMOND AT FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
At 1:00 P.M. on Friday, March 31, 2006, John Hamond, Senior Business 
Development Manager at the First National Bank in Kitchener, Ontario, stared at 
the useless papers in his hand. A borrower had failed to produce a key document, 
causing the bank’s risk manager to refuse approval on a million-dollar real estate 
loan. The borrower’s contract-to-buy would expire in a few hours. 
Commercial Real-Estate Banking At First National Bank in Kitchener 
First National Bank (FNB), a Canadian bank with revenues of $12 billion
 
and 
offices around the world, offered a full range of services. One of its operating 
units, the Commercial Real Estate branch in Kitchener, Ontario, specialized in 
commercial real-estate loans. It wrote over $1 billion in new loans every year, 
primarily to local developers and private investors. 
A commercial real estate loan was normally transacted in two-stages, 
competitive bidding followed by closing. In the bidding stage, the buyer of the 
real estate solicited quotes from lending institutions (banks, insurance 
companies, or private investors). The lending institutions then “bid” by sending a 
letter of intent, which proffered a loan at a stated rate of interest. Finalization of 
the loan itself was contingent on completion of due diligence paperwork and 
approvals. The buyer chose an offer, signed the letter of intent, and, to secure the 
offer, paid 1⁄4% to 1⁄2% of the loan value to the lender as a non-refundable 
deposit. 
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In the closing stage, the legal documents and approvals necessary to finalize the 
loan agreement were completed. FNB’s due diligence required certified financial 
statements from the buyer, copies of leases from the seller, bonded property 
appraisals, and many other documents. These documents needed the approval of 
two FNB “gatekeepers”, the Vice President for Commercial Banking, who 
managed the bank’s loan portfolio, and FNB’s risk manager, who reported 
directly to corporate headquarters. 
To close on a piece of property, then, the buyer needed to assemble a 
complicated three-cornered deal between the seller, the buyer, and the lender. 
Successful closing of the deal required all three parties to cooperate in the 
preparation of numerous documents. The closing process typically required four 
to six weeks. The time available for closing was limited by an expiration date in 
the contract-to-buy between vendor and buyer – in effect, a deadline. 
John Hamond 
FNB’s commercial real estate loans were negotiated and executed by their 
Business Development Managers. The Business Development Managers met with 
prospective borrowers, selected an interest rate, secured preliminary approvals, 
prepared the letter of intent, and then shepherded the loan through the closing 
process. 
John Hamond, a former real estate broker with an MBA from the Ivey School, was 
the most experienced and highest-grossing Business Development Manager at 
FNB in Kitchener. He dealt only with loans over $1 million, and single- handedly 
wrote more than $100 million of new business each year. He attributed his 
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success to his strong relationships both inside and outside of FNB, and to his 
longstanding reputation as a reliable closer of loan transactions. 
The Kitchener Group Loan 
In December 2005, Hamond began working on a loan for the Kitchener Group, a 
privately held local company that was new to commercial real estate. The loan 
was relatively “small”, at $1 million, but highly attractive because Kitchener 
planned to borrow only 30% of the property’s appraised value of $3 million. This 
unusually low ratio of loan-to-value suggested the possibility of much future 
business from Kitchener. In addition, FNB was bidding against a former co- 
worker, which made Hamond’s supervisor, the Vice President of Commercial 
Banking, especially eager to win the Kitchener business. 
In December 2005, Kitchener made a successful offer on a property and entered 
a contract-to-buy with the seller. In January 2006, Kitchener invited lenders to 
bid on the loan, and several did so - aggressively. In February 2006, Kitchener 
asked FNB to reduce its already low bid, and John Hamond, somewhat 
reluctantly, did so. On March 6, Kitchener signed a letter of intent with FNB. 
Kitchener then asked FNB to expedite the closing process, as their contract to 
buy expired on March 31, leaving less than half the usual time for closing. John 
Hamond agreed to work closely with the Kitchener Group’s attorney, Paul Talley, 
who, like the Kitchener Group, was new to commercial real estate transactions. 
Hamond expedited the FNB approvals as agreed and sent the draft loan 
agreement to Talley on March 14. Talley returned the draft loan agreement on 
March 21. Talley was finding it difficult to procure some of the due diligence 
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documents, and asked for leeway. Hamond agreed to be as flexible as possible. 
Missing Documents 
Talley submitted a set of due diligence documents on Thursday, March 30, one 
day before the expiration of the Kitchener Group’s contract-to-buy. But the set of 
documents was incomplete. There were no “tenant acknowledgements”, routine 
but essential documents, procured by the seller from his tenants, saying that the 
tenants do in fact have leases (and, equally importantly, do not have disputes 
with the seller). Hamond contacted the FNB risk manager, who said that the loan 
would be rejected if it lacked tenant acknowledgements. 
On the morning of Friday, March 31, Talley and Hamond manned the phones and 
scrambled madly to procure tenant acknowledgements. But the scramble 
produced only one faxed tenant acknowledgement, which would have been 
insufficient even if it had been legible. Talley wanted Hamond to seek approval of 
the loan nevertheless. He asked for FNB to release the money so that the closing 
could be consummated, and offered to give FNB a document “guaranteeing” that 
Kitchener would produce the tenant acknowledgements within 30 days. 
It was now 1:00 PM on Friday, March 31. The Kitchener Group’s contract-to-buy 
would expire at the end of business that day. John Hamond wondered what to do. 
The Case Centre: “Purchased for use by Mikko Arevuo on 19-Jan-2014. Order ref 
F220923.  You are permitted to view the material on-line and print a copy for your 
personal use until 19-Jan-2015. Please note that you are not permitted to reproduce 
or redistribute it for any other purpose.” 
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APPENDIX III – DECISION-MAKING PROTOCOL 
 
Read the following instructions carefully.  They describe the process that you 
should follow to reach a decision required in the case “John Hamond at First 
National Bank”: 
 
Your group should decide what John Hamond should do. 
 
The exercise is timed to last one hour.  You will have 15 minutes additional 
reading time. 
 
Key steps in the decision-making process: 
 Read the case independently first without discussing it with your group 
members. 
 Write down your initial reflections and ideas without discussing them 
with your group members. 
 Once you have written down your initial thoughts start discussing the 
case with your group members. 
 You have been given different color post-it notes, and color pens to 
undertake causal mapping on the whiteboard as instructed at the start of 
the workshop. 
 Undertake causal mapping as a group to outline decision options and 
their consequences using the laddering technique.  Continue with the 
mapping exercise until all options and their consequences have been 
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exhausted or once you reach the allocated time limit of one (1) hour 
allocated to the task. 
 Record the group’s final recommendations as well as the supporting 
assumptions, facts, and data on the “final recommendations form.”  
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FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS FORM - TO BE COLLECTED  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY FACTS/DATA 
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APPENDIX IV – CASE VINGNETS 
 
Case Study 1 – Blackhawks 
 
A group of four graduate students on MA Global Management course 
 As none of the informants had prior experience in using causal mapping 
as a decision-making tool, and the informants had never worked as a group 
before, initially the mapping process was hesitant.  The group spent a lot of time 
brainstorming ideas independently.  There was very little initial group 
organization of how to tackle the decision-making task except to agree that 
individual thought generations should focus on negatives and positives. 
  Two female informants seemed to look at each other and around to other 
informants as if to prompt them to get started with the mapping on the board.  
The other two informants who carried on with their own idea generation activity 
ignored these subtle glances and body movements.  As the task was timed the 
researcher was forced to prompt the group to commence the mapping on the 
board.  After the prompting there was a hesitancy to get started with the 
mapping on the board, as there seemed to be a degree of “embarrassment” for 
making the first move.  This was evidenced by some laughter and shifting on the 
seats until three informants decided to get up on the board at the same time. 
 Informants started posting notes on the board without consideration of 
the others’ placements of notes thereby making their own knowledge claims 
visible. However, the notes were placed vertically reflecting the positives and 
negatives of the decision problem.  This is probably the result of the initial group 
 170 
agreement of focusing on pros and cons of the decision to be made.  Once some 
notes were put on the board, the group spent a considerable time thinking and 
discussing how the map should look on the board.  
 The discussion mainly took place between three group members.  The 
fourth informant observed the board and listened to the discussion but remained 
standing behind the three informants.  When the three informants seemed to 
come to a halt with the mapping, the fourth informant who had until now 
remained relatively silent, distant, and aloof proposed that a binary decision is 
put on the board.  The fourth informant took the marker and wrote the binary 
decision on the board and moved some of the notes around but then passed the 
task on to the other three informants.   
 A binary decision “accept” and “reject” was written as headings on the 
board.  This seemed to create new energy among the other three group members 
and they began making sense of the problem on the board by moving notes 
around.  The notes were grouped under negatives and positives although the 
discussion was focused on the consequences of decisions.  The group seemed to 
be laddering in their discussion but as no connectors were drawn, the map 
seemed to become an obstacle for creating a structured debate. The group 
dynamic followed the pattern of map construction – reflection – map 
construction – reflection. 
 As the group was uncertain how to proceed and incorporate new 
thoughts it was decided that the map they had constructed was too messy and 
the group decided to construct another map on a piece of paper and then 
transfer this new map onto board, erasing the first map.   
 The new map construction on the sheet of paper became the focal point as 
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all group members turned their back at the map on the board and focused their 
attention to the map that was being drawn by one informant.  However, there 
was much more face to face discussion between the informants with the new 
map as it was on a piece of paper rather than a large whiteboard on the wall.  The 
discussion did not seem to flow as fluently compared to the activity undertaken 
at the board.   
 When the contents of the second map were transferred on the board 
having erased the first map, the decision was again defined as a binary problem, 
and the consequences of each alternative were considered.  The map became a 
“pros and cons” map.  The first map had prompted the group to consider 
widening the solution from the strict binary decision, but this was not translated 
onto the new map.  The second map, although more structured and clear, seemed 
to narrow to scope of the discussion and purely considered a decision to lend or 
not to lend but consider options for the bank to keep the deal alive. 
 It was at this stage when the decision was narrowed down a significant 
degree of conflict emerged between the two male group informants.  Although 
the two male informants did face each other, they tended to avoid eye contact by 
looking at the case study that they held in their hands while the two female 
informants seemed slightly embarrassed by the conflict.  The conflict of managed 
by one informant gesticulating at the map and emphasizing his view by pointing 
at notes on the map.  This seemed to reduce the degree of face-to-face 
confrontation as if the map had become a shock absorber.  The justification of a 
decision by one male informant was made by him pointing at the evidence on the 
map.  This seemed to convince the two female informants and the second male 
informant did not challenge the perspective put forward although he seemed 
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opposed the decision that was emerging from the other three informants.  He 
also withdrew from the discussion.  Sensing this, one female informant suggested 
voting, but in the end the group seemed to come to a unanimous decision.  The 
male informant who had not agreed to the decision went along with the majority 
view.  However, in the discussion after the exercise this informant stated that he 
did not agree with the decision although he had agreed with the rest of the group 
at the end of the exercise.  He had at the end of the mapping stated that the final 
decision “made sense." 
Decision outcome: 
 Not to lend. 
Reflections after mapping: 
 The fourth informant who did not agree with the decision stated that the 
mapping was a “waste of time,” as he could have made the decision by himself in 
minutes.   
 This view was contradicted by other informants who stated that the 
mapping was a useful tool: 
“it helps you to come up with a conclusion as you have everything in front of 
you”; 
“rather than writing everything down…. seeing it makes us less confused”; 
“makes us see more scenarios…. what would happen with this and what would 
happen with that.” 
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Case study 2 – Rangers 
 
A group of four final year undergraduate students on BA International Business 
course. 
 All informants had been previously taught the principles of causal 
mapping as a part of their strategic management module, and they all had had 
prior course-work experience in the use of causal maps as a decision-making 
tool.  However, the informants had never worked together as a group. 
 The group began the exercise by defining the problem as a binary 
problem.  Before engaging in idea development the group sat at the table and 
discussed how the mapping process would work and how different color notes 
could be used to express different ideas on the board.  In addition, the group 
discussed how laddering of the consequences of different options could be 
expressed on the board. 
 Having agreed the principles of the mapping process and defined the 
decision as a binary problem, one member wrote up two notes: to accept and to 
decline the deal.  These two notes were posted on the board establishing the 
decision as a binary problem. 
 Informants then began generating ideas individually and writing them 
down on notes.  One informant had identified a possible bias in the decision, put 
this note immediately onto the board, and connected it with the lending 
decision.  The same informant kept adding more notes on the board relating to 
the bias posting a “sunk cost fallacy” as a follow-on note.  This was done while 
the other informants worked on their notes at the table. 
 As one informant had immediately put his thoughts on the board there 
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was no hesitancy to get started with the map on the board.  Two female 
informants also came up to the board and started posting their ideas in no 
particular order.  Once the three informants had posted their initial notes on the 
board, there was some reflection of what was being posted and they returned 
back to the table to write further notes. The informants, who had posted notes on 
the board, turned to reflect on what was on the board and then wrote additional 
notes as an individual idea generating activity.  This implied that the notes that 
had been posted on the board generated further ideas.  This pattern of idea 
generation was also evident in later in the mapping process when the group as a 
whole engaged in map construction and reflection.  It can be observed the 
mapping process followed two cycles: construction – reflection – construction; 
construction – reflection – new idea generation on notes – construction. 
 Three informants kept posting their notes on the board, but there was 
litter discussion between these informants as they added their own thoughts on 
the board and as they returned to write additional thoughts on the notes at the 
table.  At this stage there was little reflection of what had been posted on the 
board. The fourth informant did not pay attention to what the other informants 
had been posting on the board and what connectors one informant had drawn 
between the notes.  This fourth informant was fully focused on his own idea 
generation on the notes as if not to be influenced by the other informants’ ideas.   
 When three informants happened to come to the map at the same time, a 
discussion started about the notes on the board.  The informant, who had drawn 
connectors between the notes, began explaining the meaning of the connectors 
and a discussion of the map started among the three informants.  The fourth 
informant was not drawn into the discussion but kept adding his own thoughts 
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on the notes sitting at the table. 
 After a brief discussion the three informants returned back to the table to 
write additional notes having discussed the emerging map on the board, and 
returned back to the board with new notes.  There was a high degree of activity 
as the informants moved between the board and the table.  It was at this stage 
when the fourth informant began passing his notes to another informant to start 
posting them on the board. He then joined the other group on the board and 
reflected on the map.  In the meanwhile the other informants began moving 
notes on the board and there was a degree of conflict when one informant moved 
a note from one place on the board and attempted to place in a different 
location.  The note was snatched back by another informant and returned back to 
its original place. 
 When all four informants were at the board and once the notes had been 
arranged into some kind of order, the informants reflected on the map to make 
sense of the problem.  After this initial reflection, more notes were added on the 
board and more connectors were drawn between the notes.  At this stage all 
informants were fully engaged and facing the board as the map was developed 
further.  The fourth informant stayed in the background looking at the map and 
made clarifying comments to how the map was shaping up and providing 
additional insights and ideas.  Although this informant stood in the background 
there was no indication that he was not fully engaged in the mapping process 
and the group. 
 The moment that ensued was one of iteration.  The group constructed the 
map, reflected on it, discussed it, clarified their thinking, and proceeded with 
further map construction activity either by adding new notes, or moving existing 
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notes around on the board. 
 Differing opinions were discussed and clarified by informants by pointing 
at the map.  There was little face-to-face discussion taking place, informants 
mainly faced the map when expressing opinions and especially differing opinions. 
 At one point one informant tried to remove one note from the board.  The 
informant who had posted this knowledge claim snatched it back with a strong 
“no” and placed it back it its original location.  It is interesting to observe that 
this not lead into a conflict or it was not perceived as conflict.  However, it was 
interesting to not how possessive the informant was of her idea and how 
important it is for the map to have all notes posted as this allows all knowledge 
claims to be visible. 
 Once the informants had constructed the map and began to run out of 
additional thoughts on the board, and once the map began to reflect the problem 
it causes, potential solutions, and their consequences, the informants engaged in 
debate and began moving towards a decision.  At this stage the fourth member 
who had stood in the background began leading the debate. However, it was 
clear that the other informants did not feel that they were being dominated by 
the fourth informant as all informants were actively contributing to the debate 
and the decision. The decision emerged by the members adding justifications for 
the decision by pointing to the map and drawing additional connectors between 
the notes. 
 It was not clear how the decision emerged except that all informants came 
to the same conclusion and each in turn indicated by using the map to justify the 
unanimous decision in their own words.  This seemed to result in a collectively 
agreed and shared ownership in the decision. 
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Decision outcome:  
 Unanimous decision was not to lend. 
Reflections after mapping: 
 The group’s reflection was interesting in the sense that rather than 
elaborating on the actual map construction process, the informants used the map 
to present the logic behind their decision.   
 All informants were fully engaged with this post mapping decision 
justification.  This showed shared ownership and pride with the fully justified 
decision they had made using the map as a decision-making tool. 
 
  
 178 
Case study 3 – Oilers 
 
A group of four graduate students on MA Marketing course 
  One informant had been taught the principles of causal mapping as a part 
of her strategic management module and she had had prior course-work 
experience in the use of causal maps as a decision-making tool. 
 The group was taught the principles of causal mapping before the 
mapping exercise but the group remained very hesitant throughout the mapping 
process.  The informant who had previous experience in causal mapping was the 
dominant participant in the exercise and led the process.   She also tried 
explaining the mapping to the other informants in her own words. 
 The group was very hesitant to move away from discussing the decision 
problem by staying seated at the table and engage with the mapping on the 
board.  It may well be that the table was close to the whiteboard and hence there 
was less room to move around.   
 There was no individual reflection at the start of the exercise and the 
ensuing discussion remained very stilted thought the exercise.   The informant 
who had previous experience with causal mapping seated herself at the head of 
the table and took possession and charge of the marker pens and post-it notes. 
 She led the discussion asking for other informants’ opinions and ideas and 
marked them down onto the notes.  There was no individual idea generation.  
 As the informants were seated at the table they faced each other and the 
conversation remained stilted throughout the mapping process, and there was a 
low degree of debate throughout.   
 The mapping really never got underway.  The informant who was leading 
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the discussion wrote down the ideas based on the discussion and then instructed 
another informant to put notes on the board.  There was no full engagement with 
the map on the board.  Only two informants engaged with the mapping on the 
board the one who had be instructed to post the notes on the board and the 
leading informant who got up and drew some connectors between the notes. The 
engagement was individual, as these two informants did not jointly engage with 
the mapping on the board.  The lack of mapping activity was demonstrated by 
the fact that only 12 notes were put on the board during the decision-making 
exercise. 
 When some of the notes were placed on the board, the informants’ 
attention did briefly shift from a face-to-face discussion to the map.   However, as 
the informants who had posted notes on the board sat back at the table the 
attention shifted immediately back to the face-to-face discussion.  The dominant 
informant referred to the map occasionally to make a point but that was not 
enough to maintain the other informants’ attention at the map. 
 It was interesting to observe that the group decided to take a vote on the 
decision outcome very early on after 10 minuets, even before any notes were 
posted on the board.   The vote was proposed by the leading informant.  The vote 
did not result in a show of hands but one informant proposed to reject the deal 
and the leading informant suggested that they constructed a map around that 
proposition.   It seems that the map became a post-facto justification of a decision 
that had already been made. 
 It should be noted that the video recording failed during the exercise.  My 
field notes supplemented this case, but they did not add any significant events 
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that were not present in the video data.  The final decision and reflections after 
mapping were recorded in my field note. 
Decision outcome: 
 The informant group decided very early on to reject the deal through a 
form of voting.  It was difficult to tell if the decision was unanimous in reality, as 
the decision did not emerge from the mapping process.  All informants, however, 
agreed that the decision not to lend had been unanimous.  
Reflections after mapping: 
 The informants found the mapping process confusing and they were 
uncertain what to do.   
 One informant observed that she had already made the decision and did 
not see what value the map could add to it. 
 The leading informant with previous causal mapping experience observed 
that mapping allows thinking to be visualized and options to be considered. 
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Case study 4 – Bruins 
 
A group of four full-time MBA students 
  All informants had been previously taught the principles of causal 
mapping as a part of their strategic management module.  All informants had 
prior course-work experience in the use of causal maps as a decision-making tool, 
and they had worked together before in other course-work assignments. 
 It was surprising to observe that the informants had to be prompted to 
start the mapping process as they had previously worked together as group and 
they all had had undertaken a causal mapping exercise. 
 Mapping began when two informants got up and started posting their 
thoughts on the board.  Notes did not seem to follow any particular order initially.  
The posting by the two informants was conducted without any consultation with 
each other.  However, when the third informant began posting her notes, 
discussion began about the placement of notes and what had been posted on 
board.  There was also some individual reflection of the notes on the board. One 
informant observed what the other two had posted previously.   
 The fourth informant of the group was disengaged at this stage and sat at 
the table writing down her own thoughts.  She then joined the group on the 
board and began posting her notes next to the map that was beginning to take 
shape and constructed by the other three. 
 The male informant emerged as the leader of the group by directing the 
conversation and holding onto the marker to draw connectors between the notes.  
The mapping process followed a pattern of construction – reflection -
construction and the dominant player allowed other informants to engage with 
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the map building process.  As the making progressed more thoughts emerged 
and these were posted on the board.  The mapping process at this stage became 
one of construction – reflection – new idea generation – construction. 
 The map was initially laid out as a binary problem but the laddering of the 
decision outcomes resulted in an innovative solution to ask for extension rather 
than closing the door rather than taking yes/no decision. 
 As the mapping progressed the whole group was deeply engaged with the 
mapping facing the board and the discussion was addressed to the board and 
points were made by pointing at the map.  There was evidence of significant 
laddering for various decision solutions that were considered by the group.  It 
did not appear that the dominant role assumed by male informant had a negative 
influence on the other informants. 
 Although the fourth informant was quiet and did not make much of a 
verbal contribution, she was fully engaged with the discussion by observing the 
mapping process.  This was evident later when the dominant informant asked for 
her opinion and she justified her thinking by pointing at the map and its 
component parts. 
 There seemed to very little conflict present during the mapping process 
and it did not emerge as the dominant informant moved to suggest a solution to 
the decision-making problem.  He seemed to pull other informants to his solution 
by consulting with them.  Other informants sought further clarification and the 
dominant informant, although holding onto the marker pen, drew on the map 
and made additional connectors between the notes on the board. 
 A unanimous agreement seemed to emerge and there seemed to be 
evidence of real ownership of the map and the subsequent decision by all 
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informants. 
Decision outcome: 
 Seek more time to give the prospective client a chance to come up with 
the missing documents.  
Reflections after mapping 
 It was interesting to observe how the group started their reflection by 
explaining the decision.  The dominant informant presented the solution with 
other informants making additional comments indicating ownership. 
 The informants found the mapping process messy.   
 Other comments included the following impressions and observations 
made by the informants (quotations): 
 allows different aspects to emerge; 
 new idea generation during mapping; 
 allows the problem to be visualized; 
 easier to communicate as one’s views blend to others; 
 communication is easier as the focus is not on you so that you don’t have 
the aggressively defend your own point; 
 write down your own opinions and don’t feel isolated with your opinions 
and they blend with the others; 
 push your own view in a polite way; 
 it’s non-judgmental. 
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Case study 5 – Ducks 
 
A group of six executive MBA students 
 All informants had been previously taught the principles of causal 
mapping as a part of their strategic management course.  Four of the six 
informants had prior course-work experience in the use of causal maps as a 
decision-making tool.  All informants had worked together in other course-work 
assignments. 
 One informant stood up to post her initial notes on the board, but the rest 
raiment at the table and proceed to discuss initial reflections and how to 
undertake the mapping on the board.  This discussion was mainly for the benefit 
of the two informants who had not undertaken a mapping exercise previously.  
There seemed to be limited writing of thoughts on notes independently. 
 Three informants who had participated in the initial causal mapping 
exercise all stood in from of the board while the two who had not undertaken the 
previous mapping exercise remained seated at the table.   
 One informant emerged early on as a dominant member.  She led the 
initial discussion at the table and once upon the board commenced drawing a 
binary solution to the decision problem on the board.  It is noteworthy that the 
map that emerged was a mix of notes on the board and handwritten notes. 
 As a dominant player, the informant was handed notes by the informant 
seated at the table and she began placing them on the board in an order that she 
created while also writing headings on the board.  One of the other three 
informants at the board attempted to place her notes on the board but the 
dominant player did not seem to notice this as she was consulting with the two 
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informants at the table.  The third standing informant was left in the background 
although he was following the map construction. 
 The fourth informant stood up and joined the other three informants on 
the board but she did not bring any notes for posting.  It was also at this stage 
when the group split in two.  The informants who had participated in the 
mapping exercise all stood at the board while the other two remained seated at 
the table where they remained for the duration of the mapping exercise.  They 
observed the map construction process and made some observations, but they 
did not engage in the physical map construction process. 
 The four informants standing at the board were fully focused on the map 
with their backs turned against the two informants sitting at the table.  Although 
the dominant informant did turn to face the informants at the table when they 
made comments, these comments were not noted on the board.  As the dominant 
informant held on to the marker pen the map seemed to be very much her 
construction.  It is noteworthy that she wrote “notes or headings” on the board 
that seemed to place a secondary importance on the posted notes. 
 The resulting map was a combination of hand written items on the board 
and posted notes.  The notes were not moved much during the mapping process, 
as the hand written notes seemed to replace them. 
 It was suggested that the clustering of the posted notes and hand written 
notes indicated a decision.  However, the group decided to take a vote at the end 
of the exercise and the decision was unanimous at the conclusion of the mapping 
exercise but in reality did not turn out to be the case. 
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Decision outcome 
 Not to lend. 
Reflections after mapping 
 During the reflection session it emerged that one informant wanted to 
make a positive lending decision but did not speak out.  This informant was one 
of the two informants sitting at the table throughout the mapping exercise.  
Unfortunately this was a late night session and the students were in a hurry to 
leave, and this revelation could not have been pursued further.   
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Case study 6 – Flyers 
 
A group of four final year undergraduate students on BA International Business 
and BA in Management course 
  Two informants had been previously taught the principles of causal 
mapping as a part of their strategic management module.  The other two 
informants had prior course-work experience working together but had not been 
taught the principles of causal mapping. 
 The group immediately defined the problem as a binary outcome 
decision.  The group then engaged in individual and group idea generation. 
Binary decision outcomes were put on the board.  Returning back to the table the 
dominant informant wrote down additional notes and post them on the board, 
drew a skeleton map and retuned back to the desk.  This pattern was repeated 
and the group made limited progress  
 The dominant informant suggested that the group should be split in 
pairs.  One pair would work on a positive the other a negative outcome and the 
pairs would then come together and apply ‘devil’s advocacy.’ 
 The pair with the dominant informant started working with the map on 
the board and the pair engaged in deep discussion facing the board and posting 
notes.  In contrast, the other pair remained seated at the table and one informant 
began writing note and posting them on the board and retuning back to the 
table.   
 To compare and contrast the activity of the two informant pairs, the one 
at the board was much more active in building a map as well as discussing and 
debating the problem. 
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The pairs worked on their respective outcomes and once they came together as a 
larger group they explained their respective positions.  This led into a deadlock 
situation.  There was a conflict of competing outcomes and the group could not 
agree which decision to take. 
 
Decision outcome 
 The group could not agree to a decision. 
Reflections after mapping 
 “At the beginning we tried to do it together and realized that this is not 
the way to go, let’s split up…. easier to work in pairs and compere your 
outcomes.”   
 “Can express more individually in pairs’” – commenting about working in 
pairs. 
 Had the group divided into to pairs and applied devil’s advocacy – “it 
would have been more time consuming…. and we would have talked 
about the same thing.” 
 “That’s why we would have needed to have one more person right 
there…to make a judgment call.” 
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Case study 7 – Wolverines 
 
An experienced decision-making group five senior clinicians and managers 
from Royal Free NHS Foundation Trust 
  All informants knew each other and they had experience in working 
together across the Trust hospitals with the exception of the senior operational 
manager.  Informants were taught the principles of causal mapping as a part of a 
workshop on effective decision-making.  None of the informants had had 
previous experience with causal mapping. 
 The informants started by generating ideas and reflecting on the problem 
individually, but they had to be promoted to start putting the notes they had 
written on the board.   
 After having been prompted to start constructing map on the board, one 
informant stood up and stated to the group what the problem was: “to release 
the money, or not.”  This was confirmed by another informant.  The group 
identified the problem as a binary decision and this was written on the board by 
one informant. 
 All informants stood up from the table and brought their notes to the 
board, having been prompted, and started posting their notes in no particular 
order. 
 Before notes were posted informants already pointed at the board while 
making initial claims and expressing their ideas.  This was combined with the 
discussion of where to post notes on the board.  The activity of posting notes 
resulted in the discussion of the details of the problem. 
 At the initial stages of the map construction, the group members 
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addressed each other face-to-face each while making gestures towards the board. 
 Points were made by informants while explaining what they were doing 
and posting notes on board at the same time.  Once more notes were added on 
the board the focus shifted from face-to-face discussion to facing the board.  The 
group moved into the pattern of construction – reflection – construction; as the 
mapping and discussion progressed the additional ideas were generated and the 
pattern of construction – reflection – new idea generation – construction 
emerged. 
 All informants seemed to be fully engaged with the discussion and the 
map construction.  One informant seemed to be the most active at the board but 
she did not dominate the discussion or the map construction.  She seemed to 
draw connectors and move notes as others were making claims. 
 
Decision outcome 
 Not to lend although the decision was not unanimous but the informant 
who opposed it initially seemed to buy into the decision. 
Reflections after mapping 
 Feedback from the group was positive.  The junior member of the group 
came to me after the exercise and said that NHS has a rigid structure where 
people express opinions in a rank order.  She viewed this exercise was a leveling 
device that allowed all participant to work on an equal footing and it allowed this 
informant to make a equal contribution to the debate. 
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